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Introduction 
 
 The United States leads the world by far in gun ownership and gun violence.  According 
to a 2007 estimate, 270 million Americans out of more than 316 million own private guns 
(Alpers and Wilson 2013; “United States” 2013).  The U.S. also has a private gun ownership rate 
of 88.8 per 100,000 people.  In 2011 there were more than 32,000 gun-related deaths, a gun 
death rate of 10.3 (Alpers and Wilson 2013).  The shocking disparity between the gun violence 
levels of the United States and other nations is a strong indicator of a serious problem.  The low 
levels of gun violence in other nations help emphasize that there is a clear relationship between 
the United States’ gun violence, large gun stockpiles, and weak gun regulations.   
 However, some argue that international comparisons are not sensible because the United 
States is unique.  While the United States Constitution includes a right to individual gun 
ownership, such a right does not exist in other countries.  As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the 
Second Amendment is not absolute and does not bar many types of strong gun control measures 
that exist in other nations.  But the Second Amendment does significantly hinder the 
policymaking process because it gives a powerful argument to those who oppose gun control.  
Buttressed by the Second Amendment, the power and influence of the American gun lobby on 
politics and the public are unparalleled.   
 Despite the unique conditions in the United States, international comparisons are still 
useful.  It is true that the U.S. cannot merely appropriate the gun control system of another nation 
in the hopes that it will automatically be successful.  The benefit of carrying out international 
comparisons is that other nations’ successful gun control systems and reform experiences can 
provide lessons.  These lessons can then be used by the U.S. to guide its own gun control reform, 
both in terms of specific policies and the passage process.   
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 Australia provides an especially useful guide for the United States to reform its federal 
gun control legislation.  There are a number of similarities between the two nations’ gun control 
histories, which makes Australia a particularly relevant model for reform.  Australia has had 
strong gun ownership, an influential gun lobby, and a state-level gun control system.  Australians 
have always valued guns for practical reasons in farming and hunting, as well as for recreation 
and sport.  Gun laws in Australia can only be made at the state level.  As a result, state laws 
varied in strength before the achievement of the 1996 National Firearms Agreement (NFA), 
which standardized gun control laws across the eight states and territories.  Gun control laws also 
vary widely across the U.S. because states and municipalities can make their own laws.  Prior to 
1996, Australian gun control was weak overall and reform was always hindered by the gun lobby 
and politicians sympathetic to their gun-owning constituencies.   
 Australia ultimately overcame a history of significant resistance to achieve 
comprehensive gun control reform.  The federal government created a national uniform gun 
control system that is not overly restrictive.  The system is moderate because it recognizes the 
importance of gun ownership in Australian society, but public safety is the overarching objective.  
Although comprehensive federal gun control reform has failed throughout modern American 
history due to the influence of gun owners’ interests, Australia’s similar experience demonstrates 
that successful reform is still possible.  Since the NFA was implemented, there have been no gun 
massacres with four or more deaths (Howard 2012; Chapman, Alpers et al. 2006, 365).  In 2010 
in Australia, there were only 236 gun-related deaths, a gun death rate of 1.06 (Alpers, Wilson 
and Rosetti 2013).  The passage of the 1996 National Firearms Agreement in Australia provides 
many valuable lessons for the United States to finally strengthen its federal gun control 
legislation to decrease gun violence.        
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 To assess the application of the Australian reform experience to the United States, one 
must consider the countries’ differences.  The Australian Constitution does not contain a legal 
right to private gun ownership.  As discussed above, a legal right empowers those who oppose 
gun control.  While Australia is only slightly smaller than the United States in land area, 
Australia is significantly smaller in population.  Australia has just over 22 million people 
(“Australia” 2013).  While there is almost one gun for every person in the United States, there 
are only an estimated 3.5 million guns in Australia (Alpers and Wilson 2013; Alpers, Wilson and 
Rosetti 2013; “United States” 2013).  The size, population, and number of guns in each country 
affect the feasibility of certain policies.  Australia has a parliamentary system and the U.S. has a 
presidential system.  The different political systems determine the ease of gun control lawmaking 
and the legislative process.  With these differences in mind, the U.S. can still draw important 
lessons from Australia’s achievement of the National Firearms Agreement.   
 Chapter 1 examines the history of Australian gun control leading up to the 1996 National 
Firearms Agreement.  Since Australia was established, handguns were strictly controlled, but 
long gun regulations were weak in many states.  There was no push for long gun control until a 
number of gun massacres happened in the 1970s and 1980s.  The public began to realize how the 
strength differentials among the states’ gun control systems endangered the public.  While some 
states passed new legislation, the changes were modest.  By the 1990s, governments and police 
ministers sought ways to reform Australian gun control and found that a national uniform system 
was necessary.  However, before 1996, the Australian jurisdictions could not come to an 
agreement over the policies to be included in a national uniform system.  
 Chapter 2 discusses the process of achieving the 1996 National Firearms Agreement 
(NFA) in Australia.  This chapter examines the reasons why the NFA was able to be passed at 
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that time, despite Australia’s past failed attempts to carry out strong reform.  The reform effort 
was inspired by the 1996 Port Arthur massacre, Australia’s most deadly gun massacre.  Newly 
elected Prime Minister Howard took an unwavering stance in his commitment to carry out 
comprehensive gun control reform, despite a lack of support from his political party.  With the 
overwhelming support of the public, Howard was ultimately able to convince unsupportive states 
to join the national agreement.  The chapter also shows how the NFA policies have successfully 
decreased gun violence in Australia since 1996. 
 Chapter 3 demonstrates how the United States has perpetually failed to achieve 
comprehensive federal gun control.  Ever since the first acts were passed in the 1920s, the U.S. 
has been unable to pass strong federal gun control legislation.  Although comprehensive 
measures have had reasonable public support over the years, there has not been enough political 
will to push the legislation through.  The gun lobby has been a very important contributing factor 
to the weakened legislation.  This chapter discusses the weaknesses in American federal gun 
control and how these weaknesses endanger public safety.  Presently American federal gun 
control cannot effectively regulate the differences in strength among state and local laws.  The 
chapter concludes by considering how a 2008 Supreme Court case provides hope for the future 
feasibility of passing stronger federal gun control legislation. 
 Chapter 4 draws conclusions by presenting the lessons that the achievement of the 
National Firearms Agreement provides for the United States.  Overall the Australian gun control 
reform experience can teach the U.S. a great deal about the importance of political leadership, 
public advocacy, and specific policies necessary to decrease gun deaths.  This chapter also 
analyzes how well these lessons are currently being carried out after the most recent December 
2012 mass shooting in Newtown, Connecticut.  The best policymaking approach to ultimately 
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achieve federal legislation is also considered.  Obtaining legislation at the state and local level 
first may be the best way to ultimately achieve federal legislation.  The gun control lobby will be 
an integral actor in developing support for stronger federal legislation and there is evidence 
indicating that the gun control lobby may be more politically influential in the future. 
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Chapter 1 
  
The History of Australian Gun Control: The Development of a Debate  
and the Failure to Achieve a National Gun Control Policy 
  
 Since its beginnings, Australia has valued gun ownership.  Guns were not only important 
because they were necessary for settlers to confront the country’s wild outback, but also shooting 
and hunting were new freedoms for the settlers.  Throughout its history, Australia has been in 
agreement that handguns should be strictly regulated due to the belief that they were susceptible 
to criminal use.  However, long guns were left uncontrolled because they were associated with 
hunting and shooting in rural areas.  Not until modern times did a gun control debate arise in 
Australia over long guns.  Increasingly frequent gun massacres suggested to the public that long 
guns could in fact be used in dangerous ways.  Since the states hold the power to make gun 
control laws, gun regulations varied greatly among the states.  The gun lobby had been 
influential in some states more than others, contributing to the existence of lax gun control laws 
in those states.   
 The occurrence of multiple massacres in the 1980s clearly illuminated to the public and 
governments the ways in which Australia’s gun control system endangered public safety.  At this 
time, scholars and gun control advocates agreed that laws needed to be strengthened and that the 
achievement of a national uniform gun control system was necessary.  In the 1990s, the federal 
government and some state governments sought to find answers to solve the weaknesses in the 
country’s gun control system.  The major recommendations resulting from committee meetings 
paralleled those that been advocated by gun control advocates in the 1980s: achieve a national 
uniform system and strengthen the individual gun control policies.   
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 Although the public, scholars, and some state governments were keen on strengthening 
gun control and obtaining a national agreement by the 1990s, the gun lobby continued to stand in 
the way.  Overall the public did not favorably view the gun lobby, especially due to its growing 
ties with the American National Rifle Association (NRA) in the 1990s.  However, the gun lobby 
held political power in a few states with strong rural gun ownership, which prevented the 
achievement of a national agreement.  These states prevented the achievement of a national 
agreement because they rejected an individual policy to be included within in it. 
 In this chapter I will discuss this evolution of Australian gun control and the 
accompanying debate.  The chapter will illuminate the weaknesses in Australia’s previous gun 
control system and the difficult struggle to strengthen gun control leading up to the achievement 
of a national uniform gun control system.  Gun massacres had always inspired a public response 
and moderate gun control changes, but dramatic changes, like a national uniform system, were 
always blocked by shooters’ interests.  My discussion will begin with the country’s settlement 
and end with the state of the gun control debate in the 1990s, just prior to the 1996 Port Arthur 
massacre and subsequent National Firearms Agreement.  
 
The Settlement of Australia: Affection for Guns is Born  
 
 The settlement of Australia to an extent involved the expansion of the frontier (Kopel 
1992, 194).  However, the states not lying on the eastern seaboard of the country1 were not 
settled by frontier expansion across the continent because settlers were stopped by the great 
interior deserts of the country (Kopel 1992, 193-4).  By the 1820s, the settlers, soldiers, officers 
and emancipated convicts built successful farms with the land given to them by the government.  
Upon hearing that there was cheap land and plentiful job opportunities, many British emigrants 
                                                 
1
 South Australia, Western Australia, and the Northern Territory 
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traveled to Australia (“Australia’s history”).  The 1820s was a decade characterized by a large 
amount of pastoral expansion in Australia, where settlers moved with their sheep and cattle 
hundreds of kilometers past the boundaries of settled districts (Clarke 2002, 41, 43).  Settlers 
expanded the country by moving deeper into Aboriginal territories, often accompanied by a gun, 
looking for pasture and water for their livestock (“Australia’s History”; Clarke 2002, 37).   
 The gun was an important instrument of both colonization and settlement in Australia.  
Guns were used in both an offensive and defensive manner against the Aborigines (Davison 
2000, 246).  Aborigines resisted Australian settlement by carrying out attacks on settlers, their 
stock, and their property (Nettelbeck 2010, 358).  The Australian mounted police responded to 
Aboriginal attacks, but it was largely ineffective due to the restrictions it faced (Nettelback 2010, 
358, 360).  The police were hampered by a lack of resources and the difficulty of keeping up 
with settlers’ frontier expansion.  Due to these difficulties, the settlers often had to defend 
themselves.  The police recommended to settlers to use their guns for protection, for example by 
arming their station hands (Nettelbeck 2010, 360).    
 Guns were also important for hunting, reducing stock, eliminating pests, and sport in 
early Australia (Davison 2000, 247).  Gun ownership and shooting were new freedoms for early 
Australians.  In England, hunting was only a right of the wealthy.  Upon coming to Australia, 
ordinary citizens could partake in hunting and shooting for the first time (Davison 200, 247).  
Although gun ownership was very important in early Australia, some form of gun control had 
existed almost nearly from the beginning of the country’s settlement.  Gun registration was first 
established in Australia in 1802, only fourteen years after the first penal colony was established 
there (Kopel 1992, 193).   
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Criminal Handguns and Legitimate Long Guns 
 
 The individual Australian jurisdictions have made their own gun control laws ever since 
the Australian Commonwealth was established.  The independent nation of Australia was 
established on January 1, 1901.  The six colonies became states under the Constitution and were 
given the power to govern (“Australia’s federation”).  There was no explicit mention in the 
Constitution of the authority to make gun laws when the division of power was determined 
between the states and the Commonwealth.  Therefore the power to regulate guns fell to the 
states (“Gun Politics”).  The Commonwealth has only been able to regulate firearms by using its 
overseas trade and commerce power to prohibit the importation of certain types of firearms 
(Norberry et al. 1996).  Since states have been able to make their own gun laws, different gun 
control systems arose in each state over time (“Gun Politics”; Harding 1981, 1).   
 The one area of agreement among all of the Australian jurisdictions’ gun control systems 
has been strict handgun regulations.  Between 1921 and 1932, all six of the Australian states and 
two territories passed firearms control laws2 (Harding 1981, 1-2).  Overall the laws during the 
1920s and early 1930s focused on regulating handguns (Harding 1981, 2).   Since pistols were 
concealable, the public believed that they had a greater likelihood to be used in the commission 
of crimes than other guns (“History of Firearms”).  For example, the goal of the New South 
Wales’ Pistol License Act of 1927 was to “regulate and license the use, carriage, possession, and 
sale of pistols” (“Pistol Licence Act” 1927, 131).  South Australia’s Pistol Licence Act of 1929 
also had the aim to “regulate and license the use, carriage and sale of pistols” (“Pistol Licence 
Act 1929, 1).  Tasmania enacted the Firearms Act of 1932, but the term “firearm” is never used 
                                                 
2
 Pistol License Act 1927 (New South Wales), Firearms Act 1921 (Victoria), Firearms Licence Act 1927 
(Queensland), Pistol Licence Act 1929 (South Australia), Firearms and Guns Act 1931 (Western Australia), 
Firearms Act 1932 (Tasmania), Firearms Registration Ordinance 1932 (Northern Territory), and Gun Licence 
Ordinance 1925 (Australian Capital Territory) 
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within the act itself.  All of the Act’s regulations specifically refer to pistols, suggesting that 
Tasmania believed the only type of firearm that needed control was pistols.  
 While there has always been consensus among the Australian jurisdictions that handguns 
should be regulated, no consensus on long gun regulations existed.  This disagreement stems 
from the belief that handguns were used for criminal purposes, while long guns were legitimately 
used in the countryside (Davison 2000, 251).  For example, a discussion of long arm restrictions 
in the New South Wales parliamentary debate over the 1927 Pistol License Bill is illustrative of 
the public perception of long arm usage.  A concern was raised that restrictions on long arms 
would prevent farmers from using them for practical purposes (“History of Firearms”).   
 Only Western Australia’s legislation regulated long guns, revealing the government’s 
belief that this type of firearm could also be dangerous (Harding 1981, 2).  Western Australia’s 
Firearms and Guns Act of 1931 is “an act relating to firearms, pistols, and guns,” which 
differentiates between all three.  The Act stated that the regulations within it also applied to 
pistols and air guns3, as well as firearms.  The Act established a strong licensing system where 
one had to be licensed to possess, manufacture or repair, deal in firearms, and to conduct a 
shooting gallery (“Firearms and Guns Act” 1931).  Over time, the strength of the jurisdictions’ 
long gun regulations have varied greatly because legislators have not shared the same beliefs 
about the objectives of long gun control (Harding 1981, 2). 
 Between the 1930s and the early 1970s, all of the Australian jurisdictions amended their 
gun laws or implemented new acts (Harding 1981, 2; Abrahams et al. 1999, 9)4.  During the 
                                                 
3
 Air guns were defined as “any rifle or gun, not being a firearm or pistol or toy gun which is capable of propelling a 
projectile of any kind by mechanical means or by means of compressed air” (“Firearms and Guns Act” 1931).   
4
 See the Firearms and Dangerous Weapons Act 1973 (New South Wales), Firearms Act 1958 and Firearms Act 
Amendment Act 1972 (Victoria), Firearms Act 1973 (Western Australia), Firearms Act 1977 (South Australia), 
Firearms Ordinance 1956 (Northern Territory), amended in 1959, 1960, 1961, and 1964, and Gun Licence 
Ordinance 1959 (Australian Capital Territory), Firearms Act 1932 (Tasmania), Firearms Licence Act 1927 
(Queensland) 
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1950s, Australia continued to grow in population and become more urbanized (Abrahams et al. 
1999, 9).  Again after WWII, veterans returned to Australia with ex-military firearms in hand 
(Davison 2000, 252).  Since Australia’s population of both people and guns was growing, the 
concern for gun misuse also grew.  This concern is evidenced by the small changes made to gun 
laws by all jurisdictions by the end of the 1950s.  While handgun regulations were fairly strong 
and uniform throughout Australia at this time, long gun regulations were still fairly weak.  
Western Australia continued to be the only state with legislation that exhibited a concern for 
rifles and shotguns (Abrahams et al. 1999, 9).  During the 1950s, Western Australia amended its 
Firearms Acts of 1931-1939 twice, in 1953 and 1956 (“Western Australian Numbered Acts”).  
Of the other states, Victoria made the greatest progress with the Firearms Act of 1958 that 
established a form of licensing that required a long gun owner to have a certificate for each 
specific gun in possession (Abrahams et al. 1999, 9; “Firearms Act 1958” 218-9).   
 
The Impact of Gun Massacres: The Development of the Australian Gun Control Debate  
 
 In the early 1970s, the Australian long gun control debate began to take shape and the 
disparities between jurisdictions’ gun control laws became more evident to the public.  For the 
first time, between 1971 and 1972, Australian citizens actively participated in a gun control 
debate.  The teenage daughters of two immigrant families were killed in Victoria by firearms in 
two different incidents in 1968 and 1970 (“Gun Politics”; “Our History”).  The killers were not 
criminals, but rather sporting shooters who had carelessly handled their rifles.  These incidents 
were significant because they revealed to the Australian public that private ownership of long 
guns, not just handguns, could be dangerous and lethal.  The parents of the deceased girls 
lobbied politicians to strengthen Victoria’s lax long gun regulations.  As a result, Liberal Party 
Premier Hamer introduced a Shooters License (“Guns and Politics”).  In 1972, Victoria’s 
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Firearms Act of 1958 was amended so that all gun owners must be licensed, not just pistol 
owners (“Firearms (Amendment) Act 1972” 255).  However, during the 1970s, a 
Liberal/National Coalition was in control of Victoria and the parties’ premiers were sympathetic 
to shooters’ interests (Crook 2000, 6).  After the 1972 Amendment, there was no further 
strengthening of the state’s gun control law during the decade (“Victorian Historical Acts”).   
 However, during the 1970s in Western Australia, the Liberal Party had also been in 
power, but it had increasingly strengthened the state’s gun control law throughout the decade 
(“Gun Politics”; “Western Australian Numbered Acts”).  The Firearms and Guns Acts of 1931-
1969 were amended in 1971 (“Western Australian Numbered Acts”).  In 1973 the Firearms Act 
was established repealing the Firearms and Guns Act 1931-1971.  The goal of the 1973 Act was 
to “…make provision for the control and regulation of firearms and ammunition, the licensing of 
persons possessing, using, dealing with, or manufacturing firearms and ammunition…” 
(“Firearms Act 1973”).  The Act further strengthened its licensing system in which a person was 
given a different type of license based on their use for the firearms, such as licenses to carry or 
not, for firearms dealers, repairers, manufacturers, or someone conducting a shooting gallery 
(“Firearms Act 1973”).  The 1973 Firearms Act was then subsequently amended in both 1976 
and 1978 (“Western Australian Numbered Acts”).   The 1976 Act made amendments in regards 
to interstate group permits for shooting clubs to engage in contests within the state (“Firearms 
Act Amendment Act 1976”).  The 1978 Act then raised the penalties for various firearm offenses 
(“Firearms Act Amendment Act 1978”).  The different level of attention given to strengthening 
gun control between Victoria and Western Australia is illustrative of the growing disparity 
between gun control strength among the country’s jurisdictions. 
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 In the early 1980s, the Australian gun lobby first entered the political arena to try to 
affect electoral outcomes.  For the first time, the gun lobby, in the form of the Shooting Sports 
Council of Victoria, blatantly tried to influence voters.  The Council wished to prevent a Labor 
Party takeover because Labor had stronger gun regulations on the agenda.  The Council raised 
$100,000, but its effort failed in preventing the takeover.  In 1982 the Labor Party took control of 
Victoria under Premier Cain.  Nevertheless, the Liberal/National Coalition was still able to 
influence gun lawmaking because it exercised control in the Legislative Council.  The 
Coalition’s control hindered the Labor government from reforming the state’s gun laws.   
 Stricter gun laws were imposed in 1983, but many of the proposed changes had failed in 
the Upper House (Cook 2000, 6).  Victoria’s Firearms Act was amended twice in 1983, 
modifying procedures involved with licensing and selling firearms.  For example, the first 
amendment strengthened licensing by requiring that before a pistol license is granted, the 
applicant first must obtain a permit to purchase a pistol (“Firearms (Amendment) Act 1983” 715).  
The second amendment, modifying the previous one, ensured that sellers made the registrar 
aware of transfers even if the purchasers were not required by the Act to have firearms already in 
their possession registered (“Firearms (Amendment) Act 1983” 717; “Firearms (Further 
Amendment) Act 1983” 1250).  Despite the gun lobby’s ability to block Victorian gun 
legislation, overall the years between 1981 and 1987 were troubling ones for shooters and the 
gun lobby.  Scholars, politicians, and regular citizens were beginning to challenge private gun 
ownership (Crook 2000, 7).   
 The facts of private gun ownership in Australia became known for the first time in 1981 
with the publishing of Richard Harding’s book, Firearms and Violence in Australian Life: An 
Examination of Gun Ownership and Use in Australia.  His book was a breakthrough piece 
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because it was the first comprehensive analysis of private gun ownership in Australia and its 
effects on society.  The book received attention from the media and Harding organized the first 
national conference to discuss firearms and control that year in Perth, Western Australia (Crook 
2000, 6).  Gun lobby leaders, as well as academics and criminologists, were present at the 
conference.  The arguments made by the academics both shocked and worried the shooters 
present at the conference about what the future could bring in terms of gun control changes 
(Crook 2000, 7).   
 In 1981 the Commonwealth government used its customs powers to exercise control over 
and bring more uniformity to the types of weapons allowed into Australia.  The Government 
established import restrictions on military-style firearms.  At this time, military-style firearms 
were permitted in some states, while prohibited in others.  John Moore, the Minister of Business 
and Custom Affairs, was mainly responsible for the introduction of the law, which prohibited 
machine gun style firearms and semi-automatic firearms (not a pistol) that incorporated a pistol 
grip in its design or incorporated one in its design when originally manufactured (Crook 2000, 7).  
The obvious flaw in this law was that it only prohibited firearms based on cosmetic appearance.  
It did not prohibit semi-automatic long guns in total.  The decision to only prohibit the import of 
military-style long guns suggests that a compromise position was reached on this issue. 
 The year of 1981 was an important point in the Australian gun control debate because the 
battle lines of the debate were defined.  The strong opposition between pro and anti gun control 
groups began in this year.  In 1981 Australia’s first gun control group was formed in Victoria 
called “The Council to Control Gun Misuse”5 (Crook 2000, 7; “Our History”).  In the same year, 
in response to the public’s growing concerns about the hazards of private gun ownership, an 
                                                 
5
 The Council to Control Gun Misuse gained strength after the two gun massacres in 1987: Hoddle Street and Queen 
Street.  Gun Control Australia, as it is presently known, was formed in 1988. 
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extremist pro-gun magazine had surfaced called Lock, Stock & Barrel (Crook 2000, 7).  Despite 
all of the discussion of gun control during these years, there was no dramatic movement towards 
strengthening gun control anywhere in Australia until 1987 (Crook 2000, 8).  However, during 
the 1980s, scholars and gun control advocates wrote about Australian gun control, highlighting 
the weaknesses in the system and the ways in which it needed to be improved.  The weaknesses 
that they identified and the recommendations that they made will reappear later in the 1990s 
when Australian governments sought to compose gun control recommendations.   
 Scholars and gun control advocates agreed that national uniform gun control was 
necessary in Australia (Harding 1981, 35, 86; Harding 1983, 11; Fine 1985, 137; Weapons & 
Violence 1990, 66; Crook and Harding 1993, 43).  A uniform gun control system was easier to 
achieve because the number of different sources of firearms laws in Australia was relatively 
small, with only eight jurisdictions to coordinate (Harding 1981, 86).  To achieve a uniform gun 
control system, the level of strength of the legislation in the weaker states needed to be raised.  
The stronger gun control systems of some states provided a model for the reform of weaker 
states (Fine 1985, 137).  Comparing data from the 1975 General Social Survey on the states’ gun 
ownership figures revealed that the order of states with the highest to lowest rate of gun 
ownership coincided with the order of states with the lowest to highest strength of firearm 
regulation6 (Harding 1981, 59, 60).  This direct parallel suggested that the strength of regulation 
influences people’s ownership because weak law eases gun accessibility (Harding 1981, 61).  
This variation in the gun laws of the states allowed interstate movement of guns to occur.  The 
strength of one state’s laws was undermined by the weakness of another state’s.  The lack of 
uniform regulations had deadly consequences, which could be addressed only by a national 
uniform policy (Harding 1981, 86). 
                                                 
6
 Tasmania, Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia 
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 A 1987 massacre exhibited the deadly consequences of the interstate movement of guns 
as facilitated by Australia’s state-level gun control system.  Joseph Schwab bought several guns 
in the weak gun control state of Queensland, and then killed five people in the Northern Territory 
and Western Australia (Weapons & Violence 1990, 65; Crook and Harding 1993, 3, 4).  In the 
Northern Territory a person could not purchase a firearm without a license, while in Queensland 
obtaining a license was not required for purchase (Weapons & Violence 1990, 65; Crook and 
Harding 1993, 4).  If there had been a police background check as part of a licensing procedure, 
Schwab’s criminal record most likely would have been discovered, thereby preventing him from 
obtaining the guns (Weapons & Violence 1990, 65; Crook and Harding 1993, 3).  This incident 
clearly showed how Australia’s state-level system allowed the interstate movement of guns and 
highlighted the importance of having a universal licensing system.  Specifically scholars and gun 
control advocates agreed that the states’ disparities in its policies of licensing, as well as 
registration and firearms safety were of the greatest concern.   
 In the states that required licenses, police exercised discretion in the licensing procedure 
due to ambiguous law.  Firstly, the law was ambiguous in that it allowed for the police to be 
subjective in determining who is “fit and proper” to obtain firearms (Fine 1985, 137; Harding 
1981, 22).  Licenses should only be given to those who fit specific criteria, such as having 
records of crime, violence, firearm misuse, or mental illness (Fine 1985, 137; Harding 1983, 11).  
Secondly, licensing authorities had not taken a clear stance on whether self-protection was a 
permissible motive (Harding 1981, 79).  Data from the 1975 General Social Survey revealed that 
the motive of gun ownership for 23.1% of firearm owners was for some protective purpose 
(Harding 1981, 72-3).  Scholars were concerned that allowing guns to be used for self-protection 
would endanger public safety.  The use of firearms for self-protection was problematic because it 
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increased the probability for accidents to occur, especially if the firearms were continually kept 
in a state where they could be quickly used for defense (Harding 1981, 76).  Firearms that were 
stored in the home for self-protection also left them liable to theft (Harding 1981, 77).   
 None of the Australian jurisdictions, if they required long gun licenses, required 
applicants to present a particular reason, and proof of that reason, to obtain a gun.  This lack of a 
requirement had allowed people to obtain long guns for self-protection purposes.  Merely asking 
an applicant to state the reason why they were obtaining the long gun allowed them to easily lie 
about the purpose (Fine 1985, 138).  Therefore scholars suggested that licensing authorities 
should ask applicants for tangible proof showing that the long gun is to be used for hunting or 
shooting competitions (Fine 1985, 138; Weapons & Violence 1990, 66; Crook and Harding 1993, 
43).   
 A universal licensing system must also be supported by a universal registration system. 
There needed to be a linked registration and licensing system because the former is ineffective 
without the latter (Harding 1981, 81; Harding 1983, 11; Fine 1985, 139).  If both did not exist, 
guns could be transferred privately to people who would be prohibited from having a license 
(Harding 1983, 11).  Having both systems would allow the government to monitor the movement 
of firearms in the community (Harding 1981, 85).   Some argued that since the government 
required the universal registration of cars, firearms should also be registered (Fine 1985, 137).  
Scholars advocated that a registration system could help the police investigate crimes, such as 
when addressing a domestic violence call at a home.  It would be useful for the police to know if 
guns were present at the home before arriving (Fine 1985, 138).  To be effective, a registration 
system must be a national database that linked each jurisdiction’s registries together (Fine 1985, 
139; Harding 1981, 86). 
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 Scholars also advocated for gun control to ensure firearms safety.  A firearm license 
applicant must undergo a practical firearm safety test in addition to a written test (Fine 1985, 
137).   To obtain a driving license, one had to pass both a written and practical test.  Western 
Australia had both written and practical firearm safety tests.  South Australia had introduced a 
written test, but did not have a practical test.  If an applicant failed the written test, they could 
retake it a mere two days later.  None of the other jurisdictions had any tests at all to obtain a 
firearm (Harding 1981, 97).  Passing a written test cannot truly determine whether a person could 
ably use a firearm in the same way that a written driving test does not demonstrate that a person 
knows how to actually drive a vehicle.  A lack of skill in using a firearm could easily lead to 
firearms accidents (Harding 1983, 11).  To abate gun misuse in the home, advocates argued that 
the law should also force all gun owners to comply with safekeeping standards when their guns 
are not in use.  The license application process should require the applicant to prove that he or 
she would comply with the safekeeping law.  At that time, any requirements for proof of 
safekeeping in the Australian jurisdictions only applied to applicants of pistol licenses, rather 
than all firearm licenses (Fine 1985, 142).   
 The year of 1987 was an important turning point for the Australian gun debate.  Six gun 
massacres occurred during 1987, killing thirty-two people in total, making it Australia’s worst 
year of gun massacres yet (Crook 2000, 8; “Gun Politics”).  Each massacre was planned and 
most of them were carried out by individuals who obtained their guns legally (“Gun Politics”).  
The most media attention was given to the two massacres that occurred in Melbourne, Victoria, 
killing fifteen in total.  The first occurred in August at Clifton Hill, an inner suburb of the city, on 
Hoddle Street, and the second occurred in December, right in the city’s center on Queen Street 
(Crook 2000, 8; “Gun Politics”; Crook and Harding 1993, 10).   
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 The Victorian Labor government under Premier Cain responded to the Hoddle and Queen 
Streets massacres by trying to implement stronger gun laws.  However, the Police Minister was 
incapable of obtaining support for major changes from the Firearms Consultative Committee 
(FCC).  In 1982 when the Labor government took power, this committee was established to 
advise the Police Minister on existing gun law.  However, a sub-committee formed within the 
FCC dominated by shooters’ interests, which strongly influenced the whole committee.  The 
National Party, sympathetic to shooters interests, also controlled the Upper House (Crook and 
Harding 1993, 11).  In January 1988, twenty-seven thousand shooters marched in the streets of 
Melbourne to exhibit their opposition to gun law reform (Crook 2000, 8).  This outpouring of 
resentment towards gun control reform led Leader of the Opposition Liberal Party Leader 
Kennett, who initially supported reform, to change his view and oppose most of the proposed 
changes (Crook 2000, 8; Crook and Harding 1993, 12).  Due to all of these factors, the changes 
that were made resulted in only modest improvements (Crook 2000, 8).   
 
Governments Look for Answers to Australia’s Gun Violence Problem 
 
 The most significant outcome of the 1987 Hoddle and Queen Streets massacres was the 
establishment of the National Committee on Violence (NCV).  The NCV was initiated by the 
Federal Labor government led by Prime Minister Hawke (Crook and Harding 1993, 12; Norberry 
et al. 1996).  In 1987 Prime Minister Hawke, the State Premiers, and the Chief Minister of the 
Northern Territory agreed to create the NCV, which was established in 1988 and funded by 
federal, state, and territory governments (National Committee 1990, xxi; Norberry et al. 1996).  
The Committee was chaired by Professor Duncan Chappell of the Australian Institute of 
Criminology in Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, which carried out criminological and 
criminal justice research for the country’s governments (National Committee 1990, v; Crook and 
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Harding 1993, 12).  The NCV intended to determine the state and level of violence in Australia, 
as well as offer recommendations on how to prevent and control the violence (National 
Committee 1990, iii; “Gun Politics”; Crook and Harding 1993, 12; Graycar and Mouzos 2002, 1).   
 In 1990 the NCV published its report, called Violence: Directions for Australia (“Gun 
Politics”; Mouzos 1999, 1).  The report included 138 violence-reducing recommendations 
(National Committee 1990, xlvii).  A number of the recommendations concerned gun control and 
mirrored those written about and advocated for by scholars in the 1980s.  The foremost gun 
control recommendation in the report was for a national uniform regime among all states 
(National Committee 1990, xxxvi).  Other gun control recommendations included: a gun 
buyback of unauthorized firearms, gun registration, firearms licensing, restrictions on the 
possession of semi-automatic weapons to those with specific needs, restrictions on private sales, 
and firearms safety and safekeeping standards (National Committee 1990, xxxvii).  However, the 
main recommendation of achieving uniformity was not realized because it was never acted upon, 
like many of the other recommendations in the report (Peters and Watson 1996, 253; Mouzos 
1991, 1).  Only a few of the recommendations were implemented by states or territories (Mouzos 
1991, 1; Graycar and Mouzos 2002, 1).  For example, after the report was published, the New 
South Wales (NSW) government did not intend to further strengthen its laws, although the laws 
fell short of the Committee’s recommendations.  NSW had just strengthened its gun laws in 1989, 
but only due to the great involvement of the gun lobby in drafting the accompanying regulations 
(Grigson 1990).  The gun lobby’s influence continued to prevent gun control changes and 
national uniformity in Australia. 
  The one recommendation that the federal government did act upon was the proposal to 
prohibit the importation of military-style weapons and specify what types of firearms are 
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importable (National Committee 1990, xxxvi; Crook 2000, 8).  In 1991 military-style rifles with 
magazine capacities exceeding five rounds were prohibited.  However, those that already existed 
in the country were allowed to be kept (Norberry et al. 1996).  Although the NCV’s 
recommendations were not comprehensively acted upon right away, the fact that the Government 
called for them to be crafted was important.  The NCV’s recommendations provided the basis for 
the comprehensive gun control changes of the 1996 National Firearms Agreement, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter (Peters and Watson 1996, 254).   
 The Strathfield massacre continued to keep the issue of guns in the public arena.  Wade 
Frankum randomly shot and killed six people with an ex-military semiautomatic rifle in a 
shopping mall in Sydney, NSW in 1991.  The NSW Coalition government led by the Liberal 
Party attempted to ignore addressing gun control after this incident.  However, there was public 
outrage and strong media support of gun control, so the issue became a central public debate 
(“Gun Politics”).  Public pressure induced the NSW government, through a compromise of the 
Liberal and Labor Parties, to establish the NSW Select Committee Upon Gun Law Reform, a 
parliamentary committee involving all parties to inspect the state’s gun laws (“Gun Politics”; 
Crook and Harding 1993, 37).  Although the Committee’s focus was on NSW gun laws, the 
Committee believed that there needed to be a national gun control system and that its 
recommendations should be a model for national uniformity (“Joint Select Committee” 1991).  
The successful outcome of the Committee, a report of recommendations, was largely due to the 
makeup of the Committee.  The Committee was composed of a number of smaller political party 
representatives in favor of stronger gun laws, who influenced the Committee’s recommendations 
(“Joint Select Committee” 1991; Crook and Harding 1993, 37).  The establishment of the NSW 
   
     22 
Select Committee Upon Gun Law Reform was important because it provided the basis for a 
discussion on national gun control by the Australian Police Ministers’ Council (APMC) in 1991.   
 The Strathfield massacre inspired the APMC to meet in 1991 to discuss national gun 
control.  The NSW Select Committee’s report provided the basis for the meeting’s discussion, 
from which the APMC made its own uniform gun law recommendations (“Joint Select 
Committee Upon Gun Law Reform Report” 1991; Egger and Peters 1993, 201).  The APMC’s 
recommendations mirrored many of the recommendations of the Select Committee’s report 
(“Joint Select Committee Upon Gun Law Reform Report”; Egger and Peters 1993, 202, 203).  
However, the APMC recommended a national system of registration, which the Select 
Committee’s report did not, because NSW did not favor it.  Overall, the APMC’s 
recommendations for a uniform gun control scheme were responded to positively by the states.  
However, NSW, Queensland, and Tasmania rejected gun registration because they believed it 
was not helpful in solving crime, and it wasted time, money, and police resources (“Joint Select 
Committee Upon Gun Law Reform Report” 1991).  The disagreement over registration suggests 
that this was a key factor in the failure to achieve a uniform set of national gun laws at this time. 
 
Resisting Change: The Australian Gun Lobby Looks to the NRA for Advice 
 
 The 1987 massacres and the 1991 Strathfield Massacre were also catalysts for anti-gun 
sentiment in Australia.  Australian gun groups observed that the massacres caused the Australian 
public to increasingly disfavor guns upon seeing the threat they posed to public safety.  The gun 
groups reacted in a more extremist way than ever before to try to protect gun ownership and 
prevent further gun control (“Gun Politics”).  One of the ways in which Australian gun groups 
responded to increasing resentment of guns in the 1990s was developing close ties with the 
American National Rifle Association (NRA).  The NRA had one of its earliest international 
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collaborations with Australia.  The President of the Sporting Shooters’ Association of Australia 
(SSAA), Ted Drane, visited the NRA headquarters outside of Washington, D.C. twice to learn 
about the NRA’s lobbying and public relations expertise (Morton 2006, 63; Vest 2000).  Ted 
Drane stated that he wished to emulate the NRA because it so successfully intimidates American 
politicians: the NRA “‘frightens the shit out of [US politicians].  We want to scare the shit out of 
them here too’” (Chapman 1998, 104).   
 In 1992 NRA President Robert Corbin returned the visit by spending three weeks in 
Australia and New Zealand speaking about the NRA’s beliefs and its political expertise.  Corbin 
met with Australian shooters and participated in media interviews (Morton 2006, 63).  In one 
1992 television interview, Corbin stated that he did not intend to convince anyone of the NRA’s 
beliefs while in Australia.  He also stated that he did not intend to tell Australia what to do; it 
was up to Australians whether they wanted their gun laws to mirror those of the U.S.  Rather he 
was there to educate the SSAA on how the NRA operates.  In addition, he stated that he did not 
intend to financially support the SSAA (“NRA’s Robert Corbin” 2008).  In 1993 the SSAA 
established its own legislative action institute mirroring the NRA’s lobbying institute, which 
carries out grassroots lobbying and seeks money donations from its members (Morton 2006, 63; 
Vest 2000).   Despite Corbin’s interview statements, the NRA supported the Australian gun 
lobby by providing some money to the SSAA for it to establish a lobbying arm and also paid for 
President Drane’s $20,000 travel expenses to visit the NRA headquarters (Vest 2000; Morton 
2006, 63).   
 Australian gun owners furthered their efforts to protect gun ownership by establishing 
their own political party.  The Australian Shooters Party won a seat in the NSW State Parliament 
in 1995 (Morton 2006, 63-4).  Allegedly this seat is the only one in world that has been won 
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based exclusively on a pro-gun platform (Morton 2006, 64).  By 1996 the SSAA was spending 
hundred of thousands of dollars to support pro-gun politicians.  Prior to the SSAA’s relationship 
with the NRA, any monetary exchange between the NRA and Australia was with Australian 
firearms companies.  In 1988 the arms importer, Tasco, gave more than 1% of its sales to the 
NRA to resist anti-gun candidates.  Also, the Australian subsidiary of the American arms 
manufacturer, Winchester, donated $100,000 to the NRA (Vest 2000).   
 Overall, the NRA’s visit to Australia was not largely successful in winning over the 
Australian public.  Australians had already been greatly swayed by the media’s negative 
portrayal of the NRA’s extremism (Morton 2006, 64).  Although the Australian public was not 
very accepting of a more extremist gun lobby, the Australian gun lobby still exerted a significant 
amount of political power in some states.  The gun lobby’s power in these states prevented a 
uniform gun control system from advancing politically (Egger and Peters 1993, 203).  In the 
mid-1990s the Australian gun lobby was determined to protect gun ownership and willing to go 
to great lengths to do so, as evident through its dealings with the NRA and the establishment of a 
shooters political party.  The Port Arthur massacre in 1996 came at an important time in that it 
hindered the Australian gun lobby’s efforts to prevent gun control reform, as will be explained in 
the next chapter.  If Port Arthur had not occurred and the other necessary conditions surrounding 
the massacre had not existed, the Australian gun lobby would have continued to block the push 
for a national uniform gun control system. 
 
The Uncertain Future of National Uniform Gun Control in Australia  
 
 In May 1995, the APMC reconvened again to discuss the achievement of a national 
uniform gun control system.  In this meeting the Council again emphasized the jurisdictions’ 
varied gun control systems.  The Council agreed to establish a Working Party of officials from 
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each jurisdiction to discuss the specific policies that had the potential to be achieved uniformly.  
Some of the policies to be considered were licensing, control of mail order firearm sales, 
firearms safety training, firearms storage, and pistol registration.  These policies again reflected 
the types of policies supported by scholars and advocates since the 1980s.  Victoria took on the 
responsibility of organizing the Working Party in a November 1995 APMC meeting.  The 
Council then decided to further address these issues in February 1996; however, the meeting was 
postponed when a Federal election was called.  The next time the APMC would assemble would 
be at an emergency meeting on May 10, 1996 in Canberra after the Port Arthur massacre, which 
finally established a national uniform gun control system in Australia (Norberry et al. 1996).   
 However, in the years just prior to the Port Arthur massacre, the likelihood of the 
achieving a uniform gun control system was not optimistic.  Not only were various gun control 
policies especially contentious and disagreed upon, but the history of achieving national uniform 
laws in Australia had always involved compromise, delay, and sometimes failure.  The usual 
process for drafting national uniform law was through the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General.  Other state and federal bureaucracies called the Committee a black hole because 
“issues may disappear for inordinate amounts of time and emerge stripped of substance” (Egger 
and Peters 1993, 204).  Due to these factors, some scholars recommended that it would be more 
practical for national gun control policy to be a long term goal.  In the meantime, the 
jurisdictions with the weakest gun control systems needed to make improvements to their 
systems.  Since gun lawmaking was a power of the states, it was the weak states’ responsibility 
to ensure that their laws did not undermine the country’s overall gun regulation effectiveness 
(Egger and Peters 1993, 204). 
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Conclusion 
 Overall Australian history has been characterized by strong gun ownership and weak long 
gun control legislation.  Long guns have been barely regulated, while handguns have always 
been strongly regulated because of a shared belief that handguns were susceptible to criminal use.  
Over time some Australian jurisdictions recognized that long guns could be used in dangerous 
ways and so strengthened their long gun regulations, but not all did in a similar manner.  During 
the 1980s, the weaknesses in the Australian gun control system became evident as gun massacres 
happened.  Scholars and gun control advocates showed consensus on the types of regulations that 
needed to be reformed.  The central weakness of the Australian gun control system that was 
emphasized during the decade was the jurisdictions’ varying levels of regulation.  National 
uniformity needed to be achieved, especially in the areas of licensing, registration, and firearms 
safety.   
 Although both federal and state governments explored answers to Australia’s gun control 
problems in the 1990s, gun control recommendations were never comprehensively acted upon.  
The APMC attempted to strengthen and standardize gun laws after the 1991 Strathfield massacre, 
but a national agreement among states could not be reached.  The electorate of strong rural gun 
ownership and the gun lobby’s influence in some states hindered political support and feasibility.  
Finally in 1996, the weaknesses of Australia’s gun control system, which had been discussed for 
decades, were eliminated.  A gun massacre inspired reform, but unlike any previous ones, it 
ultimately led to the implementation of the National Firearms Agreement (NFA).  National 
agreement on gun control was finally possible.  The following chapter will explain the 
circumstances and factors making this gun control overhaul possible, despite a political 
atmosphere influenced by the gun lobby that made enacting change difficult. 
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Chapter 2  
 
The Beginning of a New Era: The Achievement of  
National Uniform Gun Control in Australia 
 
 The achievement of strong and effective national gun control in Australia is truly a 
success story.  In this chapter, I will show how national uniform gun control was realized.  The 
previous chapter discussed the weaknesses in Australia’s state-level gun control system that 
endangered public safety.  The influence of the gun lobby and politicians dedicated to their rural 
gun-owning constituencies prevented national uniform gun control from being adopted for many 
years.  Although scholars, gun control advocates, and Australian governments had advocated for 
a national approach, agreement could not be reached.  The likelihood of a national agreement on 
gun control was poor just prior to its adoption.  On May 10, 1996, the National Firearms 
Agreement (NFA) established uniform gun control law among all nine state, territory, and 
Commonwealth governments (Chapman 1998, 2).  The United States, which also has a troubled 
gun control history, can look to the process of achieving the NFA and the positive effect of its 
policies as a sign of hope and a model for successful change.   
 Why was a national uniform gun control system achieved in Australia at this time, when 
it failed earlier?  The conditions leading up to the NFA were different than in the previous 
attempts to achieve national gun control.  Firstly, the Port Arthur massacre, the deadliest 
Australian gun massacre yet, incited strong public support for gun control more fervently than 
any past gun massacre.  Secondly, newly elected conservative Prime Minister John Howard 
demonstrated strong political leadership to achieve gun control reform for the sake of public 
safety.  Howard’s unwavering commitment to national gun control was an essential contributing 
factor to its achievement.  Facing disagreement among the states over the NFA, Howard 
threatened a national referendum to ensure that its original form was achieved with none of its 
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components weakened in a way that would endanger public safety.  As a result, the NFA 
eliminated all of the weaknesses that plagued the former gun control system.   
 In the second half of the chapter, I discuss the successful impact of the NFA.  Overall the 
Australian jurisdictions have uniformly implemented the NFA’s measures with support and 
supervision from the federal government.  The Port Arthur massacre and the adoption of the 
NFA irrevocably damaged the gun lobby’s power and public opinion, thus hindering its ability to 
weaken gun laws in the future.  Lastly, the most important effect of the NFA has been its positive 
effect in reducing gun deaths, especially the incidence of mass shootings.  Although there is 
some disagreement among scholars over the NFA’s effect, it is evident that Australia is a safer 
place today than in the years prior to 1996.   
 
Part I:  The Process of Achieving Uniformity 
The Port Arthur Massacre  
 On April 28, 1996, a man named Martin Bryant used two military-style semi-automatic 
rifles to shoot and kill 35 people and wound 18 others at the historic tourist area of Port Arthur, 
Tasmania.  Twenty-eight year old Bryant came from a suburb of Hobart, the capital city of 
Tasmania.  He had no previous criminal record of violence or history of diagnosed mental illness 
(Chapman 1998, 1).  Bryant used four different military-style semi-automatic rifles during the 
course of the incident (Chapman 1998, 73).  The Port Arthur massacre was described in the 
Sydney Morning Herald as “‘the worst massacre by a single gunman in Australian history’” 
(Chapman 1998, 1).  The event was especially shocking to the nation because of the immense 
death toll.  The death toll was almost half of all gun homicides in Australia in an average year, as 
well as equal to Tasmania’s annual gun death rate.  The event caused intense media attention and 
for the next three months, the country was engrossed in a debate between those outraged by the 
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event demanding stronger gun control (the public and the media) and those strongly opposed to 
gun control (the gun lobby, shooters, and supportive politicians) (Chapman 1998, 1).  The Port 
Arthur massacre would prove to be a defining moment in Australia’s gun control history because 
it was the first event in a process that ultimately led to the country’s gun control system overhaul.  
 The Port Arthur massacre revealed the weaknesses in Australia’s gun control system to 
both the public and politicians.  It clearly exhibited the problems that have existed due to the 
country’s state-level gun control system, which had varying levels of regulation.  Two days after 
the massacre, an article in the newspaper, The Australian, described exactly how weak 
Tasmania’s gun laws were and focused on the country’s need for registration of all guns, a 
“genuine reason” for ownership, and a ban on semi-automatic firearms.  In 1996, in Tasmania, 
an adult with no major criminal convictions in the previous eight years qualified for a lifelong 
license that allowed the purchase of an unlimited amount of guns.  There was also no 
requirement of the purchaser to prove a “genuine reason” of needing the gun or that he or she 
had storage facilities for it.  With that license, the person could buy a military-style semi-
automatic firearm at a gun shop and travel with it to another part of Australia.  No record of the 
gun sale was kept with any part of the government, so if the owner decided to sell it to someone 
else, the government would not know (Chapman 1998, 22).  At this time all jurisdictions had 
banned new sales of military-style semiautomatic rifles except Tasmania and Queensland 
(Chapman 1998, 73).  Tasmania’s weak laws clearly revealed the danger of having jurisdictions 
with differing degrees of gun control strength. 
 The Port Arthur massacre did not itself bring about the comprehensive gun control 
reform in Australia.  It did not cause a shift in public attitudes because there was already strong 
public support for gun laws, but rather it caused a shift in the political will to take advantage of 
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that public support (Scanlon and Handmer 2001, 206).  A July 1995 AGB-McNair poll revealed 
that 64% “strongly supported” and 18% “supported” gun laws that would make it more difficult 
to buy guns in NSW (Chapman 1998, 61).  A NSW Health Department state-wide poll in March 
1996 included three questions on gun control.  The number surveyed (2,251) was the largest 
Australian sample asked yet about gun control, in which 90% supported gun registration 
(Chapman 1998, 63).   
 Given that Port Arthur was the latest and worst in a number of recent massacres, there 
was a large outpouring of public support to ensure the prevention of similar incidents in the 
future (Scanlon and Handmer 2001, 200).  According to The Sydney Morning Herald, letters 
continuously streamed in, of which most favored Howard’s reform (Chapman 1998, 71).  Port 
Arthur also received massive media coverage keeping gun control on the national agenda and in 
people’s minds.  For example, The Sydney Morning Herald gave broad coverage to the issue 
continually for about three weeks.  Two days after the massacre, the Herald devoted a hefty 1108 
lines to the issue.  On May 11, the day after the NFA’s establishment, 809 lines in the Herald 
discussed May 10th’s events.  Over the next few months, the media continued to cover the NFA, 
as Howard sought agreement from the states (Reynolds 1997).  In late June, gun control was still 
the most discussed issue on NSW radio and TV stations (Chapman 1998, 71).  Prime Minister 
Howard’s leadership and advocacy post-massacre to frame gun control as a public safety issue 
contributed to this widespread public support.  
  
Prime Minister John Howard’s Gun Control Reform Leadership 
 Prime Minister Howard’s unwavering leadership to carry out gun control reform was an 
essential reason for the NFA’s ultimate success.  Since Port Arthur, John Howard has been 
remembered in Australian history for his unprecedented leadership.  Just one day after the 
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massacre, having only been in office 57 days, Howard stated that he wanted to implement the 
most comprehensive gun control law reform in Australia’s history and considered by any 
previous government (Chapman 1998, 2).  Kitney of The Sydney Morning Herald stated on May 
11, 1996 that “‘John Howard yesterday marked himself as the leader who has probably changed 
the nation’s future more decisively, more quickly than any prime minister before him’” 
(Chapman 1998, 28).  Howard’s decision was shocking because the head of the shooter-
sympathetic, conservative National Party and of the conservative government coalition of the 
Liberal and National Parties was leading the way on gun control reform (Costar 2011, 36, 38; 
Chapman 1998, 27).     
 Howard was personally dedicated to achieving gun control reform.  It appears that 
Howard was interested in gun law reform prior to the massacre at Port Arthur.  In a speech he 
made as Leader of the Opposition on June 6, 1995, he stated that while Australia should make 
“‘…proper allowance for legitimate sporting and recreational activities and the needs of our rural 
community, every effort should be made to limit the carrying of guns in Australia’” (Chapman 
1998, 24).  After Port Arthur occurred, it became evident that Howard was genuinely concerned 
about the safety of Australians and believed gun control reform was the key.  According to a 
Sydney Morning Herald article, Howard showed grief post massacre, and Howard’s colleagues 
said he was “…clearly distraught, still struggling to come to terms with the tragedy.  His eyes 
red-rimmed, his face still registering shock, Howard vowed to ‘bury ’ any State which blocked 
the push for a national gun control code” (Millett 1996, “Howard’s gun gamble”).  Howard was 
dedicated to protecting the future of the Australian people.  Howard believed he had a 
responsibility to the nation to enact reforms and was going to stand by them: “‘I will not retreat 
an inch from the national responsibilities I have in this issue.  Not an inch’” (Chapman 1998, 41).  
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Howard’s strong leadership was especially successful because he was able to make use of his 
political power at the time. 
 Howard utilized his public support and political power at the time to further gun control 
reform.  He had just swept the election for Prime Minister, so he had the overwhelming support 
of the Australian people.  Because the Port Arthur massacre occurred so soon after the election, 
the event allowed Howard to exhibit his strong leadership and be a memorable first act as the 
Prime Minister.  Howard may not have proposed such a bold policy change if Port Arthur 
occurred at the end of his first term facing an election.  He was also supported by a parliamentary 
majority at the time.  Liberal-National coalitions controlled seven of the eight Australian 
jurisdictions, which was useful for him when he interacted with their Premiers on the issue.  The 
massacre at Port Arthur provided a “now or never” opportunity for gun law reform that Howard 
seized (Chapman 1998, 41).  
 Prime Minister Howard removed the partisan ties from gun control by advocating for gun 
control reform as a public safety issue that was supported by the Australian public.  When 
Howard discussed gun control reform, he did not frame the proposals as radical or ground-
breaking.  He presented the changes as those that any ordinary Australian would see as 
reasonable and necessary (Chapman 1998, 27).  Howard stated in Parliament that his gun control 
reform position was reflective of the Australian public: “‘It represents what we believe to be the 
collective aspiration of the Australian people at this particular time’” (Millett and Lagan 1996).  
Howard believed that the NFA was going to give the Australian public a safer future, as 
indicated in a speech made on the night of the agreement: “‘I think we have done good work for 
the future of Australia today…We have done something that will build a safer environment for 
our children’” (Millett 1996). 
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 Howard’s conservative political platform clashed with the strength of the gun regulations 
that he advocated for (Chapman 1998, 27).  The Australian took note of the disparity between his 
political views and the regulations: Howard “‘believes in deregulation and getting government 
out of the lives of people; yet he has just imposed some of the most restrictive and intrusive 
regulations ever imposed on thousands of Australians’”  (Chapman 1998, 28).  The disparity 
between Howard’s political views and the strong gun regulations of the NFA emphasized his 
belief that gun control was a nonpartisan issue, an issue of public safety.  
 Deputy Prime Minister and National Party Federal leader, Tim Fischer, also supported 
Howard’s aim for reform despite a lack of support from within the National Party.  Supporting 
gun control reform was a great political risk for Fischer because the Shooters’ Party targeted the 
National Party’s rural seats.  Nonetheless, Fischer traveled to rural towns to explain the new gun 
laws and to alleviate the panic created by the gun lobby in those areas (Chapman 1998, 40).  The 
National Party had a long history of supporting shooters’ interests and opposing gun law reform, 
as touched on in the previous chapter.  Victorian Deputy Premier Pat McNamara of the National 
Party was present at the pro-gun rally in Melbourne after the 1987 Queen Street massacre, 
standing beside SSAA President Ted Drane.  Drane was once a National Party candidate in 
Victoria (Chapman 1998, 38).  The night after the Port Arthur massacre, Queensland National 
Party Police Minister, Russell Cooper, stated on television that he did not support the NFA by 
calling it a “‘massive knee-jerk reaction’” and explained that he did not support gun registration 
(Chapman 1998, 38-9).  Both Howard and Fischer broke with their political party on this issue of 
gun control reform.      
 Howard’s strong stance on gun control reform in the name of public safety was supported 
by other mainstream political parties and their voters.  Howard was supported by the Labor Party, 
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Green Party, and the Australian Democrats. The Greens and Australian Democrats had always 
advocated for stronger gun control laws (Chapman 1998, 34; Howard 1996).  The Federal Labor 
Opposition stated at the time that it would “…do everything it can to support the measures’” 
(Chapman 1998, 34).  Premier Carr of the NSW Labor government stated four days after the Port 
Arthur massacre that he would introduce legislation to give NSW’s gun lawmaking powers to the 
Commonwealth (Chapman 1998, 34).   
 Non-Liberal/National voters highly respected Howard for his willingness to break the 
political barriers that past gun politics had created in the name of public safety.  In a letter to the 
Melbourne newspaper, The Age, one Labor voter said, “‘I have voted Labor all my life…for once, 
political differences are buried by concern for the safety of Australia’” (Chapman 1998, 26).  
Overall, gun control was overwhelmingly supported by the Australian public and Howard’s work 
to remove partisanship on the issue gained him a higher level of support by non-conservative 
voters.  A national poll in the Sydney Morning Herald on May 7, 1996 revealed that 85% 
supported reform or a total ban on guns, while 15% supported gun ownership.  Most of the gun 
ownership supporters were also National and Liberal Party voters.  However, Howard chose to 
jeopardize his approval with National and Liberal Party voters, and instead focused on trying to 
persuade gun owners to support gun reform (Reynolds 1997).      
  Howard also used other persuasive techniques to gain greater public support.  He 
advocated that it was an opportunistic time for gun control reform.  There was no time for long 
debates; decisions had to happen before this good opportunity was lost (Reynolds 1997).  
Howard wrote an article for The Sydney Morning Herald called “We must act now or lose the 
chance” published just five days before the NFA was reached, which contains these persuasive 
techniques.  Howard stated that unless the country acted immediately, “…the opportunity for 
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effective uniform gun controls will be lost” (Howard 1996).  Howard acted on public support for 
reform before it faded away and helped convert it into political will.  Australian leaders in the 
past have been unable to do this as a 7.30 Report television journalist commented: “‘Australian 
massacres have a dulling familiarity.  Public shock and outrage is soothed by assurances of 
tougher gun laws.  But as public outcry dissipates, often so does political will in the face of the 
gun lobby’” (Chapman 1998, 7).  Howard also persuaded gun owners to support the reform by 
using the idea of “belonging.”  He pushed gun owners to join the majority of Australia, which 
was supportive of gun control reform: “An Australian community…has demanded urgent and 
effective action on tougher, uniform and more effective gun laws” (Reynolds 1997; Howard 
1996).  Howard also referred to recent polls in his article that showed that there was an 
overwhelming support for the reform (Howard 1996). 
 Howard and the media also made the Australian public fearful by speaking about the 
deadly consequences of leaving Australian gun laws untouched.  They used the United States’ 
experience with gun violence as a way to create fear in the Australian people to persuade them to 
support reform.  They furthered the view that Australia was headed down the American path of 
gun violence.  The new laws would prevent Australia from mirroring the gun violence seen in 
the United States.  In a press conference, Howard advocated that by adopting the NFA, Australia 
would not follow in the footsteps of the United States: “‘[This decision] means that this country 
through its governments has decided not to go down the American path, but this country has 
decided to go down another path’” (Chapman 1998, 24).  In an address to the Queensland 
National Party at a party conference, aimed to gain the support of members, Howard utilized the 
United States analogy: “‘There is a deep feeling within the Australian community that we have 
an historic opportunity to ensure that this nation does not go down the American path and we 
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have an opportunity to deliver on that hope and aspiration’” (Riley 1996).  Howard emphasized 
the urgent need for reform by suggesting that Australia was emulating the American path of gun 
violence.       
 In the past, gun control advocates had used the image of the United States to promote gun 
control reform in Australia, but the use of the analogy now had more serious implications 
(Chapman 1998, 24).  Professor of Law Richard Harding, believed Australia was on the same 
path as the U.S. in 1981: “We are on the same road as the United States, though nowhere near as 
far along it” (Harding 1981, 166).  At that time Harding believed that the extent of firearms 
ownership in Australia was “well short of a crisis” (Harding 1981, 166).  However, Harding 
believed that there were concerns that should be acted upon because they could lead to an 
unmanageable gun violence problem by the end of the century (Harding 1981, 166).  The 
comparison of Australian gun violence with that of the U.S. in 1996 was more meaningful 
because the gun violence problem had in fact become more serious, as Harding had expected.  
The Port Arthur massacre was the culmination of a number of shooting massacres in the 1980s 
and 1990s, so the U.S. analogy was more powerful than before. 
   
The National Firearms Agreement (NFA) 
  The resolutions that composed Australia’s new national gun control system were based 
on gun control recommendations made in the National Committee on Violence’s 1990 report.  
The new laws were drawn up by Attorney General Daryl Williams and the Commonwealth Law 
Enforcement Board.  The resolutions were explained in the agreement between all nine state, 
territory and Commonwealth governments on May 10, 1996 in an emergency meeting of the 
Australasian Police Ministers’ Council (APMC).  The National Firearms Agreement (NFA) 
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required that all states and territories pass laws in ten areas (Chapman 1998, 2).  The ten areas of 
policy are explained below: 
 
1. Ban on the import, ownership, sale, resale, transfer, possession, manufacture, or use of all 
self-loading centre-fire rifles (military style or not), all self-loading and pump-action shot 
guns, and all self-loading rim-fire rifles.  There were exemptions allowed for low-
powered (rim-fire) self-loading .22s and pump-action shotguns for primary producers, 
like farmers who could show that they had a “genuine need” based on their occupation 
and could not achieve the outcome through other means.  Another exemption was later 
added that allowed some clay target shooters to own a semi-automatic shotgun, but there 
was no “sporting” exemption for the use of semi-automatic long arms. 
 
2. The jurisdictions were to engage in a buyback of the prohibited guns under the new 
reforms.  This buyback was funded by an increase in the nation’s Medicare tax. Gun 
owners had one year to surrender their guns and they were to be paid the market price of 
their guns by the government.  If owners failed to surrender their guns during this time, 
they would face severe penalties for illegal ownership. 
 
3. The registration of all firearms, which will be kept by the computerized National 
Exchange of Police Information (NEPI). 
 
4. The licensing of all gun owners for which applicants must prove a “genuine reason” for 
owning a firearm.  “Genuine reasons” can be occupational uses like stock and vermin 
control for farmers, membership to an authorized target shooting club, and hunting if the 
applicant can prove that they have permission to hunt by a rural landowner.  The 
Agreement specifically states that “personal protection” or “self-defense” is not a genuine 
reason for gun ownership (Chapman 1998, 2). 
 
5. The licensing of all gun owners is based on five categories of firearms (A, B, C, D, H).  
To obtain a license, an applicant must be the minimum age of 18 and must fulfill the 
criteria of a “fit and proper person.”  Licenses are to be refused from people or licenses 
are to be cancelled if the person has been convicted for a violent crime or the subject of a 
domestic violence restraining order in the past five years (Chapman 1998, 3).  Licenses 
are also to be refused or cancelled if the applicant has a mental or physical condition that 
would make them unsuitable to own a firearm (“Legislative reforms” 2012). 
 
6. New license applicants must complete an accredited gun safety course. 
 
7. A licensed gun owner must obtain a permit to purchase every time he or she chooses to 
purchase a gun.  The permit application involves a 28 day waiting period so that the 
applicant’s background check and “genuine reason” for ownership is thoroughly checked. 
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8. Uniform, strict gun storage requirements (Chapman 1998, 3).  The licensing authority, 
when determining whether an applicant is “fit and proper,” must also be satisfied with the 
applicant’s proposed storage of a firearm (“Legislative reforms” 2012).   
 
9. Firearm sales must be executed only by or through licensed firearms dealers.  This law 
illegalizes all private and mail-order gun sales.  Licensed firearm dealers must keep 
detailed records of their sales which must be given to the police. 
 
10. Ammunition can only be sold for firearms that a purchaser is licensed for.  Limits would 
also be put on the quantity of ammunition that a purchaser can buy in a given period 
(Chapman 1998, 3). 
 
 
Maintaining Uniformity by Any Means:  
Prime Minister Howard Threatens a National Referendum 
 
 Although the majority of Australia supported gun control reform, the National Party was 
not supportive of Howard’s position, which posed a great threat to the NFA’s success (Chapman 
1998, 38).  Achieving the NFA involved political compromise, but Howard would not 
compromise in the form of weakened resolutions that pleased the gun lobby.  After the May 10th 
meeting of the Australasian Police Ministers, where the law reform resolutions of the NFA were 
agreed to, debates and lobbying ensued in Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, and 
the Northern Territory.  These jurisdictions sought to try to weaken the agreed upon resolutions 
by broadening definitions and amending provisions.   
 The main issue that these jurisdictions were unhappy with was the federal government’s 
decision to forbid the crimping of prohibited guns (Chapman 1998, 29).  Crimping is the 
structural modification of a five or seven shot semi-automatic or pump-action gun so that it can 
only fire at maximum two shots before it needs to be reloaded (Chapman 1998, 78).  If crimping 
were to be allowed, owners of prohibited firearms would have been able to keep their guns. 
Owners would not have had to surrender them in a national buyback, as required by the NFA.  
Rural politicians advocated for crimping because it would have appeased their gun-owning 
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constituencies.  A National Party politician stated that crimping would have appeased 60% to 
80% of gun owners.  Crimping advocates argued that gun owners would be more likely to 
comply with crimping than the NFA’s buyback.  The Department of Defense advised the federal 
government that crimping was a reversible process.  Therefore Prime Minister Howard was 
unrelenting in his stance against crimping (Chapman 1998, 79). 
 Prime Minister Howard was fearful that the NFA would fall apart due to the crimping 
issue, so he was determined to find a solution that would ensure that the Agreement’s resolutions 
would not be amended before implementation.  Howard’s solution was to threaten a national 
referendum to compel the states to implement the laws they had promised to in the NFA.  The 
referendum would ask the Australian people for the consent to amend the Constitution to transfer 
the authority to make gun laws from the state governments to the federal government.  The 
transfer of authority would allow the federal government to make national gun laws, and thus to 
implement the NFA without the states’ approval.  Newspaper opinion polls showed that the 
Australian electorate in each state, as well as the Federal Labor Opposition, would 
overwhelmingly vote in support of this change (Chapman 1998, 29).  The unsupportive states 
had the choice either to cooperate with the Commonwealth or choose to be committed to keeping 
the state’s gun lawmaking power, but yet risk losing that power (Laming 2007, 53).  Executing a 
national referendum would have been costly for the unsupportive states.  Also, removing the 
states’ rights to make gun laws would irrevocably damage the political power of the gun lobby 
(Chapman 1998, 29).   
 Facing a referendum that they would undoubtedly lose, the unsupportive states made the 
pragmatic choice to cooperate (Laming 2007, 53).  The last states that chose to support the NFA 
were Queensland and Western Australia.  It is evident that Queensland’s negotiations with 
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Howard influenced the state government’s decision to agree to the NFA.  In the weekend prior to 
Queensland agreement, Premier Borbridge stated that he had obtained some concessions in 
private talks with Howard: “‘We’ve been able to win some very major and substantial 
concessions for those responsible people in the community who require access to firearms for 
professional purposes, and for those people who seek to use them for recreational purposes’” 
(Riley 1996).  Borbridge believed that the NFA would bring “‘some very major difficulties’” to 
rural Australians and the National Party, but it was the best deal that party could negotiate (Riley 
1996).  Borbridge also conceded that it was “‘silly’” to risk losing the achieved compromises if 
Howard forced the referendum (Millett, Roberts, and Graham 1996).  It is evident that the 
agreement of the unsupportive states was only achieved due to great negotiation and compromise 
led by Howard.   
 By accepting the NFA and choosing to implement its resolutions, the states participated 
in “cooperative federalism.”  Cooperative federalism means that two levels of government are 
willing or at least accept that they have to work together to solve problems that are the 
constitutional responsibility of one or both of the levels.  Each level must also be able to bargain 
and have the ability to decline participation (Laming 2007, 53).  The Australian states that were 
unsupportive of the NFA had the ability to bargain and did obtain some bargains in the form of 
exemptions for clay target shooters and farmers to use semi-automatic guns, as indicated by 
Premier Borbridge’s statements above.  Although these compromises were made, they were not a 
great danger to public safety.  Farmers and clay target shooters would have to apply to prove 
their “genuine need” for the firearms.  However, most farmers, target shooters, and recreational 
hunters would not qualify (Chapman 1998, 93).  Although public opinion, the press, and the 
Prime Minister were strongly supportive of the new reforms, the states were not coerced into 
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accepting the NFA, according to the definition of “cooperative federalism” (Laming 2007, 53).  
Due to Howard’s clever choice to threaten a referendum, the strength of NFA’s resolutions was 
not compromised in a way that could have endangered public safety. 
  
Part II:  The Impact of the National Firearms Agreement (NFA) 
Guaranteeing the Effective Implementation of the NFA 
 
 After all the Australian jurisdictions agreed upon the NFA, the Government’s focus 
turned to ensuring that the jurisdictions implemented the necessary legislation to comply with the 
Agreement’s resolutions (Chapman 1998, 162).  In the months after the 1996 agreement, all 
jurisdictions passed legislative acts to carry out the necessary gun law reforms (Chapman 1998, 
164).  The NFA was implemented by the jurisdictions in the following years in stages.  During 
this time, the Government worked with the jurisdictions to develop the necessary policies to 
successfully comply with the NFA (“Legislative reforms” 2012).  The Commonwealth 
government gave $398 million to the jurisdictions to compensate owners of semi-automatic 
weapons who had to surrender them in the buyback.  The Commonwealth government also set 
aside $63 million for the costs of administering the buyback, of which $56.6 million was given to 
the jurisdictions (Phillips et al. 2007). 
 The Commonwealth government was concerned that there would be a disparity between 
the Agreement’s resolutions and the jurisdictions’ translated provisions (Chapman 1998, 163).  
Although all the jurisdictions did not enact the Agreement’s resolutions in exactly the same way, 
the jurisdictions overall uniformly implemented the Agreement’s main reforms and they have 
remained unchanged (“Gun Politics”).  Prime Minister Howard worked to ensure that 
implementation was monitored after the Agreement to ensure its success.  The independent 
organization, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), was commissioned by the 
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Government to help monitor the implementation (Scanlon and Handmer 2001, 1999).  Also to 
help monitor the effects of the NFA, the AIC established the National Firearms Monitoring 
Program (NFMP), which had the purpose to study the short term and long term effects of the 
NFA (Mouzos 1999, 2).  The National Coalition for Gun Control and government agencies, like 
audit offices, also monitored implementation (Scanlon and Handmer 2001, 203).  By 1997 all 
jurisdictions had implemented the NFA, but each varied in their level of enforcement of it 
(Scanlon and Handmer 2001, 199). 
 Almost two years after the Port Arthur massacre, there was evidence that some states had 
plans to not fully implement the NFA provisions.  In several states, amendments were introduced 
after negotiating with the gun lobby.  In March 1998, the Victorian Government announced that 
it planned to make multiple amendments to its gun laws.  The governments in South Australia 
and Queensland also expressed discontent with the laws imposed on them by the NFA.  To 
prevent further momentum on the amendments, Prime Minister Howard decided to re-start the 
gun control debate on March 20, 1998, at a conference of Premiers.  However, due to the 
Premiers’ anger with Howard on a health care issue, the Premiers walked out of the conference 
before the gun control issue could be discussed (Chapman 1998, 165).  As the premiers were 
leaving, sources reported to the Sydney Morning Herald that Howard angrily yelled: “‘So what 
you are saying is that you refuse to discuss guns?  This is very important.  What you are saying is 
that I am going to have to address this myself?’” (Kingston and Cleary 1998).  And so he did.  
Howard, still personally dedicated to the NFA and a strong leader of gun control, took it upon 
himself to ensure that any weakened laws passed by states would be ineffective.     
 On March 24, 1998, just days after the conference, Howard banned the import of all 
semi-automatic firearms.  Exemptions were allowed for farmers who could prove they were 
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primary producers and for clay target shooters who had the written authority of the Federal 
Attorney General.  The ban meant that if any state relaxed access to semi-automatic firearms, a 
newly licensed person would have few ways to legally purchase a gun unless they had special 
authorization from the Federal Attorney General.  A limited numbers of licensed firearms dealers 
would be authorized to sell semi-automatic firearms legally to these special shooters.  The 
imported firearms would be kept with customs until the dealer could prove that the firearm had 
been sold to an authorized primary producer or clay target shooter (Chapman 1998, 166).  In the 
past, the Commonwealth government had used its trade and commerce power to regulate 
firearms importation into Australia.  Howard exercised the Commonwealth’s powers further by 
completely banning the import of all semi-automatic firearms to make accessing this type of 
banned firearm even more difficult. 
 
The Negative Effect of the NFA on the Gun Lobby 
 The massacre at Port Arthur, the implementation of the NFA, and the gun lobby’s 
response to the events damaged the gun lobby’s political power in Australia.  The event 
negatively affected the influence of the gun lobby: “Bryant’s short rampage at Port Arthur 
marked a change in the gun lobby’s smug and wholly disproportionate political power in 
Australia” (Chapman 1998, 3).  The media consistently focused negative attention on the gun 
lobby by putting a spotlight on their desire to keep their military-style guns that would be banned 
and need to be surrendered in the buyback.  These male shooters within the gun lobby came to 
represent for the general Australian population “…a subterranean, angry and potentially 
dangerous side of Australian life.”  The image of shooting that these men were promoting was 
not the image most Australians had of shooters, which was rural farmers (Chapman 1998, 3). 
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 In a backlash to the NFA, the extremist One Nation Party arose headed by Independent 
Federal Member, Pauline Hanson.  Hanson’s policy on guns called for a return to the weaker 
policies of the pre-1980s (Crook 2000, 10).  She believed Australians had a right to bear arms, 
which included high-powered semi-automatic rifles (Davison 2000, 239).  Her gun policy stated 
that “‘Australians have a right to defend themselves and their families in their own homes’,” 
although no such legal right existed (Davison 2000, 240).  Aside from the gun policy, One 
Nation was a populist nationalist party that challenged free trade, unregulated competition, and 
free immigration (Davison 2000, 240).  After the hard hit taken by the gun lobby after Port 
Arthur, One Nation’s success in the mid-1998 Queensland state election was hopeful for the gun 
lobby’s future.  However, in the Federal election later in 1998, One Nation performed badly, 
even with financial support from the SSAA.  The Shooters’ parties also performed poorly (Crook 
2000, 10).  One Nation’s influence was short lived; by 2002, the party had fallen apart (“Gun 
Politics”).  The Port Arthur massacre and the NFA already harmed the gun lobby, and the rise of 
the extremist One Nation only further harmed the gun lobby’s power.  
 
The Successful Effect of the NFA in Reducing Gun Violence 
 National uniform gun control legislation in Australia is a success story not simply 
because political barriers were overcome to achieve it.  Most importantly, the new system has 
enhanced public safety by reducing gun deaths since its implementation.  Multiple studies have 
been done since the NFA to measure its impact, but there has been some lack of consensus on 
the results.  Overall there appears to be consistent evidence to show that the NFA has had the 
strongest impact in reducing mass shootings, gun suicide and accidental deaths, while homicide 
has been the least affected.  A significant problem in studying the NFA’s impact has been that 
gun-related deaths were already decreasing prior to Port Arthur (Chapman and Alpers 2006).  In 
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1979, the rate of all gun deaths per 100,000 people was 4.71, while in 1996 the rate was 2.82 
(Alpers et al. 2013).  Also, the rate of firearm death post-NFA could have been influenced by 
that the jurisdictions’ gun laws greatly varied prior to the NFA, the implementation in each 
jurisdiction had occurred at different speeds, and each had different levels of enforcement 
(Mouzos 1999, 2).  
 The NFA has had a strong effect in preventing the occurrence of mass shootings.  In the 
eighteen years before the 1996 Australian gun law reform, there were thirteen massacres in 
Australia, each with four or more deaths, amassing 102 deaths in total.  Since the NFA’s 
implementation, there have been no massacres with four or more deaths (Howard 2012; 
Chapman, Alpers et al. 2006, 365).  The one incident comparable to the Port Arthur massacre 
that has occurred since was a 2002 shooting carried out by an international student at Monash 
University in Melbourne (Claiborne 2011).  The licensed gunman killed two fellow students and 
wounded five others with several handguns (Phillips et al. 2007).  The Government responded to 
this shooting in a similar way to the Port Arthur massacre.  The jurisdictions agreed upon another 
gun control national agreement in 2002 called the National Handgun Control Agreement (NHA), 
which also had an accompanying national handgun buyback.  The NHA consisted of 28 
resolutions restricting the availability and use of handguns, specifically those that are easily 
concealable.  It also restricted handguns based on caliber, barrel length, and magazine capacity 
(“Legislative reforms” 2012). 
 Just three years after the NFA’s achievement, there was an indication that the laws were 
having a positive effect in reducing firearm suicide and accidental deaths.  The results of a 
preliminary assessment done by the AIC in 1999 revealed the there was a substantial decline in 
the number of firearm-related deaths from 1996 to 1997.  Excluding the Port Arthur deaths, 
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firearm-related deaths decreased from 488 to 438.  The total firearm-related death rate declined 
from 2.76 per 100,000 in 1996 to 2.36 in 1997.  The firearm homicide death rate was similar to 
those observed in previous years, but the most evident decline was in firearm suicide and 
accidental firearm deaths.  These declines contributed most to the overall decline in firearm-
related deaths (Mouzos 1999, 3).  However, conclusions at this time were premature because the 
effect of the NFA was examined so soon after its implementation (Mouzos 1999, 6).   
 The examination of the NFA’s effect seven years after its achievement continued to find 
an accelerated decline in firearm deaths.  There was an average reduction in firearm-related 
deaths of 3% per year in the eighteen years before the laws, but afterward the rate doubled to 6% 
per year.  Firearm suicide and homicide rate reductions per year doubled after the laws were 
established (Chapman, Alpers et al. 2006, 367).  Between 1979 and 1996, there was an average 
of 617 gun deaths per year.  In the seven years after the NFA, between 1997 and 2003, the 
annual average nearly halved to 331 gun deaths (Chapman and Alpers 2006).  The rate of 
accidental firearm deaths actually increased, but only by a small amount of an annual average 
increase of 1.4 deaths.  The authors cannot determine a plausible reason why the removal of 
700,000 guns, as well as the introduction of gun registration and stronger licensing procedures, 
would result in an increase in accidental shootings (Chapman, Alpers et al. 2006, 370).  The 
authors believe that miscoding of the type of gun-related death may be a contributing factor 
(Chapman, Alpers et al. 2006, 371).  Overall, it seemed that the NFA was successful in reducing 
the number of mass shootings, firearm homicides, and firearm suicides (Chapman, Alpers et al. 
2006, 365). 
 However, among scholars, there has been some difference of opinion of the NFA’s effect.  
The consensus seems to be that the NFA’s greatest impact has been on firearm suicide and the 
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least impact has been firearm homicide.  One study examined the impact of the NFA using 
firearm-related death data from 1979-2004 (Baker and McPhedran 2007, 455, 458).  Results 
showed that the only type of firearm-related death affected by the NFA was firearm suicide 
(Baker McPhedran 2007, 461).  The NFA did not influence firearm homicide.  There also 
seemed to be a negative effect on accidental firearm death over the time period examined, but the 
number was small with large variability, so the effect of the NFA on accidental firearm deaths 
was not conclusive (Baker McPhedran 2007, 463).  Overall there was insufficient evidence to 
support the assertion that reducing legally owned firearms will lead to a reduction of firearm or 
overall sudden death rates (Baker and McPhedran 2007, 467).   
 Another study examined the effect of the NFA’s buyback’s by using a different type of 
test that was not used in the other studies.  This study used both cross-state and time series 
variation, while most other studies have only used time series variation.  The authors of this 
study chose to look at variation both across states and over time because there were different 
rates of firearm buyback in the states.  Therefore, they sought to see if there was a greater 
decrease in gun death rates in states where more guns were surrendered (Leigh and Neill 2010, 
3).  The largest reductions in firearm deaths did occur in the states where more firearms were 
surrendered (Leigh and Neill 2010, 33).  Estimates of the buyback’s effect on firearm homicides 
were less clear, but it appeared that the rate dropped significantly at a point estimate of 36% 
(Leigh and Neill 2010, 3, 22).  Overall the firearm suicide rate decreased by close to 80% and 
there was no statistically significant effect on non-firearm death rates (Leigh and Neill 2010, 3).  
This study contributed to the consensus that the occurrence of firearm suicides was significantly 
reduced by the NFA. 
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 Since there has been a lack of consensus on the NFA’s impact, some scholars have 
reanalyzed the data used by other authors to find out what accounts for the lack of consensus.  
Lee and Suardi reanalyzed the same data on firearm deaths used by other authors (2010, 65).  
Their study concluded that there was little evidence to support that the NFA had any significant 
effects on firearm homicides and suicides.  In addition, they found that there did not seem to be 
any substitution effects, meaning that those with reduced access to firearms did not use alternate 
methods to commit homicide or suicide (Lee and Suardi 2010, 76).  McPhedran and Baker found 
that studies have been very consistent in their statistical findings, although they used different 
statistical methodology (2008, 2).  The disagreement over the impact of the NFA is not due to 
different statistical analysis outcomes, but rather scholars have interpreted the results differently 
(McPhedran and Baker 2008, 15).   
 Overall it has been difficult for studies to measure the impact of the NFA and buyback 
because gun deaths were falling in the early 1990s.  Nonetheless many studies have found strong 
evidence supporting the NFA’s positive impact.  Most studies have assumed that this pattern 
would have continued to occur if the NFA had not been implemented, even though they did not 
explain why this pattern was expected to continue (Hemenway and Vriniotis 2011, 3).  Of those 
studies that are less supportive of the NFA’s positive effects, the way they were designed in 
terms of the assumptions made and tests used, made it extremely difficult to find any effect from 
the NFA (Hemenway and Vriniotis 2011, 2, 3).  For example, one study assumed that the linear 
trend of decreasing firearm deaths would have continued without the NFA.  However, the chosen 
beginning year for trend analysis was 1979, while there is available data going back to 1915.  
Examining 1915-2004 data shows that firearm suicide and homicide declined significantly after 
the NFA (Hemenway and Vriniotis 2011, 2).  Between 1996 and 1997, firearm homicide and 
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firearm suicide dropped by 46% and 43%.  No two year period between 1915 and 2004 had such 
a strong drop in firearm suicide (Hemenway and Vriniotis 2011, 3).  Overall it is clear that the 
NFA was not a wasteful endeavor when it comes to reducing gun violence in Australia: 
“…Everyone should be pleased with what happened in Australia after the NFA—the elimination 
of firearm massacres (at least up to the present) and an immediate, and continuing, reduction in 
firearm suicide and firearm homicide” (Hemenway and Vriniotis 2011, 3).  
 Although scholars have been the most unsure about the extent of NFA’s impact on 
firearm homicide, the most recent firearm homicide study by the AIC reveals that it has declined 
since the NFA’s implementation.  Firearm homicides increased to 12% in 2008 from 9% in 2007, 
but this is still a historical low for Australia.  The majority of firearms used in homicides were 
identified as unregistered and/or unlicensed (Vireuda and Payne 2010, 2).  The NFA’s strong 
licensing and registration provisions have made it difficult for unsuitable individuals to 
legitimately own firearms, so they are forced to obtain them illegally (Mouzos 2000, 6).  Since 
Homicide Monitoring has begun by the AIC, firearm homicide has decreased by more than half.  
Between 1989 and 1990, twenty-five percent of homicides involved a firearm compared to 2007-
2008 where only 12% of homicides involved a firearm.  The use of knives, on the other hand, 
has remained relatively unchanged since 1989-1990, suggesting that method substitution has not 
occurred (Virueda and Payne 2010, 14).  While firearm homicide has slightly increased in recent 
years, it is clear that it has largely decreased in the years since the implementation of the NFA 
and the 2002 NHA, which speaks to the impact of the strong policies embodied in these 
agreements.   
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Conclusion: The Australian Model 
 The successful achievement and positive effect of the NFA has been due to a number of 
factors.  Disasters alone cannot bring about change, but the Port Arthur incident revealed that 
they can if the social and political climate are favorable to the impetus for policy change that a 
disaster provides (Scanlon and Handmer 2001, 200).  Gun law reform had to be persistently 
advocated for after the massacre to maintain people’s outrage and public support.  Political 
support was not unanimous for the gun control reform, but Prime Minister John Howard’s 
dedication to advancing it was critical.  Gun violence was effectively framed as a nonpartisan 
issue of public safety.  Compromise was a key aspect in obtaining the cooperation of the 
unsupportive states.  However, compromise was not achieved at the expense of specific 
resolutions in the NFA.  Rather the unsupportive states chose to cooperate with the rest of the 
nation by consenting to the Agreement’s resolutions due to Howard’s threat of a referendum.  
Although some states’ threatened to pass weakened gun laws, Howard was committed to 
ensuring they would not succeed to protect the strength of the NFA’s resolutions (Chapman 1998, 
164, 166).  It is evident that a contributing factor to the NFA’s success in reducing gun violence 
has been that none of the resolutions were weakened through compromise and that they were 
effectively implemented.   
  The Australian experience of achieving national uniform gun control is a guide for the 
United States, which struggles to bring about bold gun policy change.  Achieving national 
uniform gun control legislation in Australia was not possible for many years because the gun 
lobby blocked reform.  Prime Minister Howard admitted that he would have thought it 
unthinkable just prior to the Port Arthur massacre that a national gun control scheme would have 
been politically feasible: “‘This is an agreement I don’t think anybody would have thought 
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remotely achievable three weeks ago or even a few days ago’” (Chapman 1998, 26).  Presently 
the United States suffers the effects of weak federal gun control legislation brought about by an 
extremely powerful gun lobby.  Between 1980 and 2010 in the United States, there have been on 
average 20 mass murders per year with an average death toll of about 100 per year (Fox 2012).  
In the past few years, mass shootings have become especially frequent, yet continuously 
politicians fail to take strong leadership positions to act upon them and advocate for gun control 
reform.  No American political leader has acted with the same resolve to achieve dramatic gun 
control reform as Prime Minister Howard did in 1996 after the Port Arthur massacre.  
 The United States can learn much from the Australian experience of the Port Arthur 
massacre and the NFA: the specific policies and their uniformity, the political leadership, 
advocacy, smart compromise, and effective implementation.  In the last chapter, this thesis will 
discuss how these lessons can be realized in the U.S. to help achieve strengthened federal gun 
control legislation.  However, the next chapter will discuss the evolution of American federal 
gun control law and the contributing factors that have led to its weaknesses, as well as how its 
weaknesses endanger public safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
     53 
Chapter 3 
 
American Gun Control History:  
The Failure to Achieve Comprehensive Federal Gun Control  
 
 While Australia’s 1996 National Firearms Agreement has been successful, American 
federal gun control legislation has perpetually failed.  Unlike Australia, the United States has 
never been able to achieve comprehensive federal gun control legislation.  American federal gun 
control legislation has always had a narrow aim to target criminals or firearms dealers.  
Throughout American history, federal gun control has consistently had debilitating weaknesses.  
Like Australia’s gun control history, that of the United States has also been characterized by 
strong resistance from gun owners, the gun lobby, and sympathetic politicians against 
establishing stronger gun control measures.  The National Rifle Association (NRA) has always 
advocated against more comprehensive measures meant to target all gun owners based on its 
belief that only criminals should be burdened by gun control.  The Australian gun lobby also 
used the same argument when resisting gun control reform.  However, the Australian 
government led by Prime Minister Howard overcame the resistance of pro-gun individuals to 
achieve the National Firearms Agreement.  The present Australian gun control system is 
comprehensive and effective because the legislation’s language was not significantly weakened 
to cater to gun interests.  To achieve comprehensive federal gun control legislation in the United 
States that is effective, damaging compromises must be avoided.                
 This chapter explores how the achievement of comprehensive gun control has failed in 
the U.S. and discusses how the legislation’s specific weaknesses endanger public safety.  
Although a significant amount of the public and some political leaders have supported 
comprehensive reform over the years, there has never been the widespread public pressure 
needed to instigate enough political will in Congress to see the reform through.  Also, the 
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powerful influence of the NRA’s lobbying efforts has hindered comprehensive reform.  The first 
part of this chapter examines early American gun control in order to show that strong gun control 
measures are not contrary to American history.  The NRA has successfully argued that a balance 
cannot exist between a right to gun ownership and comprehensive gun control, but in fact it has 
already existed.  Since its beginnings, the United States, like Australia, sought to balance gun 
ownership with gun control to protect public safety.      
 The second part of the chapter presents and discusses the weaknesses of the pieces of 
federal gun control legislation achieved between the 1930s and 1990s.  The legislation was 
always motivated by social problems such as mob crime and race riots, or high profile shootings, 
such as assassinations and massacres.  During this time a majority of the public supported 
stronger gun control and although political leaders pushed for comprehensive measures, 
gathering enough congressional support to pass the legislation was difficult.  Ultimately in order 
to achieve the legislation’s passage, compromises had to be made.  Provisions were changed and 
removed, weakening the legislation’s overall strength and devastating its effectiveness.   
 The last part of the chapter discusses the negative effects of the present American gun 
control system that must accommodate the dual authority of the federal government and the 
states.  By achieving more comprehensive federal gun control legislation, a strong minimum 
standard would be put in place.  A strong minimum standard would better moderate the negative 
effects of the large difference in strength between state and local gun laws across the country.  
The chapter concludes by discussing how the 2008 Supreme Court decision, District of 
Columbia v. Heller, has firmly established that the Second Amendment is not absolute, which 
provides hope for the feasibility of achieving the necessary gun control reform in the future.   
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Part I:  
Early American Gun Control: A Balance Between Gun Ownership and Public Safety 
 
The Revolutionary Era: Early Forms of Gun Control 
 
 As long as guns have existed in the United States, there has been gun control established 
to protect public safety.  During the Revolutionary Era, every man was legally required to own a 
gun for military purposes.  Since the country did not have a standing army, an armed citizenry 
was necessary to repel European invasions or Native American attacks (Winkler 2011, 113).  
Governments used forms of gun registration in order to know where guns were in case they were 
needed to defend the community.   Men were required to assemble at public gatherings a few 
times a year for government officials to inspect their guns and record them on public rolls.  New 
Hampshire and Rhode Island carried out door-to-door gun ownership surveys.  Sometimes the 
government confiscated people’s guns temporarily if they were needed for public defense 
purposes.  These guns were returned to their owners afterwards (Winkler 2011, 113).  Overall 
these practices reveal that the government believed that public safety sometimes was of greater 
importance than the individual’s need for a gun.   
 Governments also believed it was important to institute various types of safe storage laws 
(Winkler 2011, 116).  In 1692, the Massachusetts colony barred citizens from carrying guns in 
public (DeConde 2001, 21).  Before the Revolution in South Carolina, slave owners were 
required to lock up their guns to ensure slaves could not access them (Winkler 2011, 117).  Due 
to Maryland’s large Catholic population, the state’s assembly passed a law in 1756 that 
prohibited the possession of guns and ammunition by Catholics (DeConde 2001, 22).  A 1783 
law in Boston required that loaded firearms could not be kept inside buildings.  Those found with 
loaded guns in a building or home could have had their guns confiscated.  This law hindered a 
person’s ability to use the gun in a moment of self-defense (Winkler 2011, 117).  Again, these 
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laws reveal that the state governments believed that the public safety concerns surpassed the 
individual’s need to keep guns in the home.  
 
The Civil War Era: Guns, Gun Control, and the Second Amendment   
 The South is known today for its strong gun ownership and weak gun laws, but 
historically it has been a region that instituted gun control laws due to a concern for public safety.  
Both before and after the Civil War, white Southerners were concerned about the threat of armed 
blacks to public safety, so gun disarmament became an important objective (Winkler 2011, 131, 
136).  This concern grew out of the occurrence of slave revolts in the South in the early 1800s 
(Winkler 2011, 131-2).  Laws prohibited slaves from possessing guns, but they were further 
strengthened to prevent free blacks from owning guns.  An 1844 North Carolina Supreme Court 
case stated that the “‘only object’” of disarming blacks “‘is to preserve the peace and safety of 
the community from being disturbed by an indiscriminate use on ordinary occasions, by free men 
of color, of firearms and other arms of an offensive character’” (Winkler 2011, 132).  This 
statement shows that the white Southern population believed that use of guns by blacks could 
endanger public safety.  Therefore, guns needed to be removed from the black population in 
order to help prevent gun violence from occurring. 
  Throughout the United States, citizen militias had become obsolete by this time.  Militias 
were not well trained and attendance was not strong.  The poor performance of state militias in 
the War of 1812 revealed that a standing army was necessary for any long term war effort.  Since 
the militia justification for the Second Amendment became less pertinent to the current 
conditions, the understanding of the Second Amendment was shifting towards an individualist 
interpretation.  Twenty states joined the Union between 1790 and 1860 and fourteen of them 
included the right to bear arms in their state constitutions.  Specifically the right to bear arms in 
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many of these constitutions referred to the individual using guns to defend themselves, as well as 
the republic (Winkler 2011, 133).  In the South during this time, both an individual right to gun 
ownership and gun control measures coexisted.  However, as will be discussed in this chapter, 
throughout American history, gun owners believed that an individual right to gun ownership 
precludes comprehensive gun control measures.  The Second Amendment is an individual right, 
but it does not prevent stronger gun control measures from being established in the name of 
public safety.  This will be furthered discussed at the end of the chapter when the Supreme Court 
case of District of Columbia v. Heller is presented.   
 
The American Frontier and the “Wild” West 
 The passion for gun ownership in the United States is often attributed to its frontier 
history.  On the frontier guns were a necessity for American settlers (Spitzer 2008, 8; Winkler 
2011, 160).  Guns were used for hunting game as a source of food.  Guns were also used for 
protection against dangerous animals, as well as hostile Native Americans (Spitzer 2008, 8, 9).  
However, the widely held belief in contemporary American society is that the West was a 
dangerous, violent place that was settled by guns.  This is an exaggerated understanding of what 
the actual conditions on the Western frontier were like (Spitzer 2008, 10).  Gun usage on the 
frontier is a combination of truth and myth (Spitzer 2008, 7).  
 It is true that there was the widespread prevalence of guns on the frontier.  During the 
1800s thousands of people moved westward with guns in hand, specifically handguns.  By the 
mid-1800s handguns were gaining great popularity.  Samuel Colt contributed to the 
popularization of gun ownership by making it easier for people to be a gun owner.  Colt created 
lighter, more powerful, and cheaper guns than ever before (Winkler 2011, 160).  Colt has also 
contributed to misrepresentation of the gun violence on the frontier in American history.  Colt 
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advertised and marketed his guns by glamorizing the frontier and the importance of gun usage 
there (Spitzer 2008, 8).  One of Colt’s taglines, which emphasized the importance of the gun in 
keeping peace, was “‘God created men. Colonel Colt made them equal’” (Winkler 2011, 161).  
Colt used testimonials from celebrities, as well as military and adventure heroes to promote his 
guns (Burbick 2006, 10).  William Fredrick Cody’s “Buffalo Bill’s Wild West” show, first seen 
at the 1893 world’s fair in Chicago, also emphasized violence on the frontier and the importance 
of gun usage in quelling the violence (Winkler 2011, 161, 164).  Despite the ubiquity of 
handguns and the glamorization of gun violence on the frontier, in fact, public safety was an 
important concern there.   
 Although gun ownership was common on the frontier, Western towns did not tolerate gun 
violence in the way that Colt and Cody advertised.  Gun control measures to protect public safety 
were present in frontier towns (Spitzer 2008, 11).  For example, concealed carry was not 
acceptable in many places.  Cowboys were expected to check their guns at the town’s entry or at 
the livery stable (Courtwright, 1999, 96).  In 1873 people were required to leave their revolvers 
with the police while in Wichita, Kansas (Winkler 2011, 165).  At the same time, Dodge City, 
Kansas had a law that prohibited the concealed carry of guns (Winkler 2011, 166).  The West 
was full of guns, but moderate gun control laws existed to protect the public.  The true conditions 
on the Western frontier continue to show that private gun ownership has always been balanced 
by reasonable gun control laws in the name of public safety.  
  
Part II: American Federal Gun Control Legislation 
Controlling Crime: The Establishment of Federal Gun Control Legislation 
 Federal gun control legislation was first established in the United States as a means to 
more effectively control crime.  The activity and gun usage of mobs escalated when Prohibition 
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went into effect through the 1920 Eighteenth Amendment (Winkler 2011, 189, 190).  
Specifically gangsters were partial to the “Tommy Gun,” an extremely deadly submachine gun 
that was small and easy to carry (Winkler 2011, 190).  Up until this time gun control was a type 
of law that was only addressed either by state or local governments (Winkler 2011, 187-8)   
 According to Winkler, national firearms legislation came about because the federal 
government recognized that local law enforcement was ill-equipped to address mob gun crime.  
Local law enforcement had not been successful in combating mob activity and gun usage.  Local 
police forces were often corrupted by the gangsters, but the main reason it had failed was the 
improved ease of travel.  During the Prohibition era, the ownership of the automobile largely 
increased and the national highway system connecting cities was built (Winkler 2011, 193-4).  
The combination of these technological advances allowed criminals to move easily across state 
lines with firearms in hand.  The ease of firearm movement across state borders is still a serious 
problem that faces gun control today.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized that crime had 
to be addressed on a national level because its effects were not just felt in its area of origin: 
“‘The consequences of lax law enforcement and crime-breeding conditions in one part of the 
country may be felt in cities and villages and farms all across the continent’” (Winkler 2011, 
198).  To target the crime, the Justice Department worked on creating gun control narrowly 
aimed at those types of guns used by criminals, such as registration of machine guns, 
submachine guns, handguns, silencers, and sawed-off shotguns (Spitzer 2008, 120). 
 Federal gun control legislation aimed at targeting mobster gun use came to fruition in the 
National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA).  The NFA put a heavy tax on the manufacture, sale or 
transferal of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, and sawed-off rifles (Winkler 2011, 203).  The 
law did not address any other types of firearms, such as pistols, revolvers, shotguns or rifles.  
   
     60 
Firearm manufacturers, dealers, and importers had to register, maintain records, and pay a tax 
(DeConde 2001, 144).  The burdensome tax dissuaded law-abiding people from purchasing these 
types of weapons.  Owners of these types of firearms had to register with federal authorities and 
be fingerprinted within sixty days (Winker 2011, 203).  They also had to undergo a background 
check and a waiting period of months (DeConde 2001, 144).  Gangsters would have been able to 
afford the heavy tax but would not have wanted to submit to these other requirements.  Criminals 
were not expected to comply with these requirements, but if they were found with a firearm of 
these types, they would be sent to jail for up to five years merely for noncompliance (Winkler 
2011, 203).  The NFA successfully targeted the criminal use of these types of dangerous 
weapons, but was not comprehensive because it did not address other types of firearms. 
 Originally the NFA aimed to be more comprehensive than its final version that passed 
through Congress.  Roosevelt’s attorney general, Homer Cummings, initially proposed to include 
taxes on and the registration of handguns in the NFA (Vizzard 2000, 89; Winkler 2011, 210-11).  
The NFA bill, H.R. 9066, was introduced into the House by Congressman Sumners.  The 
Committee on Ways and Means carried out public hearings on the bill in 1934.  During the 
hearings, New York Congressman Crowther explained that he had received a number of 
telegrams from various rifle associations and clubs stating their opposition to any legislation that 
would put an undue burden on them (U.S. House 1934, 63).  In the testimony of NRA Vice 
President Karl Frederick, he explained his belief that the NFA’s application to pistols would 
prevent citizens from being able to adequately defend themselves:  
 I think that the result of this provision here will be to deprive the rural inhabitant, the inhabitant 
 of the small town, the inhabitant of the farm, of any opportunity to secure a weapon which he 
 perhaps more than anyone else needs for his self-defense and protection. I think that it would be 
 distinctly harmful to destroy the opportunity for self-defense of the ordinary man in the small 
 community, where police forces are not adequate (U.S. House 1934, 43).   
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Frederick further explained that by forcing a person to go to a federal official to fill out 
documents puts a burden on inhabitants of rural communities because there are more licensed 
dealers are in the cities (U.S. House 1934, 43-4).  The final bill that passed Congress was nearly 
identical to the one that entered the Committee, except pistols and revolvers were removed 
(Brabner-Smith 1934, 406).  The resistance shown by rifle associations to any regulation of 
handguns in the NFA suggests that their influence was a contributing factor to the final 
legislation which lacked comprehensiveness.    
 In 1938, the Federal Firearms Act (FFA) implemented further federal gun control 
legislation.  The Act obliged manufacturers, importers, dealers, and those involved in interstate 
or foreign gun trade to obtain a federal license and to keep records.  However, the license fee was 
extremely small, only a dollar.  The Act prohibited firearms shipments from going to individuals 
without permits in those states that required them.  It also prohibited convicted felons from 
obtaining firearms shipments and aimed to hinder the movement of stolen guns or those with 
altered serial numbers (DeConde 2001, 147).  After the NFA, Cummings had proposed a 
comprehensive bill that would have extended the Act to all types of firearms.  He believed a 
national registration system was necessary.  He believed those who refused to comply had 
something to hide because registration was a reasonable measure: “‘no honest man can object to 
it.  Show me the man who does not want this gun registered and I will show you a man who 
should not have a gun’” (DeConde 2001, 146).  However, ultimately no type of registration 
system was included in the FFA.   
 The FFA was not a strong or an effective regulation.  People, including felons, could 
easily skirt compliance with the provisions by lying.  Evasion was also possible because the 
Treasury Department did not fully enforce the FFA (DeConde 2001, 147).  The Justice 
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Department was unable to enforce the FFA because the power to prosecute those who supplied 
guns to criminals was effectively eradicated.  Language in the FFA made successful federal 
prosecution reliant upon proof that a person provided a gun to a criminal knowingly.  The Justice 
Department was not able to meet this requirement easily because a person selling firearms was 
not required to validate the purchaser’s eligibility (Spitzer 2008, 120).  Only less than one 
hundred arrests per year were made under the law between the 1930s and 1960s (Spitzer 2008, 
121).  While the FFA applied comprehensively to gangster weapons, handguns, shotguns and 
rifles, it weakly controlled their interstate commerce (Vizzard 2000, 90, 93). 
 The framework of the FFA was largely due to the NRA’s input.  New York Senator 
Royal S. Copeland introduced the bill into Congress in 1935, which he had worked closely with 
the NRA to create (DeConde 2001, 142, 146).  In a 1935 Senate hearing on the bill, NRA 
Executive President Milton Reckord said he supported the bill, to which Copeland stated, “‘You 
ought to be.  You had a lot to do with writing it’” (DeConde 2001, 141, 146).  Overall it is 
evident that for the federal firearm acts to pass, compromises had to be made with the NRA. 
These compromises involved eliminating provisions and collaboration in bill writing.  Gun 
organizations would not accept gun control law that they understood to treat honest gun owners 
and criminals in the same category (DeConde 2001, 148).  Karl Frederick’s statement from the 
1934 NFA hearings reveals this belief: “In my opinion, most of the proposals [of] the regulation 
of firearms, although ostensibly and properly aimed at the crook, do not reach the crook at all, 
but they do reach the honest man” (U.S. House 1934, 58).    However, the public did support 
more comprehensive gun control measures that targeted all gun owners.  The first Gallup poll on 
gun control in April 1938 revealed 84% of those surveyed supported pistol and revolver 
registration (DeConde 2001, 147).  
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 Overall the NFA and FFA were weak and ineffective because their main objective was 
narrowly aimed to control crime.  The regulations were inadequate because they only controlled 
individuals who were looking to obtain or already held firearms of a certain type.  They only 
targeted firearm possession by criminals, but they did not in any way try to burden the firearms 
industry or regular firearms customers (DeConde 2001, 147-8; Zimring 1975, 143).  For example, 
the extremely low dealer license fee of one dollar required by the FFA instigated private 
individuals to obtain dealer licenses to profit from the benefits of being a dealer, although they 
were not actually dealers (Spitzer 2008, 121).  The focus of the laws was to deny criminals’ 
access to guns.  However, the laws’ narrow focus on criminals ignored the reality that 
presumably law-abiding gun owners, as well as blatant criminals, could use guns in criminal 
ways.    
 
The Civil Rights Era: “Comprehensive” Federal Gun Control is Achieved 
 During the 1950s gun ownership grew, but the public simultaneously favored gun control 
measures.  American gun ownership boomed after WWII.  It was cheap to purchase and import 
military surplus guns and importation numbers were increasing by the mid 1950s (Winkler 2011, 
247; Zimring 1975, 144).  Between 1955 and 1958, the number of imported rifles increased from 
15,000 to 200,000, while handgun imports increased from 67,000 in 1955 to 130,000 in 1959 
(Zimring 1975, 144).  Between 1958 and 1968, Americans added more than 30 million guns to 
their collections (Winkler 2011, 250).  A 1959 Gallup poll revealed that about half of all 
American homes contained guns.  Nevertheless, three out of four people surveyed believed that 
one should be required to obtain a police permit to purchase a gun.  Also, 59% of those surveyed 
believed private handgun ownership should have been prohibited.  Private gun ownership largely 
increased in the 1950s, but it is evident that the public was not opposed to strengthening gun 
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control (DeConde 2001, 165).  Starting in the late 1950s, gun control advocates pushed for 
further gun control in Congress, but to no avail.  No further federal gun control legislation was 
passed from the 1930s until 1968 (Winkler 2011, 247). 
 Despite the lack of legislation, high profile shootings emphasized the need for the federal 
government to further address gun control in the 1960s.  President John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated in 1963 by Lee Harvey Oswald using a bolt-action rifle, which had been purchased 
under a fake name from an ad in the NRA’s American Rifleman magazine (DeConde 2001, 180).  
Kennedy’s assassination revealed the need for restrictions on mail-order firearms sales and ways 
to prevent a purchaser from using a fake name (Winkler 2011, 248).  In 1966, Charles Whitman 
killed sixteen and wounded thirty-three by shooting from a tower above the University of Texas 
at Austin campus (DeConde 2001, 180).  As a result of these incidents, Democratic Senator 
Christopher Dodd of Connecticut and President Lyndon Johnson became leaders of gun control 
reform.  Five days after Kennedy’s assassination Dodd proposed legislation to restrict mail-order 
sales of shotguns and rifles (Winkler 2011, 248).  However, Dodd’s bill failed in the Senate 
Commerce Committee in 1964 simply because the Committee chose not to do anything with it 
(Zimring 1975, 146; DeConde 2001, 174).  Johnson annually proposed comprehensive gun 
control measures, like universal federal registration and licenses for carrying guns (Winkler 2011, 
249).  Overall his proposals never made any progress in Congress (Winkler 2011, 249).  
However, public opinion supported firearm registration.  In September 1967, 66% of the public 
favored and 28% opposed federal laws that would control sales of guns, such as requiring a 
person to register all gun purchases despite where they were bought (“Harris Survey, Sep, 1967”).    
 The civil rights movement and new political assassinations reinvigorated the campaign 
for stronger gun control.  During 1967, violent race riots broke out across the nation (Winkler 
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2011, 249-50).  There had been a recent spike in firearm sales and permit applications in the few 
years before 1967 (Winkler 2011, 250).  An average of 600,000 handguns were sold a year 
between 1960 and 1964.  Between 1964 and 1968, the U.S. gun homicide increased 89%, while 
other means only increased 22% (Zimring 1975, 148).  A 1968 Stanford Research Institute report 
determined that the increased gun ownership was “‘directly related to the actuality and prospect 
of civil disorders’” (Winkler 2011, 250).  With guns in hand, rioters could more easily protect 
themselves while carrying out criminal activity.  The report also concluded that firearms controls 
were needed to lessen the violence (Winkler 2011, 250).  By 1969, the majority of homicides in 
major urban areas involved handguns (Zimring 1975, 148).   
 The assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy only two months apart in 
1968 finally provided the necessary political will to push through further federal gun control 
legislation.  The day after Kennedy’s death, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Street Act.  When the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) was adopted a few months later, 
provisions were amended and added to the Omnibus Crime Act (Winkler 2011, 251).  Although 
the GCA was an improvement from the FFA in that it was more comprehensive, the changes 
were still small and weak.   
 Although President Johnson advocated for strong regulations in the GCA, such as 
universal registration and licensing, Congress failed to support him (DeConde 2001, 186; Spitzer 
2008, 124).  During debate over the GCA bill, Johnson had said to Congress: “‘in the name of 
sanity…in the name of safety and in the name of an aroused nation to give America the gun-
control law it needs’” (Spitzer 2008, 123).  Johnson had been a gun control leader throughout his 
presidency, proposing gun control legislation every year since 1965.  In fact Johnson is 
responsible for more legislation in his presidency than any other president, which is the result of 
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his great legislative skills.  If any leader could have achieved strong gun control legislation, it 
seems Johnson should have been the one.  While he did achieve the GCA, it was not without the 
compromise of eliminating the comprehensive measures in the legislation that he believed were 
necessary (Spitzer 2008, 121, 122).  There was also a divide between rural and urban members in 
the Senate that contributed to the failure to pass stronger measures (Vizzard 2000, 104).  
However, during this time, the public still supported stronger measures.  A March 1968 survey 
found that 71% of the public favored and 23% opposed federal laws that would control the sales 
of guns, such as requiring people to register their gun purchases despite where they were bought 
(“Harris Survey, Mar, 1968”).    
 The Omnibus Crime Act and the GCA were narrowly tailored, focused on regulating gun 
dealers.  They prohibited the shipment of guns across state lines to anyone but federally licensed 
gun dealers and collectors.  It was illegal to sell guns to “prohibited persons” such as felons, the 
mentally ill, substance abusers, and minors.  They also expanded the federal dealer licensing 
system that was established in the FFA (Winkler 2011, 251).  The GCA focused on ensuring that 
bona fide importers, manufacturers, and sellers were involved in foreign interstate firearm trade 
by raising the dealer license fee.  However, the fee was only increased to ten dollars (DeConde 
2001, 186).  President Johnson had also hoped to achieve a ban on Saturday night specials (small, 
cheap, low quality handguns), but the GCA only achieved a ban on their import (DeConde 2001, 
186; Winkler 2011, 252). 
 The GCA’s key failure was that it did not enact any comprehensive system of regulating 
individual private ownership of firearms, but rather focused on the commercial transactions of 
firearms (Vizzard 2000, 98).  Although it focused on regulating dealers, the regulations did not 
diminish gun sales.  Despite a higher dealer licensing fee, the number of dealers also increased, 
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and the restrictions put on dealers did not significantly curb firearm sales ((Spitzer 2008, 124; 
Winkler 2011, 252; Vizzard 2000, 104).  Saturday night specials were defined ambiguously, so 
handguns not falling under the definition continued to be imported (Winkler 2011, 252; Spitzer 
2008, 125).  It is evident that the GCA was aimed at preventing the criminal possession of guns 
and was not meant to burden gun owners.  However, while the GCA prohibited dealers from 
transferring firearms to felons and other prohibited classes, it did not address the possession of 
firearms by these people.  The GCA also did not address the transfer of firearms by individuals 
to people of prohibited categories (Vizzard 2000, 99). 
 The weaknesses of the GCA also hindered the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(ATF) from being able to properly enforce federal gun control regulations.  Not only is the GCA 
a weak piece of legislation to begin with, but its weak effect is further compounded by its 
language that makes enforcing the laws difficult.  The ATF was responsible for overseeing the 
GCA’s federal dealer licensing process.  The laws were ambiguous in regards to who was 
required to have a license.  The laws required people who “engaged in the business” of dealing 
firearms to be licensed, but it did not define those terms.  Also, since the dealer license price was 
a low $10, people could easily get licenses that allowed them to buy or sell guns across state 
lines (Winkler 2011, 255).  Due to a lack of clarity in the law, the ATF’s actions were sometimes 
inconsistent.  For example, under the law, the ATF could deny license renewal because the 
dealer sold only two or three firearms.  At the same time, the ATF could prosecute an unlicensed 
dealer for selling two or three firearms (Vizzard 2000, 123).  This inconsistency opened the ATF 
up to criticism by gun owners because the ATF’s actions seemed to be only focused on 
prosecuting gun owners for technicalities rather than focusing on actual criminals (Vizzard 2000, 
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123; Winkler 2011, 255).  But in reality, due to the ambiguity of the law, the ATF was unable to 
clearly distinguish between the law-abiding and lawbreaking individuals.  
   
The Development of the Extremist NRA and the Weakening of the Gun Control Act (GCA) 
  The origins of the present-day extremist NRA lie with the organization’s backlash to the 
GCA.  Divisions within the organization began during the debate over the GCA bill when the 
NRA’s Executive Vice President, Franklin Orth, showed some support for the bill by saying that 
“‘any sane American’” could not protest the bill that would control the “‘instrument which 
killed’” President Kennedy (DeConde 2001, 205).  Orth was one of the association’s moderates 
who wanted to shift the NRA’s focus back to hunting and conservation and away from politics 
(Spitzer 2008, 96).  However, the majority of the association’s voting members were hardliners 
(DeConde 2001, 205).  Since 1968, the hardliners had been upset by the organization’s 
movement towards refocusing its purpose to hunting and conservation.  In 1975, the NRA’s 
lobbying arm, the Institute for Legislative Action (ILA), was established and run by Harlon 
Carter.  However, the ILA was not well-funded, which was partly a result of the organization’s 
refocusing.  A debate was growing within the organization about whether it should be lobbying 
at all (Davison 1993, 34).  The NRA leadership also planned to build a National Shooting Center 
in New Mexico.  The plans included shooting facilities, but the leadership also considered adding 
other programs such as camping training and conservation education.  Thus the leadership 
considered calling it the National Outdoor Center.  This name choice revealed to the hardliners 
that the organization’s purpose was truly moving away from being a gun organization (Davison 
1993, 35).  The division among the NRA leaders would come to a head in 1977. 
 A major turning point for the future of gun control reform feasibility in the United States 
occurred at the NRA’s convention in Cincinnati, Ohio in 1977.  At the convention, the hardliners 
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executed a coup, removing the leadership and placed Harlon Carter in charge (DeConde 2001, 
205).  This event marked a permanent change in the NRA’s purpose.  From there on out, the 
NRA rejected all gun control proposals, big or small, based on the belief that it would create a 
“slippery slope” to more gun control.  The NRA no longer considered compromise as an option 
when it came to gun control legislation (DeConde 2001, 205).  By the mid-1970s, NRA leaders 
started pushing for the GCA’s repeal (Winkler 2011, 256).  In a March 1980 issue of the 
American Rifleman, President Woodson Scott stated that he wanted the GCA repealed and 
described it as “‘a legislative monstrosity saddled upon the people in a period of emotionalism’” 
(Winkler 2011, 256).  After the coup, the NRA worked towards gaining back rights for gun 
owners.  
 The 1986 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA) significantly damaged the GCA by 
expanding the rights of gun owners, further weakening federal gun control’s comprehensiveness.  
FOPA eliminated what the NRA viewed as unnecessary burdens on law-abiding gun owners.  
The law permitted the interstate trade of rifles and shotguns if the sale was legal in the states of 
the purchaser and seller (DeConde 2011, 229).  The Act removed ammunition dealer’s 
responsibility of record-keeping and lessened gun sale restrictions by unlicensed individuals.  
The ATF could not require gun dealers to preserve centralized records.  It also allowed dealers to 
sell guns at gun shows without federal licenses (DeConde 2001, 230).  This secondary market of 
guns at gun shows is one of the most problematic weaknesses contributing to gun violence in 
America today.   
 According to the NRA’s Institute for Legislative Action (ILA), the NRA had been 
working towards FOPA’s passage since 1979, when the ILA drafted the legislation.  The 
legislation was introduced into the House by former Democratic Congressman Harold Volkmer 
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from Missouri, also a member of the NRA Executive Committee, and Republican Senator James 
McClure from Idaho.  Over the next seven years, the NRA worked with these individuals to 
achieve the legislation.  This involved altering provision language, determining the most viable 
way to get it passed, like attaching it to an appropriations bill, and gathering signatures from 
politicians who would vote for it.  According to the NRA, FOPA was a “victory” (Hardy 2011).   
 FOPA also severely handicapped the ability of the ATF to carry out law enforcement.  
For example, FOPA has hindered the ATF’s ability to prosecute gun traffickers who sell firearms 
unlicensed.  Before FOPA, people were supposed to obtain a federal license if they were selling 
five or more guns per year.  FOPA amended this rule so that those who make occasional gun 
sales or buy guns as a hobby do not have to become federally licensed.  However, there is no 
clear definition indicating the number of guns or profits requiring a person to become federally 
licensed.  This hole in the law allows guns to be transferred to criminals and minors.  Since the 
traffickers are operating in the secondary market, there are no records of their transfers.  They 
can avoid prosecution by lying and saying that they were only selling a few guns from their 
private collection (Braga 2001, 547).  Not only did FOPA largely damage American federal gun 
control legislation, it made even the enforcement of the weak laws very difficult.   
 
The 1990s: A Push for Federal Gun Control Reform 
 
Assault Weapons Ban 
 
 A 1989 schoolyard gun massacre inspired gun control reform in the United States 
focused on regulating semiautomatic assault weapons (Spitzer 2008, 129).  The shooter used a 
Chinese AK-47 assault rifle to wound 29 children and kill 5 children in Stockton, California 
(Spitzer 2008, 129, 130).  The event immediately brought about public concern over assault 
weapons.  The Gallup Report in 1989 indicated that 75% of the public was in favor of a federal 
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ban on semiautomatic rifles (DeConde 2001, 237).  Just weeks after the shooting at least thirty 
states and numerous localities considered enacting assault weapon bans (Davidson 1993, 206).   
 The eventual assault weapons ban originated as a bill proposal by Arizona Senator 
Dennis DeConcini in 1989 (Davison 1993, 211, 212, 226-7).  DeConcini was greatly favored by 
the NRA.  He had never voted against the NRA and was a key member in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee to get the FOPA legislation passed (Davison 1993, 211).  DeConcini’s bill would 
have banned a few domestic and imported semiautomatic assault weapons, but allowed present 
owners to keep their firearms (Davison 1993, 212).  DeConcini proposed his “‘reasonable middle 
position’” bill in response to Senator Howard Metzenbaum’s bill.  DeConcini thought 
Metzenbaum’s bill was “‘far-reaching’” because it intended to ban many imported and domestic 
weapons, as well as confiscate guns from present owners (Davison 1993, 211).  DeConcini’s bill 
passed the Senate, but then died in the House (Davison 1993, 226; Luo and Cooper 2012).   
 The difficult process of passing the assault weapons ban reveals the pervasive resistance 
to comprehensive gun control legislation in Congress.  The slim passage of the assault weapons 
ban required support across party lines.  The eventual assault weapons ban was part of a bigger 
crime bill (Spitzer 2008, 131).  A version of DeConcini’s ban did not pass the Senate until 1993 
after Senate ban supporters, led by Democratic California Senator Dianne Feinstein, were able to 
add it to the crime bill (Luo and Cooper 2012).  When the bill reached the Senate, there was a 
significant amount of bipartisan support, which was hopeful and necessary to offset the 
opposition of anti-gun control Democrats.  However, the bipartisan support deteriorated because 
the House had uncharacteristically amended the original conference committee version of the bill 
(Spitzer 2008, 133).  The ban passed the House only by a two-vote margin.  Understandably, the 
politicians with the greatest opposition to the bill came from the South and West.  Congressional 
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voting on the assault weapons ban was reflective of voting on past gun control bills where there 
was a lack of party discipline.  While more Democrats supported it (177) than Republicans (137) 
in the House, a significant number of Democrats (77) opposed it and some Republicans 
supported it (38) (Spitzer 2008, 131).  The Senate was only able to pass the bill in 1994, due to 
almost full support of the Democrats and the support of six Republicans (Spitzer 2008, 133).   
 Like previous pieces of federal gun control legislation, the assault weapons ban was only 
minimally effective because it was not comprehensive.  The ban was able to survive within the 
crime bill because compromises were made: the sunset provision, a shorter list of banned guns, 
and a larger exemptions category (Luo and Cooper 2012).  The ten year ban prohibited the sale 
and possession of 19 types of weapons, as well as a number of copycat weapons that shared two 
or more characteristics with the specified types.  The ban did not include 661 types of sporting 
rifles.  Assault weapons already in possession were exempted from the ban and Congress could 
choose to include more weapons to the ban later on.  It also banned gun clips that held more than 
10 bullets (Spitzer 2008, 133).  The ban defined assault weapons by their military-style visual 
characteristics, rather than the capability of rapid fire.  However, the visual characteristics do not 
have any influence on the gun’s lethality (Winkler 2011, 38).  Gun manufacturers were also able 
to evade the terms of the ban by making slight alterations to the appearance of guns that were 
functionally the same as assault weapons (Winkler 2011, 39).  
 To effectively eliminate highly lethal weapons, a comprehensive ban on semiautomatic 
long guns would have been necessary, not a ban merely based on cosmetic appearance.  The 
large amount of exemptions under the law could otherwise be considered assault weapons if the 
law had banned semiautomatic rifles (Winkler 2011, 38).  However, a more comprehensive ban 
was not possible because of a lack of congressional support according to David Yassky, who 
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worked on the ban as the chief counsel to the House subcommittee on crime: “‘A broader 
definition of assault weapons would have been safer, would have resulted in fewer highly 
dangerous weapons making their way through the ban – but there just were not the votes for it’” 
(Luo and Cooper 2012).  Once again, compromises had to be made, which led to a piece of 
federal gun legislation that lacked effectiveness. 
 In 2004 the extension of the expired assault weapons ban failed.  The Democratic Party 
had been in control of the House since 1954 and the passage of the ban had occurred just before 
the 1994 elections.  In the 1994 elections, the Republican Party gained House majority (Winkler 
2011, 39).  Former President Clinton believes that the NRA’s discontent with the assault 
weapons ban played a large role in the Republicans gaining House control in 1994: “‘They were 
mad about this whole weapons ban and the Brady Bill, and they probably took 15 of our House 
members out. That was their number, they said between 15 and 20, and I'd say, at least on the 
low side, they were right’” (“Clinton Detects” 2010).  In March 2004, supporters of the ban in 
the Senate attached the renewed ban to a bill to protect gun manufacturers and dealers from 
lawsuits, which had already passed the House (Spitzer 2008, 135).  The original ban had passed 
the Senate by a vote of 52 to 47 with the votes in favor composed of 10 Republicans, 41 
Democrats, and one Independent.  However, the vote to renew the ban was overwhelmingly 
disfavored and failed due to a vote of 90 to 8 (Stolberg 2004).  The Senate’s reversal was 
shocking (Spitzer 2008, 135).  Republican Arizona Senator John McCain said, “‘I’ve been 
around here 18 years and I’ve never seen anything quite this bizarre’” (Stolberg 2004).  
According to The New York Times, just prior to the vote for the overall bill was held, NRA 
executive vice president Wayne LaPierre sent emails to senators insisting that they vote against 
the bill.  Specifically, Senate Democrats were seen reading the email on their BlackBerry pagers.  
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The email message warned senators that the NRA would use the vote “‘in our future evaluations 
and endorsements of candidates’” (Stolberg 2004).  According to Senator Feinstein, the NRA 
was to blame for the failed ban renewal: “‘They had the power to turn around at least 60 votes in 
the Senate. That’s amazing to me’” (Stolberg 2004).  Both the House takeover by the 
Republicans in 1994 and the Senate vote turnaround in 2004 suggests that the gun lobby 
influenced the failed outcome of the ban renewal.  
 The expiration of the ban was a great defeat because it further weakened the strength of 
American federal gun control.  Although the ban had large flaws weakening its effect, it did 
appear to have some impact in decreasing the number of assault weapons involved in crime.  In a 
2004 study, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence found that during the ban, the percentage 
of assault weapons in the ATF’s crime gun traces decreased by 66% in comparison to the pre-
ban rate (“On Target” 2004, 7).  The Center also found that manufacture of copycat weapons did 
not completely undermine the positive effects of the ban in reducing the frequency of use of 
assault weapons in crimes.  Comparing pre and post ban periods, there was a decline of 45% of 
assault weapons in crime gun traces, even when including copycat firearms in the assault 
weapons category (“On Target” 2004, 10).  Although the ban had significant faults, the 
expiration of the ban again allowed the free flow of all types of assault weapons and eliminated 
the positive effects that the ban did have.   
 
The Brady Act: The Establishment of Background Checks 
 Yet another high profile shooting in American history led to a movement towards 
achieving more comprehensive gun control legislation.  In the 1981 assassination attempt on 
President Ronald Reagan, the President, Press Secretary Jim Brady, Secret Service Agent Tim 
McCarthy, and D.C. policeman Thomas Delahanty were all shot.  Brady experienced a serious 
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head wound that would permanently partially paralyze him.  When the shooter, John Hinckley, 
purchased the gun that he used in the assassination attempt from a Dallas pawnshop, he lied 
about his address by using an outdated driver’s license.  If a background check had been required 
during the purchase, his lie would have been detected (“The Brady Law”).  As a result, Brady 
and his wife, Sarah, embarked on seven year long campaign in 1986 to achieve background 
check legislation on handgun purchases (“The Brady Law”; Spitzer 2008, 135).   
 The achievement of the Brady Handgun Prevention Act of 1993 is yet another example of 
a failure to achieve comprehensive gun control.  The Act established a federal background check 
system, but the legislation adopted did not come without far-reaching weaknesses.  The Brady 
Bill was first introduced into the Senate in early 1987 by gun control proponents and it was 
defeated in the House in September 1988.  The NRA spent between $1.5 million and $3 million 
on a media campaign and grassroots efforts to advocate against the bill.  Then in May and June 
of 1991, the House and the Senate voted in favor of a seven-day waiting period (Spitzer 2008, 
136).  However, the June 1991 Senate version of the bill required a five day instead of a seven 
day waiting period.  The Brady Bill was also attached to an omnibus crime bill.  The bill was 
voted on by the Senate twice in 1992, but both failed due to filibusters7 (Spitzer 2008, 137).   
 The gun lobby favored an instant check system because it was less burdensome on the 
purchaser (Winkler 2011, 71).  The NRA had shown that it favored an instant check system for 
handgun buyers since 1988 when the McCollum amendment was introduced, asking the U.S. 
Attorney General to create such a system.  The NRA spent $2 million on advertisements and 
letters to Congressional members to support it at the time (Davidson 1993, 198, 250).  In 1990 
                                                 
7
 The Senate can delay or block legislation by using a filibuster, which allows debate on legislation to continue until 
a two-thirds majority Senate vote is reached to end it (“Powers & Procedure”; “Filibuster”) 
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the NRA had full page advertisements in Washington, D.C. newspapers explaining that a waiting 
period would prevent honest people from buying handguns, not criminals (Davidson 1993, 250).   
 Finally in 1993, the Brady Act passed, but as the result of a further compromise.  One 
amendment, of the several sponsored by Republicans, was added to the bill before the final vote 
that phased out the waiting period after five years (Spitzer 2008, 138).  In its final form, the 
Brady Act required a five day waiting period on handgun purchases (Winkler 2011, 71).  In five 
years the federal government had to create a computerized national database, which federally 
licensed gun dealers would use to verify that purchasers of all types of firearms did not fall under 
one of the GCA’s categories of prohibited persons (Winkler 2011, 71; Krouse 2012, 23).   
 In 1998 the Brady Act’s five day waiting period on handguns expired and the National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) was established by the FBI.   Between 1993 
and 1998, 12.7 million background checks on handguns were carried out in which 312,000 
applicants were denied.  This is the minimum standard background check; states can implement 
a more stringent background check, such as establishing waiting periods or licenses for 
possession.  The applicant’s information is checked in three computerized databases to determine 
their eligibility: the NICS index, the Interstate Identification Index, and the National Crime 
Information Center (Krouse 2012, 23).   
 The FBI manages the background checks for some states, and some states are full or 
partial points of contact for background checks.  States that are points of contact must contact a 
state agency which then contacts the FBI to do the checks.  The NICS process is allowed to take 
up to three days to provide a decision back to the dealer, but if it does not, the dealer has the 
discretion to sell the firearm to the applicant.  The background check process may not be as 
quick in point of contact states because the check goes through a state agency, but it may be 
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more meticulous because state agencies may have better access to records that are not available 
through the NICS (Krouse 2012, 24).  It is evident that state agencies do in fact carry out a better 
check.  Of the 95.1 million checks done between December 1998 and 2009, 54.2 million were 
completed solely by the FBI and had a denial rate of 1.4%, while 40.9 million checks done by a 
full or partial contact state had a higher denial rate of 2.1% (Krouse 2012, 26).  Given the more 
elaborate, yet more thorough background check procedure in point of contact states, three days is 
a very short period of time for the check to be carried out.  The dealer’s ability to choose to sell a 
gun after three days allows for the strong possibility that the gun will go to a prohibited person in 
these situations.  The evident flaw in this system is its convoluted nature.  There is a clear need 
for a more efficient process.  However, if points of contact states are to continue to exist in the 
meantime, then it is essential that the waiting period is increased.   
 The present federal background check system can also have deadly consequences 
because the NICS lacks comprehensive information.  Such consequences were fully realized 
when the 2007 Virginia Tech mass shooting occurred.  Seung-Hui Cho killed 32 people on the 
Virginia Tech campus with two handguns he had purchased from Wisconsin and Virginia gun 
dealers after having passed the federal background check done by both dealers.  However, two 
years prior, a state judge found that Cho was a danger to himself due to mental illness, thus 
charging him to obtain outpatient psychiatric treatment (Jost 2007, 459).   
   Many states have failed to provide information to the NICS due to a number of different 
challenges.  Overall states face technological and legal challenges (“Sharing Promising” 2012, 9).  
According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Department of Justice and state officials 
have said that they face technological barriers, such as the need to update old computer systems 
or integrate existing systems to try to provide mental health records to the NICS (“Sharing 
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Promising” 2012, 11).  Also state privacy laws hinder making records available.  For example in 
Idaho, officials must defer to privacy law, since there is no explicit state-level statutory authority 
to share mental health records (“Sharing Promising” 2012, 12).  In general, states have often 
declined to provide mental health records because state mental health, patients’ rights, and 
privacy laws forbid disclosure.  The DOJ stated in congressional testimony following the 
Virginia Tech massacre that about half of the 70 million criminal history records in the Interstate 
Identification Index were lacking final dispositions.  Situations such as these often result in a 
slowed background check process, so the check is not completed in the three day maximum, 
thereby allowing a firearm transfer to happen.  The DOJ also reported that many states had not 
forwarded records to the FBI indicating that people were determined to be mentally defective by 
the court.  As of April 30, 2007, the NICS index only contained 168,000 mental defective 
records from 22 states (Krouse 2012, 28).  The number of mental defective records increased 
from 175,000 to 400,000 after the massacre.  The number increased again to 859,000 by May 
2010, largely thanks to federal grants given to states to improve their electronic access to records.  
Nevertheless, about half of states had not provided any records or only some, revealing the great 
extent of the information gap (Krouse 2012, 29).   
 The Brady Act also does not require unlicensed individuals to carry out background 
checks when making a gun sale.  Since the NICS only applies to gun sales by federally licensed 
dealers, the private sale of guns, or the “secondary market” is not subject to background checks 
(Spitzer 2008, 140).  This is a devastating weakness because forty percent of all gun sales in 
America are private (Cook and Ludwig 1997, 6-7).  A study of the impact of the Brady Act 
revealed that the Act was not associated with a reduction in overall homicide rates or suicide 
rates (Ludwig and Cook 2000, 588, 590).  The study recognized that since private sales compose 
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such a large part of gun sales, it can largely limit the effectiveness of Brady’s regulations on 
legal gun sales (Ludwig and Cook 2000, 590).  Cook and Ludwig believe that the secondary 
market is the most compelling explanation for the Brady Act’s limited impact because its 
background check had no effect on the private transactions that provide guns to criminals (Cook 
and Ludwig 2013, 28).   
 The “gun show loophole” is a component within the secondary market of guns that 
allows prohibited categories of people to easily obtain guns (Winkler 2011, 73).  Gun shows are 
a popular venue for unlicensed individuals to carry out private gun sales.  Gun shows also attract 
those who know they would not be able to pass a background check due to the volume of private 
sellers there (Winkler 2011, 74).  Private sellers are often willing to sell to “prohibited” 
categories of people.  An investigation by the City of New York of seven gun shows in three 
states found that 63% of private sellers sold firearms to people who said they probably would not 
pass a background check (“Gun Show Undercover” 2009, 6).  The investigators also found that 
multiple private sellers were clearly “engaged in a business” because they made statements 
indicating that they sold numerous firearms regularly and for profit (“Gun Show Undercover” 
2009, 24-25).  One Columbus, Ohio private seller demonstrated these “business” characteristics: 
“We keep a nice selection.  We got revolvers…We have nice automatics…,” and when asked by 
the investigators if he sold a lot, he replied, “Mmm – hm.  A lot’” (“Gun Show Undercover” 
2009, 24).   
 Federally licensed dealers selling at gun shows are legally required to carry out the 
federal background check, but in many cases this law is not obeyed (Winkler 2011, 73).  
However, at gun shows it is easy for licensed dealers to pretend to be private sellers in order to 
make quick and easy sales (DeConde 2001, 277).  The City of New York investigators found that 
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94% of licensed dealers illegally sold to people they knew were straw purchasers (“Gun Show 
Undercover” 2009, 7).  A straw purchaser is a person who masquerades as the actual firearm 
purchaser but is actually obtaining the firearm for another person (Krouse 2012, 18).  Straw 
purchases are illegal under the GCA and it is illegal if the straw purchaser knew that the recipient 
was a prohibited person (Krouse 2012, 18).  It is difficult for the ATF to prosecute corrupt 
licensed dealers because they can easily conceal their activities in their records by making false 
entries and choosing not to keep the required information about the purchase.  FOPA also 
lessened the severity of many of these record-keeping violations from felonies to misdemeanors 
(Braga 2001, 547).    
 The Brady Act has also been weakened in such a way that straw purchases or other 
firearm-related crime investigations are nearly impossible for the ATF to complete (“The NRA: 
A Criminal’s” 2006, 17-18; Krouse 2012, 33).  Since 2004, federally licensed dealers are 
required to destroy approved federal background check records within 24 hours (“The NRA: A 
Criminal’s” 2006, 18).  NRA allies in Congress were able to add a rider provision into an 
appropriations bill that achieved the 24 hour period (“The NRA: A Criminal’s” 2006, 17).  This 
rider was adopted in 2004 as part of the Tiahrt Amendments, a set of appropriations riders named 
after Republican Kansas Congressman Todd Tiahrt who introduced them on behalf of the NRA 
(Stachelberg et al. 2013, 4, 5, 6, 13).  Overall the Amendments aimed to prevent the ATF from 
being able to use and share crime gun trace data with other law enforcement agencies and the 
public (Stachelberg et al. 2013, 5, 6).  This data can link guns to the manufacturer, the original 
dealer, and the perhaps the owner (Stachelberg et al. 2013, 5).  The GAO was opposed to this 
proposal because it believed keeping records for 90 days was important for the government to 
properly audit the NICS system for accuracy (“The NRA: A Criminal’s” 2006, 17).  The 
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elimination of the background check records just one day after the purchase seriously inhibits the 
ATF from investigating any criminal transactions. 
 The deadly consequences of the secondary market, the gun show loophole, and straw 
purchasing can be seen most clearly through the 1999 Columbine High School massacre.  Eric 
Harris and Dylan Klebold shot and killed twelve students and one teacher, wounded more than 
twenty others, and killed themselves at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado (Winkler 
2011, 73, 74).  Since the boys were minors, they could not obtain firearms legally.  Klebold’s 
eighteen year old girlfriend agreed to be their straw purchaser and bought the guns they would 
use in the massacre at a gun show from private sellers (Winkler 2011, 73; Spitzer 2008, 71).  
Addressing the devastating weaknesses of the secondary market, the gun show loophole, and 
straw purchasing are absolutely essential in order to make federal gun control legislation more 
comprehensive. 
  
Part III:  Improving the Present Federal Gun Control System  
The Need for a Strong Minimum Standard 
 The main purpose of a federal gun control law is to create a minimum standard that 
prevents a state with a more permissive system from undermining one with a more restrictive 
system (Cook and Leitzel 1996, 93).  However, the U.S.’s federal gun control system is weak, 
which allows for the easy flow of guns across borders.  Based on the ATF’s 2010 crime trace 
data, thirty-one states with the weakest gun control laws export nine times as many crime guns as 
the six states with the strongest gun control laws (“Brady Issues 2011 State Scorecard” 2012).  
After grading state gun laws in 2012 based on regulation strength, the Law Center to Prevent 
Gun Violence found that twenty-four of the twenty-five states that transfer the most crime guns 
per capita to other states were given a grade of D or lower.  The Center also found that 95.6% of 
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the states with gun death rates above the national average were give a grade of D or lower.  The 
data indicates that the states with weak gun laws have both more crime gun transfers and gun 
deaths (“Gun Laws Matter 2012”).  The federal minimum standard must be raised to a higher 
level of regulation to moderate the disparities between state systems.  Also, if a stronger 
minimum standard is achieved, states can only further increase their level of regulation.   
   Federal gun control cannot effectively moderate the disparities in the country’s gun laws 
if the enforcement agency does not have the proper resources.  If interstate firearm transfers are 
well regulated, then the movement of guns from high to low regulation states is not easily 
facilitated.  The GCA only allows mail-order firearm shipments to federally licensed dealers, 
who then must observe state and local laws in conducting firearm sales (Cook and Leitzel 1996, 
93).  However, effective enforcement by the ATF is in general not common due to structural 
weaknesses in the laws, as has been discussed in this chapter, and gun advocates’ work over the 
years to ensure that the agency has not had the proper resources (Spitzer 2008 151-2; Winkler 
2011, 74).  For example, between 1980 and 1993 the number of federal firearm licenses 
increased by 59%, but the number of ATF inspectors decreased by 13%, which means that 90% 
of applicants did not have an inspector interview (Spitzer 2008, 151-2).  In 1990, only 2% of all 
gun dealers were inspected by the ATF (Spitzer 2008. 152).  The ATF’s funding has also 
stagnated over the last decade, having only increased by $250 million despite that the immense 
amount of gun dealers continues to grow (Braga and Gagliardi 2013, 150-1).  As will be further 
discussed in the next chapter, improving federal gun control legislation requires also improving 
the funding and staffing of the ATF. 
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The Supreme Court Clarifies the Meaning of the Second Amendment  
 
 The most recent event in the history of American gun control, having great implications 
for the future feasibility of strengthening gun control, is the 2008 Supreme Court decision of 
District of Columbia v. Heller.  Since 1876, when the Court first ruled on the Second 
Amendment, it has continued to interpret the right to bear arms as connected to government 
regulated militias (Spitzer 2008, 29-33).  However, throughout the U.S.’s modern history, gun 
ownership has been treated as an individual right.  This case has changed the Court’s course of 
interpretation of the Second Amendment and the constitutionality of future gun control measures.   
 The Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of Washington, D.C.’s handgun ban 
and the requirement that all long guns are disassembled or trigger locked when not in use 
(Winkler 2011, 6).  In a 5-4 decision, the Court found the laws to be unconstitutional under the 
Second Amendment.  First, the Court found that the Second Amendment grants an individual 
right to possess a firearm for self-defense, such as at one’s home.  In addition, the Second 
Amendment does not grant an absolute right that cannot be limited.  Justice Scalia, who authored 
the majority opinion, stated that the Second Amendment is not an absolute individual right:  
 There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second  Amendment 
 conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, 
 just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 
 553 U. S. ___ (2008). Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens 
 to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect 
 the right of citizens to speak for any purpose (“Opinion of the Court” 2008, 22).  
 
The Second Amendment permits many types of gun control measures.  The Court provides the 
example that concealed carry prohibitions are constitutional, as well as those on the possession 
of firearms by felons or the mentally ill.  Thirdly, the Court found the handgun ban and the 
trigger lock requirement unconstitutional.  The ban prohibits an entire group of firearms that 
Americans choose to use for self-defense.  The requirement to disassemble or trigger lock a 
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firearm when not in use is unconstitutional because it hinders a person’s ability to use the firearm 
for self-defense purposes (“Syllabus” 2008).  Although the Heller decision eliminated the 
possibility of handgun bans or certain safe keeping requirements, it has confirmed the 
constitutionality of other forms of gun control that do not unreasonably hinder a regular citizen’s 
ability to use a gun for self-defense. 
 The Court’s decision and opinion were a victory for both sides of the gun debate.  The 
outcome of the Heller decision is aligned with the early history of American gun control where 
there was a balance between the individual right to self-defense and the protection of public 
safety.  The Heller decision established that individuals have the right to bear arms for self 
defense, but this right is not absolute and can be regulated in the name of public safety (Winkler 
2011, 294).  The “slippery slope” argument used by the gun lobby to oppose any gun control 
measure is neutralized by the Heller decision because it clearly states that civilian disarmament 
is unconstitutional (Winkler 2011, 295).  Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court evaluated 
Chicago’s handgun ban in McDonald v. Chicago.  The Court found that the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment to the states (“McDonald v. Chicago”).  
Together the Heller and McDonald decisions confirmed that the Second Amendment does not 
provide a barrier to strengthening gun control at the federal, state, or local level, which provides 
hope for the improvement of America’s weak federal gun control legislation. 
 
Conclusion 
 The United States desperately needs to eliminate the weaknesses in its federal gun control 
legislation in order to establish a stronger minimum standard.  Since gun control laws are made 
at the state and local levels, having a strong minimum standard in the United States is essential to 
help mitigate the deadly effects of those states with weak gun laws.  While the Australian gun 
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lobby prevented national legislation from being achieved for many years, federal gun control 
legislation has already been achieved a number of times in the United States.  However, 
whenever federal legislation was achieved, it was always weak and largely ineffective.  It is 
crucial that compromises made in the future during the legislative process do not hinder the 
effectiveness of the policy in such a way that significantly endangers public safety.  Over the 
decades, comprehensive gun control legislation was introduced by supportive political leaders 
and somewhat favored by the public, but passage was not achieved.  A lack of widespread 
political and public will combined with the NRA’s influence prevented comprehensive gun 
control reform from being successful.   
 The decisions made in Heller and McDonald have established that many of the gun 
control measures embodied in Australia’s 1996 National Firearms Agreement would be 
constitutional for the United States to adopt.  Australia’s National Firearms Agreement has been 
so successful because it lacks any damaging compromises that hinder its effectiveness.  In the 
next chapter, I will discuss which policies of the NFA are most necessary and feasible to achieve 
based on American gun control history, the current political atmosphere, and public opinion.  I 
will also discuss the application of the lessons learned from the NFA’s achievement process 
towards the passage of more comprehensive federal legislation in the United States.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Lessons from the National Firearms Agreement for the Achievement  
of Comprehensive Gun Control Reform in the United States 
 
 The achievement of the National Firearms Agreement (NFA) in Australia can impart 
some important lessons to the American federal government about political leadership, advocacy, 
developing public support, and specific policies concerning gun control reform.  This chapter 
considers these lessons and their implications for American federal gun control reform.  The 
chapter also examines how these lessons are already being carried out by the American federal 
government and the public in response to the recent December 2012 mass shooting.  The 
response of the government and the public to the shooting has been a sign of hope for movement 
towards the achievement of gun control reform in the near future.  The response to the shooting 
has been somewhat comparable to that of the Australian Government and public after the Port 
Arthur massacre.  
 The first part of the chapter presents the important lesson of strong political leadership 
advocating for national gun control reform.  The NFA was achieved so soon after the Port Arthur 
massacre because Prime Minister Howard demanded it by making national gun control reform a 
top priority issue.  Howard also advocated for gun control reform in terms of public safety, as a 
neutral way to appeal to all citizens.  While Howard did have overwhelming support for reform 
from the public, recent public opinion research does show that a majority of Americans now 
support more comprehensive gun control measures.  President Barack Obama has begun to show 
strong leadership, reminiscent of Howard, through his public statements after the shooting and 
through the administration’s release of a gun control proposal.    
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 The second part of the chapter presents the most important policy lessons from the NFA.  
Due to the existence of the Second Amendment individual right to gun ownership and 
differences in political systems, the ease and feasibility of achieving the NFA policies as national 
legislation in the United States is not the same as in Australia.  The policies cannot be recreated 
in the United States, rather they must be a guide for the U.S.  The strength and the components of 
the policies must be adapted to fit American conditions so that they can be more politically 
feasible.  The most valuable NFA policy lessons for the U.S. are an assault weapons ban, the 
regulation of the secondary firearms market, and national registration and licensing systems.  To 
effectively enforce these policies, as well as existing American federal gun control legislation, 
the ATF will need improved funding and staff.  Also, in order to formulate effective gun control 
policies based on those of the NFA, the American government must sponsor and fund gun 
violence research.  Ever since the NFA’s achievement, the Australian Government has continued 
to study gun violence and patterns of firearms usage.   
 The chapter ends by considering the best policymaking approach for achieving federal 
gun control legislation.  Given the difficulty of achieving bold national change in America, small 
gun control reform victories at the local and state level may provide a pathway towards national-
level reform.  This approach will help to improve the strength of the country’s body of 
legislation overall, while simultaneously working towards national legislation.  The gun control 
lobby can play an important role in achieving national reform, especially if this policymaking 
approach is used.  Evidence shows that the gun control lobby can effectively influence 
congressional voting on legislation through its grassroots lobbying efforts.  With adequate 
funding, the gun control lobby has the ability to more successfully overcome the NRA’s power. 
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Part I: Lessons of the NFA for Political Leadership on Gun Control Reform  
 
Strong Political Leadership  
 
 The most significant lesson that the achievement of the NFA can impart to the U.S. is the 
importance of strong political leadership on gun control reform.  The NFA would not have 
successfully passed if immediately after the Port Arthur massacre, Prime Minister John Howard 
had not taken a staunch public position of achieving national gun control legislation.  Even 
without the support of his party, Howard stood firm in his goal of achieving the NFA.  Had a 
different prime minister had been in office during the Port Arthur massacre who had not been 
supportive of national gun control legislation, the NFA would not have been achieved in 1996.  
While the massacre did provide an impetus for change, Howard acted upon and took advantage 
of the opportunity that the event provided.  As described in Chapter 1, numerous gun massacres 
have occurred in Australia, but none of them led to national change.  In the past, American 
federal gun control legislation has been achieved in the aftermath of shootings, but no political 
leader has been able to achieve truly comprehensive gun control legislation. 
 In order to achieve more comprehensive gun control legislation, future American political 
leaders need to take an unyielding stance.  The December 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary school 
shooting in Newtown, Connecticut, killing 27 people including 18 children, has provided yet 
again another opportunity to pass more comprehensive gun control legislation.  Immediately 
after the tragedy, President Obama showed a level of gun control reform leadership that has not 
been seen by any president in recent years.  On the day of the shooting, President Obama stated 
in an address from the White House that the federal government would need to act as a result of 
the tragedy, but he did not refer to any specific policy changes.  Obama wiped away tears and 
said, “‘We’re going to have to come together and take meaningful action to prevent more 
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tragedies like this, regardless of the politics’” (O’Sullivan 2012).  Three days after the tragedy, 
Obama asked his Cabinet members, led by Vice President Biden, to prepare a set of proposals to 
reduce gun violence (Wilson and Rucker 2012).    
 On January 16, 2013, only a month after the Newtown shooting, Biden’s gun policy task 
force released its recommendations marking “the most sweeping effort at gun control policy 
reform in a generation” (Stein and Rudolf 2013).  The proposal contains four sections: law 
enforcement, the availability of dangerous firearms and ammunition, school safety, and mental 
health.  According to one senior administration official, the administration “…tried to be as 
comprehensive as possible” with the proposal.  The proposal relied upon the advice of many 
different groups (Stein and Rudolf 2013).  Biden and Cabinet members met with 229 groups, 
such as law enforcement agencies, public health officials, gun officials, gun advocacy groups, 
sportsmen and hunters, religious leaders, Congressmen, mayors, governors, and county officials 
(“President Obama’s remarks” 2013).  Some of the recommendations include requiring 
background checks for all gun sales, reinstating and strengthening the assault weapons, a ten-
round limit of ammunition magazines, eradicating armor-piercing bullets, and increasing 
criminal penalties for straw purchasers (Stein and Rudolf 2013; “What’s in Obama’s” 2013).  
Obama stated that he is committed to using all of the powers of his position to see the proposal’s 
recommendations through: “‘I intend to use whatever weight this office holds to make them a 
reality’” (Stein and Rudolf 2013).  This statement suggests a level of commitment to reform that 
is comparable to the staunch dedication shown by Prime Minister Howard.   
 The proposal also included twenty-three executive orders, revealing that Obama is 
willing to use his executive powers in any way possible to address gun violence (Stein and 
Rudolf 2013).  A way in which federal gun control policy can be improved without needing 
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Congress’s approval is through presidential executive orders.  Executive orders can be useful for 
gun control legislation because it is such a contentious legislative area.  An executive order is a 
directive handed down by the President that has the power of federal law.  Congress can try to 
overturn an executive order by passing a bill against it.  The President can veto that bill, which 
then requires Congress to override the veto.  The Supreme Court can also pronounce an 
executive order unconstitutional (“Presidential Executive Orders”).  The most significant 
executive orders in the proposal address improving the federal background check system.  Some 
of the orders include: requiring federal agencies to make necessary data available, addressing 
legal barriers that might prevent states from making information available to the background 
check system, and the publishing of a letter by the ATF explaining to federally licensed gun 
dealers how to run background checks for private sellers (Ungar 2013).   
 Although these executive actions are supposed to go into operation immediately, their 
effect will hinge on whether the necessary action is actually taken.  These orders will not have a 
full effect unless the actions embodied in the executive orders are actually taken or certain 
legislation is passed.  For example, the ATF letter to the federally licensed dealers will only be 
effective if Congress passes legislation that requires private sellers to sell through federally 
licensed dealers.  Also in regards to the background check system executive orders, action must 
be followed through for them to be effective.  While the executive orders overall address very 
important issues in the American federal gun control system, they can only be considered 
rhetoric until they are actually acted upon by the government (MacBradaigh 2013).  These 
executive orders, if fully implemented, will help eliminate some of the weaknesses in American 
federal gun control.  However, the greatest weaknesses in American federal gun control 
legislation can only be eliminated by passing federal legislation through Congress.  The most 
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important pieces of federal gun control legislation that are needed in the U.S. will be discussed in 
second part of this chapter. 
 The gun control proposal is a great achievement in and of itself, but it is only a proposal.  
It is evident that the Office of the President fully supports the gun policy reform, but the 
administration’s full support behind the proposal will not be enough to make it a reality.  
Converting the policy recommendations into real legislation will be the difficult task.  Although 
the executive orders are a start, the administration needs the citizenry’s support to bring about the 
political will to push the proposed legislation through Congress.   
 
Framing Gun Control Reform as an Issue of Public Safety  
 
 A key aspect of Prime Minister Howard’s political leadership was his advocacy of gun 
control reform in terms of public safety.  When Howard spoke of gun control reform after the 
Port Arthur massacre, he referred to the proposals as moderate ones and that passing the NFA 
would ensure a safer future for Australians.  Howard made gun control reform nonpartisan 
because he framed it as an issue that affected the safety of all Australians.  President Obama 
must do the same since gun control is such a deeply partisan and regionally based issue.  
Framing gun control reform in terms of public safety is the best way to obtain broad public 
support for more comprehensive measures.   
 Since the Newtown shooting, it is clear that President Obama has sought to frame gun 
control reform as rational measures meant to protect public safety.  On the day of the shooting, 
Obama referred to the need “‘to take meaningful action…regardless of the politics’” which 
implied that the partisan nature of gun control legislation must be ignored (Stein 2013).  Also 
two days before the gun control proposal was unveiled, Obama stated in the last press conference 
of his term that he wanted proposals that were rational and did not conflict with the Second 
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Amendment: “‘My starting point is to focus on what makes sense, what works, what should we 
be doing to make sure that our children are safe and that we’re reducing the incidence of gun 
violence.  And I think we can do that in a sensible way that comports with the Second 
Amendment’” (Stein 2013).  In this statement, Obama suggests that gun control reform 
legislation will be moderate by aiming to protect public safety, but balanced against the right of 
gun ownership.  
 When the gun control proposal was unveiled, President Obama continued to speak of gun 
control reform as rational, having the support of the American majority, and meant to protect 
public safety.  Obama explained that he supported the Second Amendment and respected the 
country’s strong tradition of gun ownership.  However, he proposed reaching a balance between 
gun ownership and “commonsense measures” that “have the support of the majority of the 
American people” (“President Obama’s remarks” 2013).  He stated, “I also believe most gun 
owners agree that we can respect the Second Amendment while keeping an irresponsible, law-
breaking few from inflicting harm on a massive scale” (“President Obama’s remarks” 2013).  
Obama also specifically referred to the politicians and special interest lobbyists who will aim to 
block the commonsense measures.  Obama then called for the support of the public, who have 
backed these pro gun advocates, to change their views in the interest of public safety: “The only 
way we will be able to change is if their audience, their constituents, their membership says this 
time must be different, that this time we must do something to protect our communities and our 
kids (“President Obama’s remarks” 2013).  As Congress formulates gun control proposals, it will 
be necessary for Obama to continually advocate publicly for reaching a balance between gun 
control measures and the Second Amendment in the name of public safety. 
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 It is challenging to use the public safety argument to advocate for gun control reform. 
According to Goss, gun control can be both a social regulation8 and a policy that furthers a 
public good,9 being public safety.  Any type of social regulation is difficult to advocate for 
because of America’s strong desire for individual liberty and a limited federal government (Goss 
2006, 27).  Viewing gun control as a comprehensive social regulation that provides a public good, 
rather than a regulation narrowly aimed at criminals, is difficult for many gun owners to accept.  
People’s perception of the Second Amendment being absolute and Americans’ strong 
individualism undermine the public safety argument.  However, social movements in American 
history have previously successfully used public safety to frame the issue, such as the Prohibition 
movement and the anti-tobacco movement (Goss 2006, 27-8).   
 As described in the previous chapter, modern federal gun control legislation has lacked 
comprehensiveness because its goal has consistently focused on criminal behavior.  Because gun 
control has been framed as crime control, people do not perceive gun violence as an issue of 
public safety.  Goss claims that many people do not think an attack by an armed stranger will 
happen to them.  If citizens do not understand the threat to be imminent and directly affecting 
them as individuals, then they will be less likely to support a preventative measure affecting all 
of society.  Framing gun control in terms of crime makes it seem that only criminals are capable 
of gun violence.  Americans must come to understand that anyone, including people close to 
them, can use a gun in a dangerous manner (Goss 2006, 109).  The Newtown shooting has 
helped further emphasize to Americans that an unsuspecting neighbor can easily wreak havoc 
with a gun within their communities.  More specifically it has emphasized that community 
                                                 
8
 A social regulation controls individual behavior and community relations (Goss 2006, 27). 
9
 Public goods are goods that blindly benefit everyone in society (Goss 2006, 27). 
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spaces that are presumed to be the safest, such as an elementary school, are not exempt from gun 
violence when gun control laws are weak.     
 Gun control reform must be framed as a solution to eliminate the shooting deaths which 
have come as a price of weak laws.  American gun control history has shown that even in the 
face of frequent shootings, protecting gun ownership has continued to outweigh achieving 
comprehensive gun control reform.  However, a right to gun ownership and comprehensive gun 
control are not mutually exclusive; gun ownership can be protected while gun deaths can be 
avoided.  The NFA’s passage showed that Australians were no longer willing to accept shooting 
massacres as a “‘blood price’” that a gun-owning community must pay as the result of having 
weak laws (Chapman 2001, 1228).  Accepting the “blood price” can no longer be an accepted 
norm in American society.  President Obama touched on the “blood price” of America’s weak 
laws when he referenced the difficulty of achieving universal background checks and bans on 
assault weapons and high-capacity magazines.  If these policies had been achieved in the past, he 
said, “More of our fellow Americans might still be alive, celebrating birthdays and anniversaries 
and graduation” (“President Obama’s remarks” 2013).  Obama ended his speech implying that 
gun control must be a social regulation to prevent future deaths: “We don’t live in isolation.  We 
live in a society, a government for and by the people.  We are responsible for each other…Lets 
do the right thing…for this country we love so much” (“President Obama’s remarks” 2013).  
President Obama must continue to frame gun control reform as a public safety issue that affects 
all Americans, in the hopes of increasing the public’s support for more comprehensive measures. 
 
Increasing Public Support for Gun Control Reform   
 An important contributing factor to the successful passage of the NFA was the 
widespread public support of the reform.  The NFA’s passage provides a lesson showing that 
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public support is needed to pass comprehensive gun control legislation.  While Prime Minister 
John Howard’s political leadership was an indispensable component of the NFA’s passage, the 
majority of the Australian public was behind Howard’s push for the NFA.  Although the majority 
of the Australian public was ready for gun control reform, Howard had to publicly call on gun 
owners to support the reform.  Upon the release of the proposal, Obama called for support from 
citizens, especially in strong gun ownership areas: “‘I will put everything I’ve got into this and 
so will Joe [Biden].  But I tell you, the way we can change is if the American people demand it. 
We are going to need voices in those areas and congressional districts where the tradition of gun 
ownership is strong.  It can’t just be the usual suspects.  This will not happen unless the 
American people demand it’” (Stein and Rudolf 2013).  Through these statements, President 
Obama has begun to advocate for reform to gun owners and the public as Prime Minister 
Howard did in Australia.  This type of public advocacy by Obama must continue as the push for 
federal gun control reform goes forward.  
 An important underlying reason explaining Prime Minister Howard’s success in raising 
public support for gun control reform is Australia’s lack of a legal right to gun ownership.  
During Australia’s gun control history, some gun lobbyists and pro-gun groups had advocated 
for a right to gun ownership, such as the One Nation Party discussed in Chapter 2.  However, 
these claims have never gained a significant amount of public support and were not taken very 
seriously since there is no legal right to gun ownership in the Australian Constitution.  Public 
support for gun control reform is inherently more difficult to achieve in the U.S. because 
Americans are able to claim a Second Amendment right to gun ownership and political leaders 
are forced to take their claims seriously.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the Heller 
decision has established that Americans cannot claim an absolute right to gun ownership and use.  
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However, overcoming some Americans’ resolute belief in the absolute nature of the Second 
Amendment is extremely difficult.  In order to gain overwhelming public support for 
comprehensive gun control reform, Americans must be convinced that the Second Amendment 
does not prevent the establishment of stricter gun control legislation.  Both public advocacy of 
gun control reform framed as an issue of public safety and advocacy of the effect of the Heller 
decision on the meaning of the Second Amendment are needed.  Obama’s statements indicate 
that he is beginning to carry out this type of advocacy. 
 The results of public opinion research since the Newtown shooting are hopeful indicators 
that American public support for gun control reform is growing.  There has been a slight shift in 
public opinion towards controlling gun ownership and addressing gun violence.  Pew Research 
Center’s poll from February 13-18, 2013 found that 50% of Americans believe controlling gun 
ownership is a more important priority, while 46% believe the right of Americans to own guns is 
more important.  The support for gun control has increased since a poll taken in April 2012 
found support for controlling gun ownership to be 45% and support for protecting gun ownership 
to be 49%.    
 Although the shift in public opinion on gun ownership has been small, the majority of 
Americans support important gun policy reform proposals.  The February 13-18, 2013 Pew poll 
found that the majority of Americans support a ban on assault-style weapons and a ban on high 
capacity ammunition clips.  However, the poll found great support for background checks on 
private and gun show sales, 83% favoring them and only 15% opposing them.  A January 9-13, 
2013 Pew poll also found that public opinion supports a federal database to track gun sales, as 
well as a ban on buying ammunition online.  Another gun control policy with great support is 
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preventing people with mental illnesses from purchasing guns, favored by 80% and only opposed 
by 16%.   
 According to Pew, just over half of the public supports the Obama gun control proposals, 
composed of 39% who believe they are “about right” and 13% do not think “they go far 
enough.”  Thirty-one percent of the public thinks the proposals “go too far” (“Gun Control: Key 
Data”).  It is clear that many of the necessary gun control policies do not have overwhelming 
public support.  However, the fact that the public is in support of the most urgent and necessary 
components of gun control reform overall provides hope for Obama’s gun control proposal and 
the future increase of support.  This evidence of majority support further emphasizes the 
importance and urgency for Obama to take a leadership position on gun control reform advocacy.  
Continuous advocacy is key to overcome the claims of those who interpret the Second 
Amendment in absolute terms. 
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Part II: The Application and the Achievement of NFA Policies in the United States  
 
Parliamentary vs. Presidential Political Systems:  
Implications for National Gun Control Legislation 
 
 In order to consider the feasibility of achieving some of the policies embodied in 
Australia’s National Firearms Agreement (NFA), it is important to understand the differences in 
political systems between Australia and the United States.  In many ways passing legislation in 
Australia is easier.  The United States has a presidential system, while Australia has a 
parliamentary system.  Policymaking in the American system is often characterized by gridlock, 
while the parliamentary system is not (Black 2012).  In the American system, the president is 
often from a different party than the one that controls Congress.  The president is independently 
elected, while in a parliamentary system, the prime minister is chosen by a vote of the party or 
coalition that forms the government (Black 2012; “Parliament v. Congress”).   
 In a parliamentary system, the party which has the majority has both legislative and 
executive control.  The majority party has the votes and the executive authority to pass the 
legislation that it desires.  However, in the American system, no party has enough votes to pass 
bills without some degree of cooperation from the other party.  The president also has the power 
to veto bills (Black 2012).  Legislation not only has to pass Congress, it also has to be approved 
by the president (“Comparing The American”).  In Australia, once the legislation passes both 
houses of Parliament, the House of Representatives and the Senate, it is given to the Governor-
General10 who automatically assents to it.  The Governor-General’s assent marks the law’s 
passage (“Comparing The American”; “The Senate”).  The Australian state legislative process 
mirrors that of the federal process; however, the Governor assents to legislation.  Also, 
                                                 
10
 The Governor-General, appointed by the Queen of England, acts as the Queen’s representative in Australia.  The 
Governor-General has certain constitutional and statutory powers.  He or she is supposed to protect the Constitution 
and oversee the work of the Commonwealth Parliament and Government (“Governor-General’s Role”). 
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Queensland has a unicameral legislature, while the others are bicameral (“Government of 
Australia”).    
 However, the process of achieving national gun control laws in Australia requires a 
special type of legislative process.  Since the Commonwealth does not have the power to make 
federal gun control laws in the Constitution, as discussed in Chapter 1, federal legislation has to 
be achieved through a national agreement.  In the time after the Port Arthur Massacre leading up 
to the achievement of the NFA, the Australian government considered amending the Constitution 
to transfer the states’ gun lawmaking powers to the Commonwealth.  Prime Minister Howard 
was thus able to threaten a referendum because after passing both houses of Parliament, the 
majority of the electorate in a majority of the states must approve any amendment to the 
Constitution (Norberry et al. 1996).  This characteristic of Australia’s political system was vital 
to the NFA’s passage.  Threatening the referendum was a saving grace for the NFA.  If the 
referendum had not been an option, the NFA would have likely failed because Queensland, 
South Australia, Western Australia, and the Northern Territory lobbied to weaken the NFA’s 
provisions immediately after the agreement (Chapman 1998, 29).  Although these aspects of 
Australia’s political system helped create a situation which increased the NFA’s feasibility, 
Prime Minister Howard’s strong political leadership was indispensable to convincing the 
unsupportive states to join the Agreement.   
 In the United States, the normal legislative process must take place to pass federal gun 
control legislation since the power to control guns lies with both the federal government and the 
states.  This process is difficult because, as described above, it is usually stricken by gridlock if a 
majority of the two parties in the Congressional houses do not agree on the legislation.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the passage of federal gun control legislation requires 
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cooperation across party lines.  However, passage has been difficult because there has been a 
considerable amount of pro-gun support in the Democratic Party and a small amount of support 
for gun control reform in the Republican Party.  In addition, the Senate has certain powers that 
can hinder the passage of legislation (“Powers & Procedure”).  For example, the Senate can 
delay or block legislation by using a filibuster, which allows debate on legislation to continue 
until a two-thirds majority Senate vote is reached to end it (“Powers & Procedure”; “Filibuster”).  
Despite the obstacles that the American political system has to hinder legislation, the power of 
political leadership cannot be dismissed.   
 
Assault Weapons Ban 
 
 The United States desperately needs to reinstate an assault weapons ban to help avoid 
future mass shootings.  More than half of the perpetrators of 62 mass shootings in the last thirty 
years have possessed assault weapons (Follman et al. 2013).  Since 2007, there have been 11 
mass shootings where the perpetrator used assault weapons or other type of semi-automatic gun 
with a magazine larger than 10 rounds to wound or kill eight or more people (Koper 2013, 157-
8).  The first policy of the NFA was the ban on all self-loading and pump-action rifles and 
shotguns (Chapman 1998, 2).  This provision provides a guide for the U.S. in composing a 
strengthened assault weapons ban.  The NFA ban is more comprehensive than the U.S.’s former 
1994 assault weapons ban.  Since the assault weapons ban only prohibited 19 types of weapons, 
in which assault weapons were defined by their cosmetic appearance, many dangerous guns that 
are functionally the same as assault weapons were exempted (Spitzer 2008, 133; Winkler 2011, 
38).  The NFA policy does not have such a weakness because the ban covers all semi-automatic 
rifles and shotguns, whether they are military-style or not.  Visual characteristics do not define 
the type of prohibited guns, but rather it is the fact that they are self-loading.   
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 The feasibility of achieving an assault weapons ban as comprehensive as the NFA’s 
would be near impossible.  The assault weapons ban was difficult to pass initially and the 
attempt to extend it in 2004 failed (Winkler 2011, 39).  Nonetheless, reinstating an assault 
weapons ban is better than having no ban at all.  A feasible goal for reinstating an assault 
weapons ban would be to include more firearms on the prohibited list of firearms.  The definition 
of assault weapons, which implicates the type of guns included in the ban, must change.  Rather 
than defining guns based on their cosmetic aspects, guns should be banned based on their degree 
of lethality, as was achieved in the NFA.   
 There has already been action towards reinstituting an assault weapons ban, which seeks 
to be more comprehensive than the 1994 ban.  Obama’s January 2013 gun control proposal 
includes reinstating and strengthening the assault weapons ban and limiting ammunition 
magazines to 10 rounds (“What’s in Obama’s” 2013).  California Senator Dianne Feinstein has 
also introduced a new assault weapons ban bill.  The new legislation seeks to improve the former 
weak definition of assault weapons by distinguishing the firearms by their lethality.  The 
legislation focuses on banning firearms that allow the shooter to fire a large number of bullets 
without needing to reload.  This definition is a better way to distinguish between sporting/self-
defense firearms and military-style firearms that are meant to kill many (Follman et al. 2013).  
For example, the bill changes the two-characteristic test to a one-characteristic test11 (“Assault 
Weapons Ban of 2013”).  It also removes certain characteristics from the characteristic test, such 
as the easy-to-remove bayonet mounts and flash suppressors, which made the original ban easy 
to evade (“Assault Weapons Ban of 2013”).   It also seeks to prevent gun manufacturers from 
evading the assault weapons categorization by making superficial modifications to the firearms 
                                                 
11
 The 1994 ban had a characteristics test provision which stated that, in general, semi-automatic firearms were 
prohibited if they had two or more military-style features (Koper 2013, 159).   
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(Follman et al. 2013).  For example, the legislation bans aftermarket modifications and 
workarounds.  Overall the bill bans 157 specific firearms, a large increase from only 19 specific 
models in the 1994 ban (“Assault Weapons Ban of 2013”).  The NFA banned the importation of 
self-loading firearms (Chapman 1998, 2).  The proposed bill bans the import of assault weapons, 
as well as large-capacity magazines, which the 1994 ban did not do (“Assault Weapons Ban of 
2013”).  
 The NFA’s second policy and accompaniment to the firearms ban was the national 
buyback.  The buyback was very important because it sought to eliminate all the prohibited guns 
already in people’s possession.  As discussed in Chapter 2, it appears that the buyback 
contributed to the overall success of the NFA.  Through the NFA buyback, the Australian 
Government was able to swiftly remove over 700,000 guns from the population in one year 
(Chapman, Alpers et al. 2006, 371; Chapman 1998, 2).  A weakness of both the 1994 and 
proposed 2013 assault weapons ban is that they do not ban the possession of already existing 
assault weapons, but rather ban their future manufacturing.  Since the policy will not regulate the 
existing stock of assault weapons or magazines, it will take many years before the policy causes 
significant reductions in crimes involving banned weapons and/or magazines (Koper 2013, 168).  
Nonetheless, this should not prevent the passage of a more comprehensive assault weapons ban.  
Over time the existing assault weapons and magazines would become more expensive and 
difficult to find and repair, so the stock would naturally decrease (Eisgrau 2013). 
 However, a comparable national buyback would not be feasible in the United States, 
although it would help quicken the effects of an assault weapons ban.  A mandatory buyback 
would not be able to pass Congress or have the support of the public.  Firstly, members of 
Congress, the gun lobby, and citizens would challenge a mandatory buyback using the Second 
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Amendment.  Pro-gun individuals would argue that the forceful removal of their guns directly 
conflicts with their legal right to gun ownership.  Since the gun lobby resists every piece of gun 
control legislation because it believes that each is a step towards the government’s confiscation 
of all guns, a mandatory buyback would be viewed as a large step forward.  The NFA buyback 
was a large national endeavor that cost the Australian Government $461 million to administer 
and compensate gun owners (Phillips et al. 2007).  Given the United States’ larger size, an 
enormous amount of funding would be necessary for a comparable buyback.  Funding for the 
NFA buyback also required an increase in the country’s Medicare tax (Chapman 1998, 2).  Not 
only would a mandatory buyback receive pushback from Congress and the American people on 
Second Amendment grounds, they would not favor another tax-increase to implement it.  
Scholars agree that the NFA buyback would not be as easily replicable in the U.S. (Hemenway 
2011, 3; Lee and Suardi 2010, 66; Leigh and O’Neill 2010, 2-3).  Although a national mandatory 
buyback scheme is not a possibility, other smaller-scale, voluntary publicly and privately 
sponsored buyback programs still should be carried out in order to remove as many assault 
weapons as possible from the population (Eisgrau 2013).   
 
Regulation of the Secondary Firearms Market  
 Another important NFA policy lesson for the United States is the requirement that all 
private gun sales must go through licensed firearms dealers.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, forty percent of gun sales in the United States are private sales (Cook and Ludwig 1997, 
6-7).  Since such a large proportion of gun sales are private, many gun sales occur without 
background checks, which largely increase the likelihood that guns will come into the hands of 
criminals and prohibited categories of people.  There is evidence to show that requiring a 
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background check for all firearm sales is both feasible and effective in preventing guns from 
going to prohibited persons.   
 A 2007 study compared gun shows in California, a state which requires background 
check on all gun sales and separate regulations for gun shows, with four states12 that do not have 
such policies.  At the observed California gun shows, private party sales occurred using the 
assistance of a licensed dealer as the transfer agent.  The study did not observe any direct private 
party sales occur between attendees at the California gun shows (Wintemute 2013, 102).  The 
study suggests that if regulations are put in place that require private sales to go through licensed 
dealers, fewer illegal sales will occur, such as at gun shows.  Illegal straw man purchases were 
also six times as common in the comparison states than in California (Wintemute 2013, 103).  
Including California, eleven states already have a comprehensive background check policy, such 
as New York and Pennsylvania, revealing that establishing such a regulation is feasible 
(Wintemute 2013, 105).  This policy must be expanded nationally through federal legislation. 
 Obama’s 2013 gun control proposal recognizes the importance of regulating the 
secondary market.  A proposed congressional action is to require criminal background checks on 
all gun sales, including private sales.  The proposal also includes increasing the criminal 
penalties for straw purchasers (“What’s in Obama’s” 2013).  Including the regulation of private 
sales in the gun control proposal is an important first step, but actually achieving federal 
legislation mandating these policies will prove to be difficult.  However, achieving such a piece 
of legislation is absolutely essential to prevent guns from going to prohibited categories of 
people, which happens due to the large percentage of private sales that occur in the U.S.   
 The current difficulty of passing universal background checks legislation was made clear 
on April 17, 2013 when the Manchin-Toomey amendment was defeated in the Senate.  This bill 
                                                 
12
 Arizona, Nevada, Texas, and Florida 
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sought to require background checks on all commercial sales of firearms.  Fifty-four senators 
voted in support of the bill, while forty-six voted against.  The bill needed sixty votes.  The bill 
was not supported by four Democrats: Senators Max Baucus of Montana, Mark Begich of 
Alaska, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, and Mark Pryor of Arkansas.  Each senator comes 
from a rural state with strong gun ownership.  Except for Heitkamp, all also have impending 
difficult reelections in 2014.  It is clear that these senators voted against the bill to appeal to their 
constituencies.  The close vote on this bill does reveal that there is significant political support 
for universal background checks.  However, the support for the legislation is very much divided 
on party lines and there is not much bipartisan support.  Only four Republicans voted for the bill: 
Susan Collins of Maine, Mark Kirk of Illinois, John McCain of Arizona, and Pat Toomey of 
Pennsylvania (Blake 2013).  As discussed earlier in this chapter, the American public 
overwhelming supports universal background checks legislation.  However, this amendment, 
widely desired by the public, was defeated due to only a few senators’ votes.  The bill’s defeat 
reveals that presently universal background check legislation is not politically possible.  But, as 
will be discussed later in this chapter, the gun control lobby has recently been increasingly active 
at the grassroots level due to increased public and financial support.  The bill’s close vote and the 
gun control lobby’s increased activity provide hope that those few necessary votes can be 
obtained and the legislation will be achieved in the future.   
 
National Registration and Licensing Systems 
 An area of gun control legislation that is not addressed in Obama’s gun control proposal 
is a national firearms registration and licensing system.  Throughout American gun control 
history, attempts at achieving various federal licensing and registration systems have been 
unsuccessful.  The feasibility of achieving a national licensing and registration scheme in the U.S. 
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is extremely weak, but if achieved would make federal gun control legislation much more 
comprehensive.  As discussed in Chapter 1, registration and licensing systems were long debated 
in Australia.  Australia has always had strong regulations of handguns, but the regulation of long 
guns was long resisted.  The NFA finally applied the licensing and registration systems that 
always existed for handguns to long guns. 
 The NFA achieved both a comprehensive registration and licensing system for all 
firearms.  The NFA states that the registration of all firearms will be kept by the National 
Computerized Exchange of Police Information (NEPI) (Chapman 1998, 2).  However, gun 
registration is now handled by CrimTrac.  CrimTrac, established in 2000, was meant to replace 
NEPI, which shares information between each of the nine policing agencies of Australia (“The 
Implementation”; Molloy 2012).  In Australia, each jurisdiction has its own firearms registry 
within the jurisdiction’s police department (“Firearms”).  The NFA also requires that a person 
must first obtain a license to purchase a firearm.  The license applicant can be refused if the 
person has been convicted of a violent crime, subject to a domestic violence restraining order in 
the past five years, or has a mental or physical condition that makes them unsuitable to possess a 
firearm (Chapman 1998, 3; “Legislative reforms” 2012).  The licensing process also involves 
completing an accredited gun safety course.  In addition, a licensed gun owner must acquire a 
permit to purchase every time he or she wishes to purchase a gun.  The permit application 
involves a 28 day waiting period so that the applicant’s background check can be thoroughly 
completed (Chapman 1998, 3). 
   The Port Arthur massacre revealed the dangers of not having licensing and registration 
systems.  The perpetrator of the massacre, Martin Bryant, was able to obtain his guns from a 
licensed gun dealer despite not having a license.  Although the state of Tasmania had a licensing 
   
     109 
system, it did not have a long-arm registration system.  Without a registration system, it was easy 
for the dealer to sell guns to Bryant because there would not be a record of the purchaser 
(Chapman 1998, 83, 84).  During the 1980s in Australia, scholars advocated the benefits of a 
universal registration system, licensing system, and required firearms safety course, as discussed 
in Chapter 1.  Completion of a firearms safety course, including both theoretical and practical 
components, is an important part of the licensing process.  Like a driving test, it helps ensure that 
the individual knows how to properly handle the firearm. 
 Registration and licensing systems can provide many benefits.  Registration allows law 
enforcement to track a gun’s movement owner to owner, which in turn allows authorities to see 
if people are amassing arsenals, and provides a way for authorities to connect a gun used in a 
crime to its owner.  Registration and licensing systems are not fully effective unless both are in 
place.  Licensing provides a major obstacle for criminals and prohibited categories of people 
from obtaining a gun.  However, a licensing system does not provide a strong impediment if 
there is not an accompanying registration procedure.  As evidenced by how Martin Bryant 
obtained the guns used in the Port Arthur massacre, dealers do not have an incentive to check for 
a purchaser’s license if there will be no record of the sale.  When there is no gun registration, 
there is no paper trail for law enforcement to follow (Chapman 1998, 85).  According to a 
January 2013 Pew poll, public opinion significantly supports a federal database to track gun sales 
with 67% in favor and 30% in opposition (“Gun Control: Key Data”).   
 Presently in the United States, no comprehensive national firearms database exists.  There 
is no database which has information about ownership, the number sold annually, or how many 
exist (Associated Press 2013).  The 1986 Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, which was discussed 
in the previous chapter, contains specific language that prohibits the creation of a registry of 
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firearms, firearms owners, or firearms transactions (“18 USC § 926”).  The lack of a national 
firearms database makes the process very difficult and convoluted for the ATF to trace a gun’s 
history.  The ATF is only permitted to trace a gun’s history when it was used in a crime.  Gun 
dealers are also required to keep a record of the federal forms showing who bought guns as well 
as a log of their sales, which they must share with the ATF.  The ATF sends all the information it 
has to its National Tracing Center, where officials call the manufacturer of the gun to obtain the 
wholesaler.  This call may then lead to contacting the second distributor to find the dealer who 
sold the weapon.  However, this is as far as the firearms paper trail can go, since the law has 
clearly prohibited the government from accumulating information about gun owners (Associated 
Press 2013).    
 The efficiency of the Tracing Center’s activities is also hindered by poor technology.  
The Tracing Center carries out traces using an unsophisticated computer system.  The records are 
stored as digital pictures that can only be searched manually one image at a time.  A routine trace 
can take about five days and may involve going though paperwork by hand.  The ATF must also 
sort through many records of dealers that have gone out of business in order to find the relevant 
information that it needs.  According to Charles J. Houser, who runs the ATF’s National Tracing 
Center, “‘We are…prohibited from amassing the records of active dealers.  It means that if a 
dealer is in business he maintains his records’” (Associated Press 2013).  Despite the tracing 
obstacles that the ATF faces, Houser says that in 2012, the Center traced 344,000 guns for 6,000 
different law enforcement agencies at a success rate of 90%, given that it had enough 
information.  Houser says every successful trace gives at least one lead in a criminal case 
(Associated Press 2013).  This information suggests that if the ATF had access to a registration 
system, supported by strong technology, it could significantly help the ATF find the information 
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needed to solve criminal investigations.  A national registration system would allow the ATF to 
be more efficient by simplifying the tracing process.   
 A thorough background check accompanied by a waiting period must be a component of 
the licensing process.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the process involved in doing a 
federal background check is complicated.  Therefore, the waiting period of three days does not 
provide enough time for a sufficiently thorough background check.  The NFA’s waiting period 
of four weeks provides ample time for a background check to be done.  Currently Congress 
would oppose such a long waiting period.  Nonetheless, the United States should look to 
Australia’s waiting period length as a lesson that a longer waiting period is necessary.  Increasing 
the U.S.’s federal background check waiting period to five days or week may be a feasible 
possibility.  Before the instant federal background check was established in 1998 as part of the 
Brady Act, there was a five day waiting period on handgun purchases (Winkler 2011, 71).  Since 
a longer waiting period has existed once before, there is hope that it could be achieved again. 
However, the previous five day waiting period applied only to handguns, but a future waiting 
period must apply to all firearms.  
 Although a universal registration and licensing system is ultimately necessary, it will be 
extremely difficult to achieve.  Pushing for registration and licensing systems for handguns first 
may be more feasible.  In Australia, handguns have always been strictly regulated because they 
have been considered to be more likely to be used in criminal activity than long guns.  Although 
handguns are largely viewed as a gun to be used for self-defense in the United States, they are 
also associated with criminal activity.  Handgun licensing systems have shown to be feasible 
because they already exist in some states.  Presently nine states have a licensing system for 
handgun purchases.  Of these nine states, five of them require the applicants to apply with a law 
   
     112 
enforcement agency and be photographed and fingerprinted.  Three of the states also allow the 
agencies to use discretion to deny the license application in the interest of public safety (Webster 
et al. 2013, 111).   
 Permit to purchase regulations have also shown to have positive effects in the U.S.  
Missouri’s permit to purchase law was repealed in 2007.  The law required handgun purchasers 
to apply for a permit through the local county sheriff, as well as it required a permit on all 
handgun sales by both licensed and private sellers.  A study found that the law had helped the 
prevention of gun diversion to criminals.  When the law was in existence, the proportion of crime 
guns that originated in Missouri was an average of 55.6%, which increased to 70.8% in 2011 
(Webster et al. 2013, 114).   
 In another study of state gun sales laws in the 48 contiguous states found that 
discretionary permit to purchase gun laws were the strongest deterrent to interstate gun 
trafficking (Webster et al. 2013, 117).  The study concluded that discretionary permit procedures 
like in-depth examinations by law enforcement, longer waiting times, high fees, and strict 
standards may decrease gun ownership and the opportunities for criminals to find people willing 
to sell them guns or who would be good gun theft targets.  Statistically controlling for gun 
ownership levels, geography, and other gun laws, the study also found a strong negative 
relationship between nondiscretionary permit to purchase laws13 and the export of guns to 
criminals in other states.  This finding again suggests that permit to purchase laws discourage 
gun trafficking (Webster et al. 2013, 118).  Overall permit to purchase laws are both feasible and 
effective, so the achievement of them on a federal level would be a positive way in which to 
make federal gun control legislation more comprehensive.   
                                                 
13
 Nondiscretionary permit to purchase laws require a permit to buy a firearm but do not oblige the applicant to be 
fingerprinted by agencies (Webster et al. 2013, 115). 
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Increased ATF Funding and Staff  
 In order for an assault weapons ban, secondary market regulation, and national licensing 
and registration systems to be effective, the ATF must be able to enforce them.  The 
effectiveness of all present and future federal gun regulations rides heavily on the efficiency of 
the ATF.  Without improved funding and staffing, the ATF cannot successfully enforce federal 
gun control regulations.  As discussed in the previous chapter, as well as earlier in this chapter, 
laws passed by Congress have purposely weakened the ATF’s power and ability to enforce gun 
control regulations.  The ATF has also been weakened by perpetual underfunding and 
understaffing.  A lack of funds and staff has hindered its enforcement activities, such as 
inspecting licensed dealers and investigating criminal firearms trafficking (Braga and Gagliardi 
2013, 147, 150-1).  Although there are 130,000 federally licensed gun dealers in the United 
States, the ATF’s budget has not adequately risen to meet the increasing number of gun dealers.  
The ATF’s budget has only risen to $1.1 billion in FY 2012 from $850 million in FY 2002 
(Braga and Gagliardi 2013, 150-1).  The ATF only has about 2,500 special agents and 800 
inspectors.  This amount of staff is not adequate to accomplish all activities the ATF is 
responsible for.  The current ATF is only about the same size of a city police department, like the 
Boston Police Department which has 2,250 officers.  Since the ATF is extremely understaffed, it 
is only able to inspect licensed firearm dealers every ten years (Braga and Gagliardi 2013, 151).  
The President previously had the power to choose a director of the ATF without needing 
congressional approval, but the law was changed under pressure from the gun lobby in 2003 
(Schmidt 2013; Murphy 2013).  Since then any nomination must be confirmed by the Senate 
(Murphy 2013).  Thus the ATF has been lacking leadership since the agency’s last director 
resigned in 2004 (Braga and Gagliardi 2013, 151). 
   
     114 
 Obama’s 2013 gun control proposal addresses some of the weaknesses of ATF that have 
hindered federal gun control enforcement.  One of Obama’s executive actions seeks to address 
the ATF’s lack of leadership, by nominating an ATF director.  Since Congress must confirm any 
nomination for ATF director, one of the proposed congressional actions is to confirm Obama’s 
nominee.  Some of the other components of the proposal also implicate the actions of the ATF.  
Another proposed congressional action seeks to eliminate a restriction on the ATF that requires 
the agency to allow the import of weapons more than fifty years old.  An executive action 
demands that a rule be proposed that allows law enforcement authorities to run a background 
check on a person before returning a seized gun.  Another executive order states that Obama is 
going to issue a presidential memorandum requiring federal law enforcement to trace guns 
recovered in criminal investigations (“What’s in Obama’s” 2013).  The President has also asked 
the Department of Justice to release a report that has analyzed information on lost and stolen 
guns, and make it widely available to law enforcement (MacBradaigh 2013).  In addition, the 
proposal makes a general demand to maximize enforcement efforts to prevent gun violence and 
prosecute crime (“What’s in Obama’s” 2013).   
 Although the gun control proposal addresses the important issue of ATF leadership and 
specifies the type of activities that law enforcement should be engaging in, it does not propose 
legislation to increase ATF funding.  In order for the ATF to do its duties, as well as to comply 
with the directions in the proposal, the agency must obtain the necessary funding.  However, the 
government’s treatment of the ATF in recent history has shown that Congress is opposed to 
strengthening the ATF in the name of protecting gun owners’ interests. 
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Government-Funded Gun Violence Research 
 Another lesson from the NFA’s implementation is the importance of devoting 
government funding to gun violence research.  As described in the second chapter, to monitor the 
effect of the NFA’s implementation, the Australian Government commissioned the Australian 
Institute of Criminology (AIC) (Scanlon and Handmer 2001, 1999).  Established in 1973, the 
AIC is the country’s national research center on crime and justice, which aims to promote justice 
and reduce crime through doing evidence-based research to influence policy and practice 
(“About the AIC”).  Upon commission by the Government, the AIC established the National 
Firearms Monitoring Program (NFMP) to study the short term and long term effects of the NFA 
(Mouzos 1999, 2).  The NFMP is still in existence and continues to publish its findings yearly.  
Mainly the NFMP focuses on collecting information about firearm offense patterns, the numbers 
and types of registered firearms in the jurisdictions, the number of people licensed to use 
firearms, and deaths and injuries using firearms (“National firearms”).  The AIC also conducts 
other monitoring programs that address gun usage and gun violence: national homicide, national 
firearms theft, and national armed robbery (“National monitoring”). 
 However, in recent years, the American federal government has failed to adequately 
support gun violence research.  Between 1986 and 1996, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) carried out high-quality, peer-reviewed research aimed at understanding 
the causes of gun violence.  But in 1996, legislation passed that would prevent the distribution of 
this research and block government funding of further research.  An amendment to an 
appropriations bill removed $2.6 million from the CDC’s budget, which was the amount spent on 
firearms-related research in the year before.  The amendment also contained wording that 
prevented the CDC from doing research that would implicate gun policy: “‘None of the funds 
   
     116 
made available for injury prevention and control at the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention may be used to advocate or promote gun control’” (Dickey and Rosenberg 2012).  
According to Jay Dickey, a former Republican Arkansas Congressman and lifelong member of 
the NRA, a Republican in Congress acted for the NRA by submitting the amendment (Dickey 
and Rosenberg 2012).  As a result, since 1996, the U.S. government has spent $240 million per 
year on traffic safety research, but barely any research on firearm injuries.  The passage of and 
failure to repeal this legislation reveal yet again that Congress continues to favor gun interests 
through hindering the work of a government agency that can influence the effectiveness of gun 
control legislation. 
 If scientists cannot carry out the research to understand the nature of American gun 
violence in America or the effectiveness of certain gun policies, there is little hope for the 
achievement of successful gun control policy (Dickey and Rosenberg 2012).  However, there is 
some hope for future gun control research at the CDC.  One of the executive orders included in 
the proposal is to issue a presidential memorandum directing the CDC to research the causes and 
prevention of gun violence (Ungar 2013).  Despite these instructions by the President to refocus 
the CDC’s research efforts, in the long run it will need more funding to carry out gun violence 
prevention research, which will require legislation.  The gun control proposal does not include 
any legislation to increase CDC’s funding of gun violence research.  The Obama administration 
presumably chose not to include such a piece of legislation in the proposal because it is not 
feasible in the current Congress, in which the Republican Party controls the House.  The defeat 
of the Manchin-Toomey amendment also revealed that it would not be feasible in the present 
Senate, although controlled by the Democratic Party. 
 
 
   
     117 
Part III: The Policymaking Approach to Achieve Federal Gun Control Legislation  
 
Small Steps Towards Bold National Change 
  
 Raising the standard of federal gun control legislation in the United States is necessary 
and must be the ultimate goal.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, nationalizing any proposed 
policy, especially gun policy, is difficult.  In the few years prior to the Port Arthur massacre, 
some scholars seriously doubted the feasibility of achieving national gun control legislation in 
Australia.  Egger and Peters stated that not only was gun control an especially contentious policy 
area, which provided a barrier, but also the history of achieving national uniform laws in 
Australia had involved compromise, delay, and sometimes proposals had completely failed.  Due 
to the obstacles at that time, they believed achieving gun law uniformity should be a long term 
goal.  The states with the weakest gun control systems needed to make improvements in the 
meantime.  Since the states had the power to make gun laws, it was the states’ responsibility to 
ensure that their laws were effective.  Weak regulation in one state undermined the effectiveness 
of the country’s gun regulation overall.  Achieving a national uniform gun control policy was a 
“highly desirable” goal that should remain on the reform agenda, but they did not believe that it 
should be the top priority (Egger and Peters 1993, 204).  
 The resistant political atmosphere to national gun control in 1993 Australia is similar to 
the situation of the U.S. today.  Egger and Peters were both pessimistic and practical in their 
view, but only three years later national uniform gun control was achieved.  Achieving national 
uniformity seemed impossible at the time in Australia, but it was eventually achieved.  
Achieving more comprehensive national legislation is not impossible in the U.S., although it will 
be very difficult.  Strong national gun control is what the U.S. desperately needs and must 
remain the ultimate goal.  However, achieving improvements at the local and state level may be a 
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more feasible approach in the mean time, as a way to move towards strengthened uniform law 
across the country, while pushing for national legislation simultaneously. 
 According to Goss, policy incrementalism14 is the best gun control policymaking 
approach.  Goss explains that in American history, members of social movements have disagreed 
over whether to obtain large policy change through a slow incremental approach by gaining local 
victories, or rather waiting for the right, yet rare, opportunity to achieve national change (2006, 
147).  Social movements like the anti-abortion, anti-alcohol, and the anti-smoking movements 
have used the approach of winning modest measures at the local and state levels before pushing 
for national legislation (2006, 186).  The NFA could be categorized as a rare opportunity where 
bold change was achieved.  Although the NFA was achieved in a different political system that is 
more conducive to change, large changes were never achieved after the 1980s and early 1990s 
gun massacres.  When the Port Arthur massacre occurred, Australia was ready for bold national 
change in gun control.  Since the American political system is not conducive to the easy 
achievement of bold policy change, Goss believes that incrementalism is the best strategy (2006, 
146). 
 Incrementalism is also a policy strategy that may help produce broader based gun control 
support and participation.  People are more likely to participate in a movement when there is 
reasonably strong expectation that their participation will contribute to achieving the desired 
outcome.  To attract participants, movements must show that they have had successes and there 
is a strong possibility of future successes.  An incrementalist approach works towards these small 
successes (Goss 2006, 146).  The incrementalist approach that Goss suggests has strong 
implications for the gun control lobby’s future actions and how they can successfully inspire 
                                                 
14
 “Policy incrementalism: small policy steps that might be expected to aggregate toward ever larger political goals.” 
(Goss 2006, 145). 
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citizen support and participation at the local level.  Grassroots efforts are an important 
component of an incrementalist policymaking approach.  For example, Goss claims that through 
a local-approach to gun control reform, which focuses on achieving local ordinances, grassroots 
coalitions and activists mobilize naturally because people believe they have more power and 
access to elected officials (2006, 182).  Overall grassroots efforts are essential to achieve local 
level gun control policies.  The achievement of numerous state and local level policies creates a 
foundation on which widespread support can be developed for reaching bolder policy change, 
being federal gun control legislation.   
 
The Grassroots Work of the Gun Control Lobby 
 The gun control lobby will be indispensable towards achieving more comprehensive gun 
control change.  Although the NRA has proved to be extremely powerful and wealthy, there is 
evidence to show that the gun control lobby can overcome the NRA’s wealth with grassroots 
lobbying efforts.  A study investigating the effect of lobbying of the McClure-Volkmer Bill 
(1986 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act) reveals some important lessons for the gun control 
lobby’s work of obtaining federal gun control legislation.  The study examined the political 
effectiveness of the gun lobby and the gun control lobby in affecting votes in the House.  The 
study examined the impact of elite and grassroots lobbying, as well as campaign contributions 
(Langbein and Lotwis 1990, 413).  The results showed that campaign contributions for both the 
NRA and Handgun Control, Inc (HCI) influenced how members of Congress voted on the bill 
when controlling for the member’s position prior to the debate, ideology, constituency, and 
lobbying efforts.  The NRA spent more than HCI, but per dollar HCI’s contributions were more 
powerful (Langbein and Lotwis 1990, 430).  Also, the NRA’s grassroots lobbying seemed to 
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have been effectively countered by the lobbying work of HCI supportive local and national 
police groups (Langbein and Lotwis 1990, 433).  
 Overall this study seems to suggest that the gun control lobby would be more influential 
than the NRA if its wealth matched that of the NRA.  HCI’s monetary contribution had a 
statistically marginal impact, but their lobbying was successful compared to the NRA’s.  If HCI 
had given as much money as the NRA, they would have had a greater overall impact than the 
NRA.  Langbein and Lotwis concluded that “The fact that both groups were effective, but in 
different ways, suggests that relative wealth does not determine overall effectiveness but rather 
affects how groups chose to exercise influence” (1990, 434).  Making a significant difference lies 
more in the lobbying efforts, rather than merely campaign contributions.  This is an important 
discovery for gun control advocates because it indicates that the influence of the NRA’s wealth 
can be moderated by effective grassroots lobbying efforts.  However, grassroots lobbying efforts 
need money to be effectively executed.  This study makes clear that if the gun control lobby had 
comparable wealth to the NRA, it could finally have the ability to significantly influence policy. 
 Now it appears that the gun control lobby may finally have the necessary funding to carry 
out the grassroots lobbying and advocacy that is needed to pass meaningful gun control 
legislation.  On March 23, 2013, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced that the 
coalition, Mayors Against Illegal Guns, would carry out a $12 million television and ad 
campaign.  Bloomberg co-founded the coalition in 2006.  According to The New York Times, 
Bloomberg personally contributed the funding.  The goal of the campaign is to target 13 states15 
that are divided over gun control.  The campaign aims mainly to lobby senators to support 
comprehensive background checks legislation.  According to Bloomberg, the ads advocate for 
                                                 
15
 Arkansas, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio and Pennsylvania. 
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universal background checks by presenting the legislation as something that the majority of 
Americans support: “‘These ads bring the voices of Americans – who overwhelmingly support 
comprehensive and enforceable background checks – into the discussion to move senators to 
immediately take action to prevent gun violence’” (“Michael Bloomberg” 2013).  The two 
television ads represent new gun control legislation that will balance gun rights with gun safety.  
The man in the first ad states that he will defend the Second Amendment, but also says that 
“‘rights come with responsibilities’” (“Michael Bloomberg” 2013).  The second ad features a 
male hunter who says that “‘background checks have nothing to do with taking guns away from 
anyone’,” and then explains that the checks will prevent criminals and the mentally ill from 
acquiring firearms (“Michael Bloomberg” 2013).  The coalition’s campaign is reminiscent of 
Prime Minister John Howard’s advocacy of the NFA.  One way Howard advocated for the NFA 
was by presenting it as sensible legislation that the majority of Australians supported.    
 Also on March 28th, 2013, the coalition carried out over 100 events across the country to 
advocate the passage of new gun control legislation.  These events involved elected and law 
enforcement officials, as well as survivors of gun violence and their family members (“Michael 
Bloomberg” 2013; “Mayors Against” 2013).  Mayors Against Illegal Guns has described the day 
as “one of the largest days of advocacy in United States history to address gun violence” and that 
it is “part of the largest field campaign in United States history to address gun violence” 
(“Mayors Against” 2013).  Sparked by Bloomberg’s initiative, there is hope that the gun control 
lobby can continue to grow, both in terms of wealth and size, and as a result, finally have the 
ability to effectively counteract the NRA’s power.    
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Conclusion 
 Political leaders, citizens, and the gun control lobby each must unwaveringly press for 
change.  Without dedication and commitment, as the successful passage of the NFA has shown, 
change is not possible.  The most significant lesson that the NFA can teach the U.S., aside from 
its policy lessons, is that strong political leadership on gun control reform must be taken to 
achieve the policies.  Obama’s leadership after the Newtown shooting and the release of the gun 
control proposal one month later is a promising sign of achieving reform in the near future.  The 
proposal addresses a lot of important weaknesses in American federal gun control, although it 
should be more comprehensive.  However, as American gun control history has shown, the more 
comprehensive proposed legislation is, the more difficult it is to achieve.  The proposal is still an 
important achievement that must be acted upon quickly in Congress.  Although the shooting has 
revealed that there is substantial public will for reform, achieving more comprehensive 
legislation will not be easy.  The recent Senate defeat of the Manchin-Toomey amendment 
clearly showed the present difficulty of passing more comprehensive legislation.  Public support 
must continue to become widespread in the hopes of influencing legislators to pass legislation.  
President Obama and other political leaders must show the way on gun control reform advocacy, 
by framing the issue as an important means to improve public safety.  The recent strong 
leadership and growth in both support and wealth of the gun control lobby is a promising 
indicator of achieving change in the near future. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The achievement of the 1996 National Firearms Agreement (NFA) in Australia provides 
a guide for comprehensive federal gun control reform in the United States.  Given the similarities 
and differences between the two countries, Australia is the best example from which the U.S. 
should model its reform.  For most of Australia’s history, long guns were not regulated because 
only handguns were viewed as dangerous.  Some Australian states developed stronger gun 
control systems than others, but overall Australian gun control was very weak.  After a number 
of gun massacres happened between the 1970s and early 1990s, some Australian governments 
sought answers to the gun violence.  The National Committee on Violence and the New South 
Wales Select Committee Upon Gun Law Reform found that a national uniform gun control 
system was necessary.  However, when the Australian Police Ministers’ Council met in 1991, the 
jurisdictions could not come to an agreement on a national uniform system.  Before the 1996 
Port Arthur massacre, the feasibility of achieving a national agreement was not very hopeful.    
 The passage of the 1996 NFA eliminated the weaknesses of the Australian gun control 
system.  Since the Port Arthur massacre was Australia’s latest and worst gun massacre, it 
inspired significant public support for the NFA.  Also for the first time, Australia had a prime 
minister who was staunchly dedicated to achieving comprehensive gun control reform.  The most 
meaningful lesson for the U.S. from the passage of the NFA is political leadership.  Howard was 
intimately involved in all aspects of the NFA from its conception to its implementation.  His 
contributions were instrumental to its success.  Howard threatened to call a referendum to 
transfer the states’ gun lawmaking rights to the Commonwealth.  He personally spoke with 
politicians from unsupportive states to persuade them to join the NFA.  Howard also did not 
allow any of the NFA policies to be significantly weakened by gun interests.  As a result, there 
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have been no mass shootings with four or more deaths since the Port Arthur massacre, and there 
has been a decline in firearm homicides and suicides.   
 The NFA’s achievement does not serve as a simple template for the passage of American 
federal gun control legislation.  Throughout modern American history, comprehensive federal 
legislation was consistently introduced into Congress, but due to a lack of political will and the 
gun lobby’s influence, it was always weakened in order to pass.  Even in the face of riots or 
shootings, members of Congress have not been compelled to support stronger federal measures.  
Legislation passed between the 1920s and 1960s was narrowly aimed at controlling criminals or 
firearm dealers, but never gun owners in general.  The gun lobby has also specifically set out to 
achieve legislation meant to expand gun owners’ rights, such as the 1986 Firearms Owners’ 
Protection Act.  Sympathetic members of Congress have also attached riders on appropriations 
legislation that specifically hinder the ATF’s enforcement abilities.  In the 1990s, gun control 
proponents introduced a comprehensive assault weapons ban and background check legislation.  
However, these pieces of the legislation were weakened in the passage process, rendering them 
largely ineffective.  The gun lobby will undoubtedly continue to be a hindrance to the passage of 
stronger gun control, but evidence shows that the gun lobby’s influence may be effectively 
countered in the future.  The Supreme Court’s clarification of the Second Amendment, President 
Obama’s leadership on gun control reform, and the gun control lobby’s increased support are 
hopeful indicators. 
 Overall federal gun control legislation in the United States must be strengthened to 
effectively moderate the differences between state and local level laws.  While some states have 
extremely strong gun control systems, others are quite weak.  Both the Australian and American 
experience clearly show that a lack of uniformity among gun laws facilitates the flow of criminal 
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guns across borders.  The Second Amendment does permit stronger federal gun control 
legislation.  The 2008 Supreme Court case, District of Columbia v. Heller, confirmed that the 
Second Amendment is an individual right, but also confirmed that many types of strong gun 
control measures are constitutional.  In spite of this decision, the gun lobby will surely continue 
to litigate against gun control laws as a way to obstruct the gun control reform process.  However, 
this decision does lessen the validity of the gun lobby’s arguments against moderate gun control 
laws, declaring that the laws are inconsistent with the Second Amendment.  While the Second 
Amendment will always provide a barrier to gun control reform, it is not an immovable obstacle.  
Going forward, the gun control lobby must advocate and explain the meaning of the Second 
Amendment to counteract the gun lobby’s false advertising of its meaning.  
  The NFA, as a whole system, would not be feasible in the United States, but some of its 
policies provide a guide for reform.  An assault weapons ban and the regulation of the secondary 
firearms market are the most important and feasible policies.  The Australian experience has also 
shown the importance and necessity of universal licensing and registration systems.  These 
systems would be the most difficult to achieve since the gun lobby has long resisted the 
government holding information about gun owners.  Although the present federal legislation is 
ineffective, it is further weakened by poor enforcement.  Increased ATF funding and staffing are 
essential to improve the operation of present and future legislation.  To compose effective federal 
gun control legislation in the future, government must fund and perform gun violence research.   
 The prospect of federal gun control reform in the United States is both optimistic and 
uncertain.  Before the Port Arthur massacre in Australia, the likelihood of achieving a national 
agreement was doubtful.  The resolve shown by President Obama after the December 2012 mass 
shooting is admirable.  The establishment of a gun control policy task force and the demand for a 
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gun proposal was a huge step forward for American gun control reform.  While many of the 
proposal’s policy recommendations are very moderate and the public significantly supports some 
of the most important measures, such as universal background checks, strong opposition still 
exists.  To overcome this opposition, framing the recommendations as common sense measures 
that do not impinge on Second Amendment rights will be crucial.  Not only will political leaders, 
such as President Obama, need to promote gun control reform, but grassroots advocacy by the 
gun control lobby will be key.  Mayor Bloomberg’s leadership and recent financial support of 
Mayors Against Illegal Guns provides some hope that its efforts will be an effective political 
influence in the future.  
 The achievement of comprehensive federal gun control legislation is not feasible in the 
United States of the present or near future.  The lessons from the Australian gun control reform 
experience, American gun control history, and the present American political climate indicate 
that modest reform is the most likely to be successful.  Modest reforms must be achieved first as 
a stepping stone, before more comprehensive measures can be achieved.  Gun control reform, at 
all levels of government, must be advanced without delay because it is critical to save the 
thousands of American lives lost each year due to firearms.  Prime Minister Howard prioritized 
gun control reform until it was achieved due to the urgency and severity of the issue.  He framed 
gun control reform in terms of public safety because gun violence can touch the lives of all 
citizens.  The United States must do the same.  Early American gun control history and the 
meaning of the Second Amendment clearly show that public safety was not supposed to be 
sacrificed for the right to gun ownership.  Only time will tell if American federal gun control can 
realize this balance once again.  When both the American public and political leaders demand to 
live in a safer society, comprehensive federal gun control legislation will be achieved.   
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